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In an open letter to his audience, the Dutch writer A,F.Th. van der Heijden describes
the creation of his cycle of novels 'De Tande/oze Ti/<f (The Toothless Time). He sets
out how an initially vague idea for one novel was transformed in his mind, and
through various stages of manuscripts, into what is now a series of three bestsellers.
Along the way, the initial central theme was sidetracked and developed into a
completely new narrative line. Three more volumes of the series are still in the
twilight zone between thoughts and the publisher.
In this sense, the creation of literature resembles the writing of a PhD thesis, at least
in these two specific cases. Four years ago, a proposal for a PhD project on growth
and technology was submitted by Luc Soete and myself. After its approval, I started
a literature survey on productivity growth and the neoclassical production function.
Gradually, the idea that research in this field had reached the stage of decreasing
marginal returns settled in my mind, and I started searching for an alternative
approach.
Such an alternative seemed to be available in the form of evolutionary economics,
which was 'practised' by a number of influential colleagues at MERIT. By the time
I had decided that my PhD project would develop into the direction of evolutionary
economic theory, the profession was shocked bjv whaf latar K»«HM .W^-MIT **• a\c
new growth theory'. So much for decreasing returns: Here was a wholly new field
which would become a source for a voluminous literature full of interesting findings
and new conclusions.
Still, I decided to stick to the evolutionary approach, while taking close notice of what
was happening in the newly developed growth field. This choice became the source
of many lively debates with colleagues, on almost 'literary' topics as the notion of
rationality, dynamics, and out-of-equilibrium behaviour. Finally, this resulted in the
'hybrid' thesis presented here.
Like in all PhD projects, I am indebted to a number of people who influenced my
thoughts on the topics of growth, trade and technology. And although they are not
responsible for any of the views expressed here, nor any remaining errors, this thesis
would not have been the same without their influence. Here is the list of names.
My supervisor Luc Soete provided me with the necessary direction when I was
searching for new directions, and was always ready to make his original comments
on drafts and redrafts. Gerard Pfann continued to be an inspirator for the
econometric parts of the analysis. Gerald Silverberg provided me with the necessary
approach to leap from ideas to the model in Part Two. Paul Diederen and Adriaan
van Zon were a big inspiration in times when things would not immediately work
the way I expected them, and the latter also made available the necessary software
to carry out the simulations in Part Three. The software used to present the
simulation results on the floppy disk was created by Huub Meijers.
Discussions with Rohini Acharya, Theon van Dijk, Hugo Hollanders and Thomas
Ziesemer in MERIT'S TM group helped me to review the new growth literature in a
Vi . • .-• •••" .•./•;••• -••.•• :';.. • . .: ••-•.•:. .'relatively fast and efficient way. The members of the 'Productivity Group', Paul
Diederen, Fabienne Fecher, Rene Kemp, Huub Meijers, Rombout de Wit and Adriaan
van Zon, were a very useful platform to get comments on drafts of parts of the thesis.
Chris Freeman also gave me useful comments on parts of the thesis.
The research environment at MERIT provided me with facilities for the necessary
hard- and software, and to discuss ideas with a broad range of foreign colleagues at
various conferences, summer schools and workshops. Among the many people from
whom I have learned, Jerry Courvisanos, Giovanni Dosi, Anders Skonhoft and Jan
Fagerberg deserve special mentioning. The latter, together with Keith Smith, invited
me for a stay in Oslo (to visit both NUPI and Norsk Regnesentral), thus providing
me with an excellent opportunity to present almost my full range of ideas to a critical
audience.
Within MERIT, Marjolein Caniels and Ton van Moergastel helped me to handle the
large amounts of data used in the analysis. Corien Gijsbers corrected the English,
which she did with a very skilful eye for detail. Finally, Wilma Coenegrachts, Mieke
Donders and JoAnn van Rooijen took care of many day-to-day details in a way that
gives the MERIT environment its specific inspiring flavour.
I thank all these people and hope to be able to return their favours some day.
Maastricht, July 1992
viiPART ONE
Theory and Empirics o/ International
Growtfo Rate Differentials and
GapsCHAPTER 1, Tecfcwo/ogy, GrotvfJi
e: A Htstoncal Perspective
U. Tfce Sear** ^9r Welfare «««* fltg Role o
The story of man's search for more material, and from there also Immaterial,
wealth, is one of constant improvements in technological methods of using earth's
resources. The long way that brought Homo Sapiens from its origin to the modern
times certainly must appeal to everyone's imagination. The knowledge embodied
in the principles that are taught in primary and secondary schools (let alon©
universities) has taken thousands of years to develop. The tremendous potenr «f of
this development of knowledge that has revealed itself has been the inspiration for
many authors of (both optimistic and pessimistic) future world views (as for
example in the so-called scrence /icfion literature). However, the process of
technological development has hardly been one that can be represented by a
simple, linear development towards more welfare for all members of the human
species. . , _ •..,.,. . > .. ..........
A number of historical and contemporary examples can be given to illustrate the
importance of scientific and technological development. Some of the inventions
that were made during the early ages of human civilization still play a role in
economic life, like the alphabet (invented around 3200 B.C., generally attributed
to the Sumerians, living in Babylonia, part of the current state of Iraq). Others,
such as the sail (already used on seaworthy boats by the Egyptians around 2000
B.C.) have lost their central (economic) importance, but are still used in some parts
of the world. Still others, like stone tools (believed to have been used from around
60000 B.C. until iron tools were introduced in some parts of the world around 2700
B.C.), have vanished almost completely from the technological scene. Each of these
inventions represented an important potential for more welfare, and, mostly only
after important gestation lags, changed life in a drastic way.
Perhaps the most impressive Jump towards our modern age of technology was the
industrial revolution that began to take shape in the middle of the 18th century in
Britain. The introduction of steam as a powersource and large-scale (compared to
the methods used at that time) mechanical devices for weaving and spinning
paved the way for industrial development. Today, the potential of information
technology and space travelling seems to open up possibilities for the spread of
mankind outside of the planet Earth.
Obviously, the blessing of technology and science is, in several ways, a mixed one.
First, the direct and indirect effects of technological innovation are not purely
beneficiaL Contemporary leading centres of technological and economic activitiesare clear examples of what technology can do to the quality of life: It enables
modern man to manipulate his environment by moving his fingertips, but it also
brings with it the need to wear little air filters when going outside. The insight that
we will not be able continue using technology as we have done throughout the
past few hundred years without ruining the environment is gaining support
rapidly.
No matter how important this question is, it is not the main interest of this thesis.
The main interest is a second aspect of mixed blessings of technology: ite ^erenria/
Jm^icf o« separate n«fib«s ««rf ca/fKres. Again, numerous historical examples may
be referred to to illustrate this. One example which shows how local institutional
factors have influenced the development of technological innovation is the status
of technological change in ancient Babylonian society (Viljoen 1974: 47). The
Babylonians believed that production techniques were given by the gods, implying
that there is only one ('holy approved') way of doing things. Besides taking male
and female animals, the Babylonian Noah (Ut-Napischti) also took craftsmen (and
presumably women!) aboard of his ark, so that the art of handwork created by the
god Ea was preserved for the human race. Surely this view was not very
encouraging for the development of new technological methods.
Another example are the numerous inventions made by the Chinese during the
period that is known in the Western world as the Middle Ages (Viljoen 1974: 64-6).
Among the Chinese achievements are the art of printing (the Confucian Classics
were published in printed form in China in the year 953), the invention of the
magnet, the invention of gunpowder (which they are believed only to have used
for fireworks), the mechanical clock, bow bridges and many others. The first three
of these drastically changed the history of the world. Printing was an important
step forward in the diffusion of written documents. Gunpowder teared down the
best-practice technology in the 'art of war', and thereby caused power relations to
change radically. The magnet, used in the compass, enabled sailors to navigate in
a much more precise way than they had before.
The peculiarity of all these inventions, however, is that while they were mnenteri
by the Chinese, they were MsaJ by the Europeans, for whom they became
important tools to make their continent the 'centre of the world'. The impact of
these inventions in the Chinese society itself was minor during the first few
hundred of years after their introduction. Apparently, there were forces in China
which prevented the diffusion of the inventions through the economic system.
Viljoen (1974: 64-5) identifies the differences between the organization of the
economy in China and Europe (which was much closer to what is now called a
market economy) as the explanation for this lack of diffusion.
A more recent example of the lack of integration between scientific (i.e., scholarly)
and technological (i.e., economic) development in the former communist countries
is often explained by the same factor: The absence of market forces driving the
economy towards more efficient use of its resources. The investment in science in
these countries has been relatively high. Nevertheless, their economies have not
been able to perform on such a high technological level. The same argument
applies to a number of developing countries. In spite of the purchase of high-techproducts (often weapons and related products), they have not been able to develop
ways of providing the basic health and food necessities for their population.
These examples put forward the role of technology as a means of international
competition between nations. During the centuries that passed between the periods
in which they are situated (the Middle Ages and the present), technology has
played an important role in this respect The most direct and radical way of
international competition is without doubt war. It is somewhat depressing to recall
that the geographic scene where the USA and its allies recently showed their great
military technological potential by destroying the Iraqi military force by means of
computer-guided missiles, communication techniques and the like, witnessed the
introduction on the battlegrounds of (then) modern innovations such as the horse-
pulled chariot and weapons made of iron already during the first millennium B.C.
(Roberts 1987). ' ' *
But technological power is also an important aspect of competitiveness in a less
direct and repelling battleground: the world goods market. The changes of
economic leadership, as described in Maddison (1991), from the Dutch (18th
century) to the British (the dawn of the industrial age), to the Americans (the late
19th and early 20th century), and perhaps to the Japanese (recently), are without
doubt all connected to changes in technological leadership.
This process of cfffdimg wp and owrfaJcmg, which is much closer to the Imagination
of modern economists than the historical examples used so far, also shows the
importance of institutional, political and geographical factors in explaining
international growth rate differentials. Maddison (1991: 33-4) describes the factors
that explain the emergence and erosion of leadership in the three cases mentioned
above. In the Dutch case, the three main factors explaining success around 1700
were institutions (landownership, the role of the church and the spread of political
power, which was mainly controlled by the middle classes), geography (the
availability of sea ports and rivers which gave access to the European main land),
and the active pursuit of mercantilist policies.
The loss of the Netherlands' central role in world trade after conflicts with France
and the UK gave way to British leadership around 1820. Maddison (1991: 36)
mentions the same three reasons for UK leadership as in the Dutch case:
favourable institutions, geographical advantages, and world trade leadership.
During this epoch, the world saw the birth of the industrial revolution, which
originated in the British textiles industries, but had its major impact through
innovations like steam power, steel, and the railway.
While the industrial revolution changed the way in which products were produced
drastically (process mmrtwtton), it was only after the leadership take-over by the
Americans (late 19th century) that new products became more important
(Maddison 1991: 42). Its high investment ratios (Maddison 1991: 40) had led the
USA to the leading role which has only recently been challenged by the
'newcomer' Japan, and some of the more traditional European economics
(Germany). The introduction of new products together with strong cost-reducing
process innovations (economies of scale) introduced 'mass-consumption' as adriving force of the economy. A prime example of this tendency can be found in
the automobile industry, where the term Fordism was used to describe the broad
context of ('Taylor-based') process innovation and consumer-oriented production'.
So far, the terms fec/moZogy and science have mainly been used as referring to one
and the same phenomenon. However, there are important differences between
technology and science. Science stems from the general human urge to understand
the world around us. Its driving force is curiosity. Tec/woZogy on the other hand
emanates from the urge to use events observed around us (nowadays mostly by
use of so-called scientific methods) for the benefit of ourselves. Thus, science
mainly has an expZaHafory character, while technology has an appZicatory character.
The interaction between science and technology as we know it now, has only
gradually emerged in the process of economic development briefly described
above. In ancient times, technological inventions were mostly rooted in empirical
observations rather than systematic scientific progress, although there are also
exceptions to this rule (e.g., gunpowder was invented by Chinese alchemists
systematically in search for a way of reaching a longer life or even immortality,
Viljoen 1974: 64 cites Needham on this matter). It were the Greek philosophers
(especially Plato) that began to develop scientific methods to investigate the world
around us. Before them (and also long after them), technological development was
dependent upon the activities of practitioners (Viljoen 1974, Chapters 1-3).
To highlight the (recent) change in the relationship between technology and
science, the following quotation from an article introducing a special issue of
Science /imerican on the greatest discoveries in the 20th century (Piel 1991: 4) is
illustrative:
"The 20th century is the first in which inquiry into nature has become the source of
technologies that amplify the power of the human mind and may even render human
intelligence redundant. (...) The 20th century has experienced a sea change in the
relationship between science and technology. In the 18th century the members of
Birmingham's Lunar Society learned more about physics from their mill machinery
than physics contributed to productivity. The study of illness has traditionally
illuminated biological processes; now medicine takes lessons from molecular biology.
Finally, science has become a global profession with its own rules and culture. It is a
profession institutionalized in university, government and industrial research
laboratories. Political leaders and entrepreneurs have begun to listen to what science
has to say."
Certainly, modern examples show the need to study the mfermiribnflZ dimension
and spreading of (the interaction between) science, technology and growth. Why
are some countries able to assimilate the potential of scientific and technological
development so much better than others? An economist who asks in what way
economic growth and technology interact, cannot pass by this international aspect.
He must study local circumstances that influence this relation, and try to explain
how the interaction between different national economies influences this process.
' See Boyer (1989) for a general treatment of Fordism and simitar 'modes of production'.However, modern economics has not paid much attention to these issues. Two
factors that emerge from the above examples as being particularly important for
economic development, technological change and institutions, have by and large
been treated as exogenous phenomena in modern economic science. Therefore, one
might expect that the explanatory power of economic theory in this field is not
very high.
1,2.4tm 0/ rite Thesis
The aim of what follows below is to explain some of the aspects of the relationship
between technological change and economic growth in an international context.
Despite the size of the work, the focus of the analysis is quite narrow, and will
only address a limited part of the issues touched upon in the broad overview in
the previous section. There are four issues that are at the core of the analysis;
technological change, economic theory and empirical analysis, and Ihi
International setting.
- • f
With regard to technological change, it is necessary to make it clear at the outset
that its role will only be taken into account in a very stylized way, The perspective
of this thesis is primarily an economic one, and the way technological change wUl
be analyzed is by giving it an explicit role in stylized mathematical models of the
international economy, This way of treating such a complex phenomenon as
technological change can never do Justice to all the important issues that are
connected to its use and limitations. However, as will be argued in more detail
below, economic models have only given little attention to technological change,
Therefore, by thinking about it more deeply, and by consulting experts from
outside the economics field, the economic modeller can strongly improve upon the
previous work in the field. Thus, although the result of these modelling exercises
will remain of limited value, useful work still remains to be done. Recent
overviews of the state of the art in this field can be found in Dosi ?f a/. (1988) and
Gomulka (1990).
This brings up the second and third items in the list of central issues in this thesis:
economic and empirical analysis. Although economic analysis is much richer than
mathematical modelling alone (note particularly the contemporary and historical
exercises outside the field of neoclassical theory*), the present focus will mainly
be formal. However, where necessary, ideas will be taken from the more detailed
descriptive branches in economics. This approach brings with it the possibility of
disappointment, when the rich ideas found in the descriptive, historical approach
are translated into mathematical equations and empirical indicators. For some of
the models presented below, the representation of technological change and its
consequences will certainly fall under this heading. Nevertheless, the formal
approach is worth developing, and future research should be aimed at enlarging
the scope of the present models and methods.
Ever since the birth of economics as a science, there have been intense polemics
* Especially relevant contributions to the current topic are among others Gerschenkron (1962),
Rostow (1960, 1980) and Maddison 0982, 1991).between different practitioners (note for example the interesting references to
Smith in the original works by Marx). Partly, these debates concentrated on issues
that were at some stage resolved (or seemed to be resolved). However, a large
number of the issues in the debates have not been resolved, and live on in
numerous recent publications. Many of these debates are in some way related to
almost po/iHcaf issues like the value of the free market, and individual liberty.
The present work adds in some way to these polemics. After a detailed survey of
the approaches found in growth theory, an explicit choice for one approach to
modelling is taken. This approach, the evolutionary way of looking at economics,
is relatively new, and needs to be developed more thoroughly before it can compete
with other, more established schools of thought. This choice is partly made on the
basis of issues that have been resolved (such as the character of technological
change, see Chapter 4), and partly motivated by arguments that cannot be tested
in practice (such as the role of market equilibrium). Therefore, this choice should
mainly be seen as a useful way of exploring some of the consequences of
evolutionary thinking in economics, rather than looking at it as a hostile action
against mainstream economics.
The last central issue to be explained is the international context of the analysis.
In economics, switching from closed economy analysis to open economy analysis
means introducing iMfrnfepeudenefes into the models. There is no reason to include
foreign economies in a model, unless there is some influence from this foreign
economy on the domestic economy. Often, textbook models concentrate on this
one-way influence only. However, in a more integrated setting, the effect of each
economy on each other economy in the world should be modelled. This justifies
a multi-directional approach to modelling the international economy.
In the present context, there are two sorts of interdependencies that are relevant:
technological and economic interdependencies. In a technological sense, economies
depend on each other because innovations diffuse across national borders.
Inventions made in one country can be applied in another. This phenomenon is
very common in today's world due to the presence of multi-national corporations.
However, the role of these firms will not be explicitly addressed here. Instead, the
unit of analysis will mainly be the country (or sector in a country), and overlaps
between countries in the form of multi-national firms will be ignored. Moreover,
while looking at the consequences of technological interdependencies, (al)most
(exclusive) attention will be paid to countries at the 'receiving end' of the diffusion
Technological interdependencies have not been at the core of economic analysis.
Much more attention has been given to economic interdependencies. The
explanation of international trade was already one of the subjects in classical
economics (Ricardo'). Also in modern economics, international trade remains at
the core of the analysis, and technological change is identified as one of the main
explaining factors (for example Hughes 1986, Dosi ef a/. 1990). In macroeconomic
modelling, the influence of international trade through the trade balance has been
* And before him, the mercantilist writers, see for example Schumpeter (1954, chapter 7).neatly incorporated irt the mainsfream models (the so-called neo-Keynesian
synthesis)*.
However, the issue of the relationship between trade and growth, which is at the
core of the present analysis, has never been addressed in much detail. Only
recently, mainstream growth models have begun to look at the consequences of
trade. Following some early contributions in the neo-Keynesian tradition (see
Chapter 2), recent models look at the influence of endogenous international trade
(in its turn influenced by endogenous technological change) on international
growth patterns. Some of these models will be reviewed in Chapter 2, others will
briefly be commented upon in Chapter 7.
1.3. Organization o/ rite Rest o/ ffce Test's
The rest of the analysis is organized as follows. Part One serves to give the reader
an overview of previous work in the field of (international) growth and
technology. It starts off with Chapter 2, which reviews the ffewefiatl roots of
growth models in economics. Some stylized versions of models in the literature
(starting in the 1940s and 1950s, and ending in the 1990s) will be given and
compared with one another. A discussion on the usefulness of the way in which
technology is represented, and the usefulness of the models in explaining
international growth rate differentials is undertaken in the two concluding sections
of the chapter.
After having set out the teic theoretical lines available from previous work in
Chapter 2, the Chapter 3 provides the link from previous work to what can be
viewed as the original theoretical contribution of this thesis. It discusses some of
the detailed historical work on the nature of the innovation process and its relation
to economic growth, and confronts ideas in this part of the literature with the
representation of technological change in the models in Chapter 2. The second part
of the chapter makes some methodological propositions about the nature of the
economic theory that can deal with these issues, based on the historical
interpretation of the innovation process. This section is more oriented towards the
micro side of the economic process, and criticizes the concepts of rational
behaviour, the representative agent and market equilibrium. The resulting
propositions will be shown to be useful in the context of an analogy between the
biological idea of evolutionary selection and economic modelling.
Chapter 4, the last one in the 'review of the literature' part, gives an empirical
overview of the facts of postwar growth and technology. Subsections, in turn,
consider the observed trends in economic growth, technological change, and some
of the relations between them. The analysis will concentrate both on aggregate and
on sectoral trends. The concluding section of this chapter lists some sfy/izerf /acte.
Parts Two and Three contain the 'original' contribution of this thesis. Based on the
theoretical considerations in Chapter 3, they provide some interpretations of the
* A standard textbook on international macroeconomics is for example Ri vera-Batiz and Bivera-
Batiz <1985).stylized facts observed in Chapter 4. In Part Two, the issue of technological
interdependences and their influence on growth rate differentials will be treated
in more detail. This part will try to model the issue of technology diffusion
between countries, as dealt with in the so-called catching-up debate (see also
Chapters 2 and 4). A simple model of technology spillovers will be set up in
Chapter 5. The model does not consider technology spillovers as an automatic
process, but stresses the way in which these spillovers are assimilated in the
receiving country. It also includes some elements of economic linkages between
countries, but these are not the core of the analysis. (It is shown that the basic
conclusions of the model also hold under the assumption that these economic
linkages are absent).
An empirical test of (a simple version of) the model is undertaken in Chapter 6.
The analysis in this chapter tests whether the model proposed in Chapter 5 does
a better job in explaining the pattern of aggregate international (114 countries)
growth observed in Chapter 4 than some other models found in the literature. This
is done by setting up these other models as special cases of the model in Chapter
5, and by using the technique of non-nested hypothesis testing. v
In Part Three, the full set of interdependences between trade, growth and
technological change will be analyzed. In Chapter 7, a multi-sectoral model of
international growth is specified, which looks at the interaction between
(cumulative) technological change, wage rate dynamics, specialization patterns,
and growth. Technological change, wages, specialization and growth are all
modelled in a dynamic, endogenous, but also stylized, way. The driving force of
growth in this model is an evolutionary selection equation, which brings a
tendency to selection of the most competitive producers. Since other parts of the
model are taken from neo-Keynesian theories, it can be characterized as an
evolutionary model with neo-Keynesian features. The equations of the model are
presented, and analyzed, to the extent possible, by means of analytical methods.
In view of the complex (nonlinear) character of the model, however, the most
important way of analyzing it will be by means of a simulation approach.
The two remaining chapters in Part Three are aimed at providing some
preliminary tests of parts of the model in Chapter 7. Because of the stylized nature
of the model, it is not possible to apply it directly to actual data. Therefore, its
main propositions will be tested in an indirect way.
In Chapter 8, an empirical test of the trade 'block' of the model is undertaken for
35 countries, including OBCD countries and NICs. A slightly modified version of
the main trade equation in the model of the preceding chapter will be estimated
on the sectoral level using regression techniques. The chapter also includes a
section where results of earlier work by Dosi ef <iJ, (1990) are re-established, as well
as a section on the usefulness of patents as indicators of innovation.
The results of Chapter 8 are used in Chapter 9, where a more general test of the
model proposed in Chapter 7 is undertaken. This chapter is aimed at testing the
relationship between competitiveness, structural differences between countries, and
growth rate differentials. The chapter includes a general approach with data on
10aggregate and manufacturing growth rate differentials for all the countries used
in Chapter 8, and a more detailed approach similar to a case study which looks
at the Asian NICs (being recent successful examples of catchmg-up countries), the
USA and Japan only. In the general approach, the main equation of the model to
Chapter 7 is used to derive a general hypothesis about growth rate differentials.
Using the parameter estimates obtained in Chapter 8, this hypothesis is tested in
several ways. The case study approach of the NICs is used to illustrate the
importance of several factors that are difficult to capture in a general regression
framework.
The main results are summarized, and conclusions are drawn, in Part Four, which
consists only of Chapter 10. This chapter will outline the main lines along which




11CHAP7*ER 2. I7ie Literatwre on Economic
and Tedmo/ogtca/
2.1. A Brte/ Ot>m>fau>
What have economists said about the relation between technological change and
economic growth? Figure II.l gives a schematic overview of the interlinkages






prs-modem 1960 1970 1980 1990
Figure II.l. An interpretation of the structure of the literature on technological change and
economic growth
The notion of economic growth explained by endogenous technological progress
was already present in the work of the classic school (see Gourvitch 1940 for a
detailed overview). In Adam Smith's pin factory, technological change took the
form of further and further division of labour, enabling an increase in productivity
in the system as a whole. Ricardo was more pessimistic when he first wrote the
12chapter on machinery in his Pnncip/es 0/ Po/iffcai Economy and Tavafion. Dealing
with the employment consequences of technological change, he assessed the
innovations of his time as employment-reducing, thus confirming the concern in
the labour class of that time. In Marx' work, technological change was seen as the
principal means of capitalists in their search for more surplus value. In his view,
technological change, through the 'organic composition of capital', was the driving
force behind the 'tendential fall' of the profit rate, and eventually, the decline of
the capitalist era.
Via Marx, endogenous technological change became prominent in the work of
Schumpeter (for example, Schumpeter 1934). In his long wave theory, Schumpeter
describes the disrupting effect of major technological breakthroughs on economic
growth paths. In his view, major innovations are introduced in a process of crewfiw?
desfruchon, drastically changing the structure of the capital stock in the economy.
The major innovations, which are introduced in the depression phase of the long
wave, are followed by a tenduw^on of incremental innovations during the early
upswing.
In the first growth models, developed during the 1940s and 1950s, technological
change was reduced to an exogenous phenomenon, basically for analytical
convenience. These early growth models did not specifically deal with the
relationship between technological change and economic growth, but focused
primarily on issues like the influence of factor substitutability and the savings rate
on the stability of macroeconomic growth paths. Kaldor's growth model is an
exception to the 'rule' of exogenous technological change.
Intuitive support for the assumption of exogenous technological change in these
models might be found in the public good characteristics of innovation. The user
of technological change does not have to develop the innovation himself, but can
(partly) rely upon other agents to develop the knowledge and then simply copy
(or buy) it. This notion was formalized in the (neoclassical) literature by Arrow
(1962). However, the question remains why innovations would be 'produced' at
all if public good characteristics are used as an explanation for the assumption of
exogenous technological change'. If technological change is a purely public good,
there will be no incentive whatsoever to produce and sell it in the market.
Possible answers to this are the following. First, Schumpeter argued that monopoly
power is the principal means of appropriating an innovation. Second, a patent
system might create legal protection from imitation. Third, a time-lead might give
the innovator enough opportunities to earn back the innovation costs. All these
possibilities have been developed in an analytical way in the literature on
industrial organisation (for an overview see among others Kamien and Schwartz
1982, Scherer and Ross 1990).
Other neoclassical models of endogenous innovation have also been formulated.
' Moreover, as has been recognized by among others Dosi (1988a, 198#b) and Cohen and
Levinthal (1989), imitation of technological knowledge developed elsewhere might be a costly
activity.
13Most of these models were, similar to the literature on industrial organisation,
mainly dealing with the character and pace of innovation itself, rather than
economic growth. In contributions by among others Kennedy and Binswanger (for
a survey and exact references see Thirtle and Ruttan 1987), the factor price ratio
was identified as being one of the main (endogenous) determinants of the
character of innovation in models on endogenous biases of innovation. In another
approach (initiated by the seminal work of Schmookler 1966), effective demand
was considered a main vehicle for the pace of innovation. However, the literature
on endogenous technological change in growf/i mode/s 'died ouf after a few early
contributions by Uzawa (1965), Phelps (1966) and Shell (1967). These papers
specified models in which human capital formation is a main determinant of
technological change.
It was only recently that the interest in endpgenous technological change as a
motor for economic growth revived again. First, the idea of endogenous innovation
in a theory of economic growth was a major source of inspiration for the
raj/Mf/onary or neo-Sc/mmpefman literature, which was initiated in the 1980s by
authors like Nelson and Winter (1982) and Dosi ef a/. (1988). The ideas underlying
these theories will be introduced in Chapter 3, and further developed in the rest
of the thesis. Out-of-equilibrium dynamics and bounded rational behaviour are key
concepts in this literature, which distinguishes it from the 'new" neoclassical
growth models, the second group of theories dealing with endogenous
technological change. These models try to Jink some of the insights gained from
industrial organisation to the issue of economic growth, and will be discussed in
depth in section 2.3 below.
2.2, Tfce TradifioMaf Literature o« Economic Growfft .?
This section will briefly summarize the main streams of thought on economic
growth found in the postwar literature. As the discussion in sections 2.4 and 2.5
will show, these models are not the most interesting ones from the perspective of
technological change and growth rate differentials. The reason why they are
discussed, however, is that they provide the basic tools in the modern economist's
toolkit. Virtually all formal approaches to growth are rooted in one of the basic
models discussed here*, and as such this chapter is meant to give the reader a
short overview of the basic facilities in the profession.
The models found can be distinguished according to their basic underlying ideas.
This typically leads to a division into neoclassical models, neo-Keynesian models
and post-Keynesian models. The neoclassical model assumes market equilibrium
and optimizing behaviour, leading to a stable growth path. The post-Keynesian
approach, on the other hand, does not use optimizing behaviour, and typically
finds unstable growth paths. Neo-Keynesian models are somewhat in between,
leading to growth paths which are sometimes stable and sometimes are not.
' The evolutionary approach, which is developed further in Chapters 3 et«?., might be called
the exception.
14a. Sofou/s Neodassiftff Grcnt-'fJi
The basic neoclassical growth model was developed by Solow (1956, 1970), and
included the following basic equations:
£,-e"L, (IIJI)
J,-S, (M.6) J,S,
Dots above variables denote time derivatives. Hats denote proportionate growth
rates. Q stands for production, L is (raw) labour input, K is capita! input, a is the
exogenous rate of technical progress, E is labour input expressed in efficiency
units, A is a constant, / is investment (depreciation is assumed to be absent), S
represents savings, fc is the capital / labour (in efficiency units) ratio, » is the rate
of growth of the labour force (population), s is the exogenous savings rate, P is a
parameter, and f refers to time (a subscript 0 indicates a starting value). Equation
(II. 1) is the production function, specified as a Cobb Douglas form with labour-
augmenting technological progress and constant returns to scale (CRS). Equations
(II.2) - (11.4) are definitions and (11.5) - (II.7) define capital accumulation. In order
to find the market equilibrium growth path, one proceeds as follows. First, one can
solve for the growth rate of £ and K.
01.9)
f f
Then, the motion of it can be written as follows,
The differential equation (11.10) is depicted in Figure H.2. It can be easily seen that
fc tends to its (stable) equilibrium value /fc' for all initial values. The exact value of
this equilibrium value is:
01.11)
Writing the production function in its capital-intensive form, and substituting i*,
one finds that the growth rate of output and the growth rate of the capital stock
are equal along the path where Jt takes on its equilibrium value. From (11.8) and
• ..•• :/•• ..= •••' .•';..• •-,- •':'....- •/.•••-^ '. •;• •• '.••.•. ^ -.•.-•• • "• • ^ Jf(11.11) it then follows that the following must hold:
(11.12)
-f a
Figure H.2. The Dynamics of the capital labour ratio in the Solow model
Thus, the outcome of the model is that output and the capital stock grow along a
ta/nncerf £rcratf/i p«r/i at a rate equal to the sum of population growth and the rate
of labour-augmenting technological progress. The economic mechanism behind this
balanced growth path is the following. Whenever one of the input factors (labour
or capital) grows at a faster rate, the supply of the other factor will be relatively
tight. This will induce price movements and thus substitution (note the importance
of a functional specification of the production function / that allows for
substitution) between factors, and change the (optimal) capital labour ratio (it).
Whenever this ratio takes on its equilibrium value again (Jk*), the economy will be
back at a (new) balanced growth path. From this intuition, and from equation
(11.11) above, one can deduce that the equilibrium value of Jt is a positive function
of the savings rate (s), and a negative function of the rate of growth of the
population (t>) and the rate of technological progress a.
Following his early contribution to growth theory, Solow (1957) derived a simple
and elegant formula to assess the influence of several supply side factors upon the
economic growth performance of a country in a quantitative way, thus setting the
first steps along a path that later became known as growrffe accounfing (see also
16section 2.5). This method assumes that the production function has the following
general form, which allows for substitution between capital and labour.
Q.-A, / (K^ (11.13)
Here, <4 is an index representing neufra/ technological change. Logarithmically
differentiating this equation with respect to time and assuming that factors are
paid their marginal product, one obtains the following expression.
,£ (11.14)
In this equation, a^ and o, are the shares of capital and labour (respectively) in
income'. This equation allows for a division of the growth rate of output into the
contributions of the growth rates of labour and capital, and a residual factor (the
growth rate of A, or total factor productivity), which is usually regarded as a
measure of technological change.
b. The Posf-JCeyMesiaM Hurrod-Domar Morfef of EcoMomk Grotufh
The post-Keynesian ideas on economic growth can be clarified using the Harrod-
Domar model. This model largely uses the same variables as the Solow model




The capital and labour coefficients are denoted by a and n, respectively. Looking
at the equations of this model, one finds that there is only one difference with the
neoclassical growth model: the form of the production function. While in Solow's
model substitution between factors is possible, the Harrod-Domar model assumes
that the elasticity of substitution is zero. This means that the production function
(11.15) is of the Leontief type. In this case, a distinction must be made between the
available quantity of a factor (denoted by a superscript m) and the quantity
actually used (without superscripts). Thus, K is defined as the capital utilization
ratio.
' In the Cobb Douglas production function with CRS, O, and Oj are equal to p awl 1-p,
respectively.
17Solving for the growth rates of the available capital stock (IT) and labour in
efficiency unite, it is found that the following holds.
#;=_U.5lA=f* (IL22)
£/"=cc+p (11.23)
Now the question arises as to whether a growth path exists along which both
factors are used completely at all times, as in the Solow model. Obviously, looking
at the production function (11.15), such a path can only exist if 1) both factors are
used completely initially, and 2) subsequently have the same growth rate. The first
of these requires that none of the two factors is in abundance, or iT°/fl=E™/n,
leading to K7F"=*=«/H. Moreover, equations (11.22) and (11.23) immediately reveal
that the second will only hold by chance, since the growth rates of IT and E" are
completely determined outside the model (note that along the path searched here,
«*1).
Hence, the conclusion drawn from the Harrod-Domar model is that balanced
growth will only arise by chance. The rate s/a, at which capital expansion will
grow in a situation of full utilization of capital (w=l), is called the warranted rate
of ^rcwf/i. If the actual rate of growth is equal to this warranted rate (i.e., u=l),
there is some kind of balanced growth, in the sense that the capital stock will grow
as rapidly as the production. If a+u, which is called the nflfura/ rate of grcrotfi, is
equal to the warranted rate of growth, a situation of completely balanced growth,
as was found in Solow's model, will arise if the economy starts from a situation
of full utilization of both factors. Slight differences between the warranted and
natural rates will lead to unbalanced growth paths ('Jtm/e edge' property).
However, the natural and warranted rate need not be equal. Figure II.3 depicts
three possible different situations. In each of the figures, the growth path of the
economy is to be found on the line that crosses the horizontal axis at the point«/«
(see above). In II.3a, the natural and warranted rates are equal and the economy
grows at a balanced path. In II.3b, the warranted rate is smaller than the natural
rate, and will restrict the growth path, leading to unemployment. In II.3c, the
natural rate is smaller than the warranted rate, thus restricting the growth rate. In
this case, the utilization rate of capital will fall to some equilibrium value for
which the actual rate of growth (ws/a) is equal to the natural rate.
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Figure 11.3a. The dynamics of capital and labour inputs in the Harrod-Domar model,
balanced growth ^
»•«
Figure II.3b, The dynamics of capital and labour inputs in the Harrod-Domar model, growth
with unemployment
•arriflla
Figure II.3c The dynamics of capital and labour inpua in the Htrrod-Domar model, growth
with capital undtr utilizationc, Neo-JCej/nestan Morfe/s o/ Economic Grotefft :
In this section, a stylized model capturing some of the basic ideas of the neo-
Keynesian growth theory will be discussed. The model as such cannot be
attributed to any specific author, although most of it is taken from Kaldor (1957).
For reasons of simplicity, the growth rate of population will be set to zero, so that
technological progress is the only source for an increase of the labour input (in







Labour productivity is denoted by G. Equation (n.25) is the technical progress
function, which says that the growth rate of labour productivity is equal to an
exogenous part (a>0) and a part that depends on the growth rate of the capital
stock (l>p>0). This equation is taken from Kaldor (1957). It presents the
counterpart of the natural rate of growth in the Harrod-Domar model, since it
gives the maximum rate of output growth starting from a situation with full
utilization of resources.
Another essential part of the neo-Keynesian model, taken from Robinson and
Kaldor, is the savings function (11.26). This function assumes that the proportion
saved out of labour income (sj is smaller than the proportion saved out of profits
(%>sj. This means that the average savings rate depends upon the income
distribution, which is in turn determined by the real profit rate r\ as in equation
(11.29). ^
The warranted growth rate of output is in this case given by the growth rate of the
capital stock, which, assuming for simplicity that s^=0, can be expressed as follows:
£,=-1=8/,. (IUO)
The natural rate of growth can be expressed as follows:
G.-ot+Bw.. (11.31)
* The profit rate is defined as the ratio of total profits to the capital stock,
20Figure II.4. The dynamics of labour productivity and the capital stock in the neo-Keynesian
growth model .... , , .,, ^,
Both the warranted and the natural rate of growth are a function of the profit rate
(income distribution). Equations (11.30) and (11.31) are drawn in Figure II.4. Since
P<1 and a>0, there will always be an intersection point between the two curves.
A balanced growth path is found at this point of intersection, since the capital
stock and the amount of labour (in efficiency units) will grow at equal rates,
Although a formal argument will not be given here*, the general neo-Keynesian
idea is that for unequal rates of growth of labour and capital (i.e., for points to the
left or right of r' in Figure II.4), the profit rate will change. In a situation where the
capital stock grows faster than labour supply, a demand shortage on the consumer
good market will drive the profit rate down, In case the labour supply grows
faster than the capital stock, excess demand will drive the profit rate up. Thus, for
points to the left of r* in Figure II.4, the profit rate will increase, while for points
to the right of r* it will go down. Hence, r" is the stable equilibrium rate of profit
in this model. As in the neoclassical model, a stable (balanced) growth path (with
zero population growth) is found through equations (11.24), (11.30) and (11.31).
The interested reader to referred to, for example, KaWor 0957) and Qxxiwin (1967).
21(IL32)
This stability characteristic is described by Kaldor (1957: 285) as follows:
"(...) the system tends towards an equilibrium rate of growth at which the 'natural' and
the 'warranted' rates are equal, since any divergence between the two will set up forces
tending to eliminate the difference; and these forces act partly through an adjustment
of the 'natural' rate, and partly through an adjustment of the 'warranted' rate".
Later, Kaldor (1966,1970) added another element to his description of the process
of economic growth, generally known as Verdoom's law. According to this 'law%
there is a positive relation between economic growth and productivity, with
causality indeed going from the first to the latter. This positive relationship is
caused by static and dynamic economies of scale arising from the growth of
production. Static economies of scale in this sense correspond to the notion that
a larger production volume provides opportunities for a further division of labour
(similar to that proposed by Smith) and economies of scale at the individual firm
level. Dynamic economies of scale are associated with the effects of learning-by-
doing and incremental technical progress which occur as increasing experience is
gained from using a production process.
The application of Verdoom's law opens up possibilities for dynamic models of
economic growth, in which cumulative causation is an important element. This
potential can easily be recognized when considering the dual relationship between
economic growth and productivity growth. The traditional viewpoint is that there
is a strong causal relationship from productivity to economic growth. Verdoom's
law assumes that there is also an important relationship going the other way.
Thus, a combination of these two relationships opens up the possibility of self-
reinforcing growth, where an initial advantage can be of decisive importance for
growth rate differentials. This feature of the neo-Keynesian model will be
discussed in more detail in section 2,5, as well as in Parts Two and Three.
2223. Nm< Ateoefassfca? Grotpffe Morfffs; Endogenous f«Horafio»
As a reaction to the unrealistic assumption of exogenous technological change, and
long after endogenous technological change had been incorporated in
Schumpeter's theory and the evolutionary tradition, neoclassical scholars began to
introduce endogenous technological change in growth models. In order to
endogenize innovation, the 'new* neoclassical models have to deal with the public
good features of technological progress, and the problems this poses with regard
to appropriability of innovation. The way in which this is done will briefly be
discussed below.
a. Inneuflfion- ExfemaJifws s»<l Increasing Rpfwrnj*
New neoclassical growth models follow Arrow (1%2) in assuming that there are
important MfenwJifMs concerned with the development of technical knowledge. In
most cases, these externalities take the form of general technological knowledge
which can be used to develop new methods of production and which is available
to all firms. Art exception to this specification is Lucas (1988), where the
externalities take the form of J?MWIC learning, which increases the stock of human
capital.
The existence of externalities in the innovation process is closely connected to an
important novelty in new neoclassical growth models: the existence of increasing
returns to scale in the aggregate production function. In the old neoclassical model,
it is typically assumed that the production structure is characterized by constant
returns to scale. In mathematical terms, the production function is homogenous of
degree one. Multiplying factor inputs by some (positive) number will also multiply
output by that number. The presence of externalities, however, means that if one
firm doubles its inputs, the inputs of other firms will also increase. Hence, this
results in a more than proportionate increase in aggregate output.
Thus, in the case of constant returns to scale, a larger resource base can influence
the lew/ of output, but not the grorof/i rate. In case of endogenous technological
change, innovation itself is a factor of production. Since innovation can influence
the growth rate of production, as in the old model, the case of constant returns to
scale no longer applies. Instead, the production function is characterized by
increasing returns to scale.
An overview of the different models, as well as a more precise indication of the
mathematical implication of the ideas discussed, is given in Diagram H.I. Perhaps
the most dear and simple way of modelling the externalities involved in the
innovation process is found in early papers like Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988).
In this approach, technological change is treated as a separate factor in the
(aggregate) production function. Individual agents (firms, labourers) invest in (some
form) of technological change, and spillovers of this investment are added to the
inputs of all other firms. These models have no explicit rnicroeconomic foundation
for the production of knowledge (in a separate research sector) itself, and,
* TWs section, as weD as sections b up to d below, draw largely on Verspagen (1992a),
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entries in this column not separated by a ; should be interpreted as in one combined sector".therefore, do not explicitly address the question of market structure and a market
price for technological change. They only look at the consequences of investment in
knowledge.
The general form of these models assumes that technological change enters the
production function 0/ an irufrtrirfua? entrepreneur in two separate terms. The first
term describes the outputs of private investments in knowledge, which have the
normal characteristics (decreasing marginal returns). The second term describes the
existence of knowledge spillovers. This term is related to the other firms'
investment in knowledge. In mathematical terms, this can be stated as follows:
In this equation Q is output, L is some (conventional) production factor like labour,
T represents the stock of investment in technological change (human capital in
Lucas 1988) and 1 (l..m) is an index representing the j'th firm. The bar indicates a
general volume, available to all firms in the economy. In Romer (1986), it indicates
the sum of all individual Ts, while in Lucas (1988) it is the average level of human
capital.
An obvious drawback of this simple approach is the lack of a clear rnicroeconomic
foundation explaining the working of the externalities, and the decision to invest
in technological change. Later models following the early contributions of Romer
(1986) and Lucas (1988) have tried to fill this gap. Most notable contributions are
in Aghion and Howitt (1990), Romer (1990a) and Grossman and Helpman (1989,
1990, 1991a). Some of the implicit assumptions about (the output of) the research
sector made In the early approach are made explicit in this second approach. The
general approach chosen in this second type of models is to make a distinction
between a research sector and other sectors in the economy, Le., technological
change is explained from the perspective of market structure and price relations.
The research sector typically produces two types of goods: blueprints of new
(intermediate) goods and (general) technological knowledge. A (first) difference
between blueprints arid general knowledge is concerned with their application in
the production process. General technological knowledge cannot be applied
directly in the production of goods, but has a more general nature. It adds to the
productivity in the research sector, and is thus used in the production of
blueprints. General knowledge is produced as a by-product of the innovation
process* It can be used not only by die entrepreneur who developed it, but also by
other firms is Ite nseifclj sector (non-appropriability). This effect is completely
public, so that it embodies the externalities in the innovation process.
Blueprints are specific. They provide the guidelines to produce a given type of
intermediate good Cor consumer good). Firms operating in the research sector
devote their efforts to producing and selling these blueprints. The level of output
(in the form of blueprints) in the research sector depends on human capital input,
general knowledge input and a (fixed) productivity parameter. Blueprints yield a
positive price because they enable producers of consumer or intermediate goods
to produce at lower cost or higher quality.Two different approaches to modelling the advance in general knowledge are
found. In the first one, introduced in Aghion and Howitt (1990), technological
change increases the productivity in the production of intermediate goods. It is
assumed that the development of production costs of intermediate goods over time
takes the following form:
where c stands for production costs, y is a parameter indicating the size of the
innovation (technological opportunity), and i denotes a specific intermediate good.
A period f is specified as the time span during which one blueprint is used, so that
each time an innovation occurs, the production costs are reduced,
Grossman and Helpman (1991a) use the same type of relation, but specify product
innovation as steps up the quality ladder of a (fixed) range of consumer goods $.
Similar to equation (11.34), the highest quality version of each variant i of the
consumer good is specified as follows:
g(0«u>. (11.35)
In this equation, u is a parameter, and / is an index for the highest attained
position on the quality ladder.
Both these equations reflect the notion that each new innovation (blueprint) builds
upon the previous one, so that the productivity (quality) of the intermediate
(consumer) goods is always higher for the next innovation. This means that the
impact of an innovation is not only to raise productivity (quality) in the present
period, but also in the periods that follow. Since innovations in future periods may
(and will) be sold by different firms, the value of an innovation to society as a
whole goes beyond its value for the innovating firm in the present period. Thus,
there is a postfix* (intertemporal) externality in the innovation process.
However, there is also a negative externality involved in the production of
innovation. This effect, which is called creariw rfasfracfion after Schumpeter, or
alternatively, the business ste?/wg e//ecf, is due to the fact that a new innovator, by
bringing his innovation on the market, destroys the monopoly rents for the
previous innovator. This is implicit in equations (11.34) and (11.35), where each new
innovation makes the previous one obsolete. This negative externality is nof
present in the other models of endogenous technological change considered below.
This leads to a difference in the 'welfare properties' of these two types of models,
which will be discussed in more detail below.
The second approach to modelling the research sector is found in Romer (1990a)
and Grossman and Helpman (1989, 1990). In these models, the development of
genera/ knowledge is typically seen as a by-product of the research process. The
following general form of the production function for blueprints is used:
27^,n), (11.36)
4 is a productivity parameter, H is human capital input, n is the number of
blueprints, a subscript « points to the research sector. The presence of n itself in
the (aggregate) production function for « points to an important positive
externality engaged in the production of blueprints. Each new blueprint generates
genera! knowledge as a by-product, which is a stimulus for the development of
new blueprints by «IJ firms in the research sector. This amount of general
knowledge is measured by w itself, which explains the presence of n in the rhs of
CHJ6),
b, I»«o»flfio«,' jtppropriaWHfy ani Marfcet
If innovation was a jmre/y public good, obviously none of it would be produced
in a purely free market economy. Therefore, the new theory has to introduce some
effects of technological change that are appropriable. In order to do this, the
models build to a large extent on work in the field of imiusfrai/ organizaffon, thus
more or less incorporating this branch of literature in macroeconomic growth
models. Monopolistic tendencies in the research market, enabling the producer to
earn monopoly rents that cover its research costs, are an important issue in these
models.
An overview of the different models and the mathematical details can be found
in Diagram II. 1 above. The early models discussed above do not elaborate
explicitly upon modelling the microeconomics of innovation. All markets
(including the implicit technology market) are competitive in these models. In
Romer (1986) there is only an assumption about maximization of profits by means
of investment in knowledge, which has its effect through a very general
production function of technological knowledge. In the first version of the Lucas
model, human capital is accumulated through explicit production: A part of
(individual) working time is devoted to accumulation of skills. It is assumed that
the growth rate of human capital is a linear function of the time devoted to
accumulation;
#-8(1 -H), GI-37)
where H is the fraction of time devoted to productive (in a direct way) labour.
Lucas' (1988) second model assumes a different structure of technological change.
In this case all technological change (human capital accumulation) is related to
endogenous learning-by-doing. Instead of assuming that the rate of accumulation
of human capital is dependent on the time explicitly devoted to this accumulation,
it is assumed that the time devoted to (direct) production determines the rate of
growth.
The process of innovation and the role of appropriability is more complex in the
second (later) type of models. These models of endogenous technological change
tackle the problem of the public good characteristics of technological knowledge
28by assuming that part of the effects of the innovation can be appropriated (by
monopoly power) and that another part takes the form of external effects. Thus,
there wiE be an incentive to produce innovations (because of monopoly power),
but there will also be a spillover effect (eKtemality).
Once again, the distinction between blueprints and general knowledge is
important As already touched upon above, a second difference between blueprints
and technological knowledge is the degree of appropriability. Blueprints can be
appropriated completely (for example by means of a patent) by the producer, who
thus becomes a monopolist CoMgopolist if there are dose substitutes). On the other
hand, general technological knowledge, as explained above, cannot be
appropriated and flows over directly to the other producers of blueprints. Thus,
the problem of the lack of incentive to produce technological change in the
presence of public good features is solved by making the distinction between
general technological knowledge (non-appropriable) and specific technological
knowledge (appropriable).
A closer look at the different models reveals another distinction between two types
(this distinction corresponds to the one made above). A first approach to the
modelling of the innovation sector is found in Aghiort and Hewitt (19%) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991a). In Aghion and Howitt, technological change
enters the consumer goods sectors (indirectly) via the intermediate goods sector.
A fixed continuum of intermediate goods / e [0...1] exists, the production costs of
which are influenced by innovation via equation (11.34). In each period, (only) one
pafente* blueprint is sold by the patent holder (monopolist) to the (fixed) range of
sectors ([0..1]) which produce intermediate goods. Each innovation (blueprint)
affects all intermediate sectors in the sense that it IOHWS cosfs of the intermediate
good to the same extent. The value of a patent is thus determined by the profits
made in the intermediate sector. In Grossman and Helpman (1991a), each new
blueprint increases the quality of each consumer good in the fixed continuum.
Both in the case of this 'quality ladder* approach and in the case of the Aghion
and Howitt model of the research sector, technological advances are sfocfaisfic: The
chance of success of research efforts is represented by a Poisson distribution, i.e.,
the arrival rate of research success in a given period depends upon the research
efforts (intensity) and the parameters of the distribution. In determiiustie
innovation models there exists a fixed relation between inputs and outputs in the
research process. Input in the innovation process is human capital. In these
stochastic models of innovation, the more human capital is used, the bigger is the
chance of research success. The (expected) rate of return to human capital is thus
the main determinant of the wage rate (human capital is assumed to be the only
form of labour input). Human capital is also used in the production of other
(intermediate, consumer) goods, so that producers have to choose in which sector
to use it.
Each producer oi blueprints sells its products to the intermediate/consumer good
sector. Each blueprint is patented, so that the producer can make a monopoly
profit provided that his blueprint is the most advanced one available. As soon as
a new blueprint occurs, the current producer leaves the market The time span in
• 29which one blueprint is used is called a period (and is variable). Profit
maximization and free entrance to the research sector ensures that expected profits
are equal to the development costs of the blueprint (limit pricing, as it is called in
Grossman and Helpman 1991a),
This stochastic approach to innovation captures the basic notion of innovation as
a search process with an uncertain outcome. In the evolutionary tradition, Dosi
(1988a, 1988b) has pointed to this aspect of the innovation process. Dosi makes a
distinction between weak uncertainty (the probability distribution of an event is
known) and strong uncertainty (not even the probability distribution is known).
He argues that innovation involves a considerable degree of srrong uncertainty. Of
course, this latter notion is not captured in the stochastic model discussed above
(where the probability distribution is known explicitly). However, modelling
strong uncertainty is extremely difficult and involves a wholly different approach
than the one used in the neoclassical tradition (see Chapter 3).
A different approach to modelling the innovation sector is found in Romer (1990a)
and Grossman and Helpman (1989,1990), where each new blueprint leads to a new
iwr/efy of the intermediate good used in the production of consumer goods. In
these models, three sectors exist: a research sector, an intermediate goods sector
and a final goods sector. The first two sectors can be thought of as being combined
in one. All sectors u§e human capital, while the final goods lector also uses
intermediate inputs produced in the other sector. The production function in the
consumer goods sector has a functional form borrowed from Ethier (1982). In
Grossman and Helpman (1989,1990) it has the following form.
xft) is an intermediate good, and a is a parameter. All other symbols have the
meaning defined before. The Ethier functional form of the production function has
the property that an increase in the number of varieties increases productivity.
Thus, an increase in n through efforts in the research sector raises productivity in
the consumer goods sector. The varieties of the intermediate good are not complete
substitutes, since every new variety adds to the productivity in the consumer
goods sector (prodttcf di/jfervntiafibn). Therefore, different producers (each producing
one variety of the intermediate good and thus having some degree of monopoly
power) can co-exist in this sector without prices being driven to marginal costs.
Assuming free entry in the research sector, prices are set by a markup above
marginal costs, as in the standard monopolistic competition (oligopoly) case. This
markup just covers the research costs, so that net profits are equal to zero. As in
the stochastic models, human capital is the input in the innovation process in these
deterministic approaches to the innovation process. The more human capital is
used, the larger is the research output, so that the (certain) rate of return to
innovation efforts determines the wage rate.
The framework of rationality used in the models discussed is usually strongly
criticized in evolutionary theories (Dosi 1988a, 1988b, Dosi <tf a/. 1988). In this type
30of theories, it is argued that firms, given the strong uncertainty they face, cannot
optimize profits in the usual way. Instead, fern/n^ad rariona/ify is used as the
framework in which firms make decisions. Bounded rationality (Simon 1986)
reflects the notion that agents only take into account some variables and relations
in predicting the outcome of alternative behavioural patterns. The first efforts to
use the concept of bounded rationality in (growth) models have been undertaken
only recently, and are still in the early phases of development. They will be
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Summarizing, it can be said that endogenization of technological change In
neoclassical growth models basically comes down to assuming that there is a
distinction between appropriable and non-appropriable effects in the production
of innovation. In the neoclassical literature, this notion goes back to Arrow (1962).
The distinction is necessary because the existence of externalities poses the
problem of whether there is an incentive to produce innovation. It is typically
assumed that some degree of monopoly power (patent protection, product
differentiation) is needed in order for appropriability.
c. Sofotwg the Modfe!.- E^reo{tbrmm Grou/f/« Paths
The explicit modelling of the externalities, increasing returns and market structures
in new neoclassical models would only be of limited use, if the conclusions from
the overall model did not differ from those drawn from the basic neoclassical
model. In that case, the innovation-modelling exercise would merely have a
cosmetic effect. However, in this subsection it is shown that endogenous
technological change has consequences for the equilibrium growth paths of an
economy. An overview of the results is given in Diagram IL2.
In Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), the model is solved by maximizing the single
objective function (utility). The procedure is more difficult in the later models,
because these include more (interrelated) sectors (equations). The general way of
solving these models is to assume equilibrium on the market for human capital
(labour) (Aghion and Howitt 1990, Romer 1990a, Grossman and Helpman 1989,
1990) or the markets for human capital and capital (Grossman and Helpman
1991a). In the former papers, equating the reward for human capital in both
(research & intermediate goods and consumer goods) sectors yields a single price
for human capital inputs. This price is equal to the marginal product of human
capital in the two sectors, and thus, given the production functions in the two
sectors, determines the allocation of human capital resources over the two sectors
and the levels of output. This yields an equilibrium growth path of the production
and consumption of all goods.
In Grossman and Helpman (1991a) equilibrium is found at the point where labour
market equilibrium coincides with capital market equilibrium. The capital market
equilibrium ensures that an equilibrium rate of interest is reached which both
satisfies intertemporal consumer utility maximization and equals the rate of return
of the 'quality leading' firm which operates in the research sector and the
consumer goods sector (arbitrage). Together with labour market equilibrium (as
in the other models), this determines the equilibrium growth path.
31Diagram H2. A •thematic description of the characteristics of the growth path in new, neoclassical arowth models
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' Romer's (1986) model is formulated in very general terms, and the equation for the a ^. - _«M ik,
" Here, the growth rate is defined as the growth rate of efficient human capital. "* ^The general characteristics of the growth paths found are as follows. The growth
rate of the economy is a positive function of technological opportunities and the
size of human capital (labour) endowment. In addition, factors found in the basic
growth model, such as the time preference parameter, the interest rate and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, affect the growth rate in their usual way.
Technological opportunities are reflected in the arrival rate parameter in the
poisson distribution for innovation and the size of innovations (y,u) in Aghion and
Howitt (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a) or the productivity of research
in Romer (1990a) and Grossman and Helpman (1989, 1990). Their effect is
intuitively plausible. The role of increasing returns is reflected by the role of the
supply of human capital in the equation for the growth rate. This role of human
capital (functionally equal to labour) endowment as the factor responsible for
increasing returns is somewhat awkward. One would expect a factor more closely
related to technical change to embody this effect.
Being as it is, the models lead to the conclusion that the largest countries (simply
measured in terms of population) should also experience the highest growth rates,
a hypothesis that is not only implausible, but also inconsistent with the empirical
facts. As Aghion and Howitt (1990: 22, emphasis added) note when they discuss
this result, "the positive effect of [the total supply of labourl on [the average
growth rate] has the un/orfMnafe implication (...) that larger economies should grow
faster. (...) We accept the obvious implication that this class of models has little to
say, without considerable modification, about the relationship between population
size and growth rate". The most obvious interpretation of this peculiarity is
probably that it is the result of the stylized way of modelling the inputs into the
innovation sector. A more realistic (but also more complicated) way to tackle the
innovation process would be necessary to solve this deficiency and attribute the
increasing returns argument more directly to innovation.
Each of the models treated above has some specific additional factors influencing
the growth path. The most notable of these are the following. In Romer (1990a),
the value of the growth rate does not depend on the level of population, like in
other models, because it is assumed that the amount of human capital is fixed, In
Aghion and Howitt (1990) the degree of monopoly power has a positive influence
on the growth rate. The role of monopoly power reflects the Schumpeterian notion
that the appropriability of innovation rents spurs innovation efforts, and therefore
economic growth. Moreover, their paper shows four types of equilibria (a
stationary equilibrium with positive growth, a stationary equilibrium with zero
growth, a 2-period cycle and a no-growth trap). Since there is a stochastic element
in the production function for innovation in this model, the average growth rate
shows (random) variability (this also holds for Grossman and Helpman 1991a),
Thus, a measure of the average variability of the growth rate can be formulated.
To sum up, it can be said that the basic driving forces behind the growth rate in
the models discussed above are technological opportunity, as measured by the
(average) size of innovation and the efficiency in the research sector, and
population (human capital) endowment
33<f. Opfimaftty ««<f tfce Marfcef Process
From welfare economics, it is generally known that the presence of externalities
has important consequences for the distinction between the optimal and the
equilibrium market result. This is also true of the new neoclassical growth models.
An overview of the differences between the equilibrium and optimal growth path
in the different models is given in Diagram II.2 above.
The effect of externalities is perhaps made most clearly visible in the early
aggregate models in Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). The procedure followed there
is simply to calculate the optimal rate of return by intertemporally maximizing the
aggregate utility* function subject to the restriction of the production function. The
outcome of this exercise is that the equilibrium growth rate is smaller than the
optimal growth rate, due to the existence of externalities. This leads to the
conclusion that government policies (subsidies) are necessary to increase the
equilibrium growth rate up to the level of the optimal growth rate.
This procedure is repeated in more or less the same, although more detailed, way
in the other models. For the characterization of the differences between the optimal
and the equilibrium growth paths of the economy, it is again useful to make the
distinction between the models by Aghion and Howitt (1990) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991a) on the one hand and the other models on the other. This is
because the first type of models takes into account the negative externality that is
not taken into account in the other models, as explained above.
In the former two models, the difference between the equilibrium growth rate and
the outcome of the 'social planning exercise' is not unambiguous in sign. It is
possible that too rnttdi is invested in research from a welfare perspective. The
positive externality in the innovation process (i.e., the effect that an innovation
lowers production costs beyond the period of the current innovation) leads to
underinvestment in innovation. However, the negative externality (the business-
stealing effect) leads to overinvestment. In addition to these two externalities in the
innovation process, there is also a monopolistic distortion effect which creates a
difference between the equilibrium and optimal growth rate: The presence of
monopolistic market structures allows for innovation, but reduces the consumer
surplus. This effect can also work either way, and vanishes in case of some
functional specifications of the production structure. The question as to which of
the two external effects will dominate, and hence the question of whether the
equilibrium growth rate is smaller or larger than the optimal growth rate, depends
on the size of innovation and the degree of monopoly power. For large innovations
(and little monopoly power), the social value of innovation is large relative to the
private value to the monopolist, so that the optimal growth rate is larger than the
equilibrium growth rate. When the size of innovation is small (and monopoly
power large) the opposite case arises.
In the Grossman and Helpman (1991a) paper based on the Aghion and Howitt
approach, the positive externalities of innovation concern the intertemporal quality
* The choice of the functional form of the utility function is generally without discussion.spillover, which is part of the consumer surplus due to innovation. Innovation is
passed onto the consumer in the form of quality improvements with constant
prices*. The business-stealing effect is also present in this model. This effect is
relatively large for small and for large innovations, so that the optimal growth rate
exceeds the equilibrium growth rate only for intermediately sized innovations.
In Romer (1990a) and Grossman and Helpman (1989), the socially optimal rate of
growth is unambiguously larger than the equilibrium growth rate. This is caused
by the presence of positive and the absence of negative externalities. Thus, the
growth rate (and welfare) can be increased by subsidizing research efforts, This is
a simple reproduction of the results in early models as proposed in Romer (1986)
and Lucas (1988).
e. App/icaWoM.- The Sfylizei Endogenous Growfh Model *
After the above review the new neoclassical growth models and the role of
endogenous innovation, the present section will present a simple illustration of
these models. The model chosen is very simple, and draws mainly on Lucas (1988).
Similar to Lucas, first a version of the model with exogenous innovation will be
presented, in order to explain the differences between endogenous and exogenous
innovation. The result of this exercise, i.e., a reproduction of the outcomes of
Solow's growth model, is due to Cass (1965).
The central equation of the model is the production function. As in Solow's growth
model (section 2.2), this function is assumed to have a Cobb-Douglas form with
labour-augmenting technological change.
The intertemporal utility function is defined in terms of per capita consumption,
and has the CES form. In aggregate form, utility is defined as
with c denoting per capita consumption, o standing for the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and p denoting the discount rate. Equation (11.40) assumes that
consumers have equal preferences, so that per capita income is constant over
population. Moreover, it is assumed that all labour is used, so that L is equal to
population. Finally, there is a budget constraint which holds at each point in
time".
According to this equation, the sum of consumption and investment is equal to
* The result that prices are independent of quality Wnges on the functional spedflcaMon of the
quality function. It can be shown that for different functional specifications than the one used in
Grossman and Helpman (1991a) prices change (rise) over time.
* This section draws mainly on Lucas (1988).
'" In a more complicated model, one could allow for a capital market for Jntertempora!
borrowing. This yields the same results if one lays certain restrictions on borrowing (No-Pcwzi ^»we
amdtfwn). See Btanchaid and Fisher (1989)
35production (the equivalent of the definition of the savings rate in the early growth
models. Growth paths of the economy described by 01.39) - 01.41) are found by
maximizing 01.40) under the restriction 01.41). To find this path, substitute 01.39)
in 01.41) and set up the current value Hamiltonian".
••;-•' - ••<••>- /'•-;;• ""T^'"~*
In this optimal control problem, c is the control variable, K is the state variable,
and 0 is the current value multiplier. A path maximizing 01.40) must satisfy the
budget constraint 01.41) and the following conditions.
c,-%-0L,-O ' * " ' <H-43)
> (11.44)
(11.45)
The last equation is the terminal condition, or the frflnsyers«/ifv condifion.
While there are more paths that satisfy 01.41) and 0I.43MII.45), only the balanced
growth path will be considered here. Cass (1965) shows that under reasonable
circumstances any solution for the system will converge to this balanced path.
Along the balanced growth path, all variables grow at a fixed rate. Assume first
that the (fixed) rate of growth of c is equal to i. Then, by (logarithmically)
differentiating 01.43) and substituting the result in 01.44), one arrives at an
expression for the marginal product of capital.
,.,,,, (l-pM(e"W-^-p*<n OL46)
Dividing 01.41) by K, and substituting 01.46) in the result gives the following.
£
i_p ,
Along the balanced path, the growth rate of K is constant, so that 01.47) implies
that cL/JC is also constant. Thus, the following must hold.
This equation implies that the growth rate of the capital stock is equal to the sum
of the growth rates of population and per capita consumption. Substituting the
definition of I in this expression and differentiating yields the obvious result that
the growth rate of investment is equal to the growth rate of capital. Differentiating
the production function yields the following expression for the growth rate of
output.
" For this application of Pontryagin's Maximum Principle, see Kamien and Schwartz (1981).Knally, one can differentiate the budget constraint a»d substitute the expression
for the growth rate of output in the result, finding that the growth rate of per
capita consumption is equal to the rate of labour-augmenting technical progress,
a. Substituting various occurrences of t, one finds mat, along the balanced growth
path, the growth rates of the endogenous variables Q, K and e are equal to f>+a,
p+o and a, respectively. Thus, this exercise reproduces the results of the Solow
growth model in section 2.2.
Now consider the same model with endogenous technological change. Lucas (1988)
assumes that endogenous technological change takes the form of human capital
accumulation. Denoting the stock of human capital by ft, assume that an individual
can divide his time between producing output and learning. Let « denote the
fraction of total time devoted to producing output Then assume that the rate of
growth of human capital is a linear function of the fraction of time devoted to
learning.
Next, the influence of human capital accumulation {i.e., technological change) is
defined to be twofold. First, as before, there is labour-augmenting technical
progress, and second, there is an externality in the form of the average level of
human capital having an influence through neutral technical progress. The average
level of human capital is defined as the total sum of human capital over total
labour. , .,,>,, ,,...-; , •
01.51)
It is important to understand that although the average level of human capital is
endogenously determined, an individual has no influence whatsoever on its level,
due to the assumption of a targe {infinite) population. Now the production
technology can be defined by a new production function, which looks as follows.
The model can be solved in two different ways, in each case, the integral (11.40) is
maximized under the restrictions (11.41) and (11.50), using definition (11.52) of the
production function. However, in one case, the sodaffy opriwial path, one treats the
average level of human capital as oorying with decisions on human capital
accumulation by the individual households. In the other case, which is the pfiaife
egui/ftrium path, one treats the average level of human capital as gtsvn at each
point in time, which is what households would do when they try to maximize
utility by dividing time between producing and learning, and output between
consumption and investment In any case, the current value Hairultonian is defined
as follows,
-J-(c;
37Control variables are K and /t, state variables are c and u. Since there are two
restrictions now, mere are also two current value multipliers. Restrictions (11.41)
and (11.50), and the following conditions are necessary for an optimal (social or
private) path.
£1-0 => c-°«6 (11.54)
IF ' '
i, -00, -0,(1 -f3)/^U,«,L/K/ (H-55)
(11.56)
dn ' ' ' ' * '
__-u -* w.u^..» v»-)PX'-»-0.5(l-M.) (M.57)
Transversality conditions are no longer documented explicitly. Condition (11.56)
contains the partial derivative of the average level of human capital with respect
to private human capital. It is with regard to this derivative that the cases of a
socially optimal path and a private equilibrium path differ. Since individuals are
identical in all respects, the individual level of human capital is equal to the
average. Thus, 3/i/d/t=l is the relevant expression for finding a socially optimal
path. In case of a private equilibrium path, an individual's personal influence on
average human capital is zero, which comes down to 3ft/dft=0.
Thus, for each of the two cases (11.56) can be simplified in the following manner.
For a socially optimal path, (11.56) reduces to
The expression that is relevant to the private equilibrium path is
0J»P0J-0,«3/I^"'(M,L/-0J8(1-M,). (11.59)
Note that if y=0, the two expressions are the same. In other words, only "the
presence of the external effect (..) creates a divergence between the 'social'
valuation formula and the private valuation" (Lucas 1988: 21). Again, the model
is solved for balanced growth paths (defined as before, plus the assumption that
the growth rate of M is equal to zero), Denoting the growth rates of c and ft by i
and u respectively, one can derive expressions for the growth rate of output
[(fJ+Y)u+i(l-|J)+p] and capital (p+i) in the above manner. Then differentiate (11.54)
and (11.57), eliminate the growth rate of 0, and use definition 01.48), so that the
following results.
Furthermore, by applying the same way of reasoning as above, one can derive the
following expression for i.
38In order to find the expression for u, one can substitute (11,57) in (11.58) / (IIJ9),
and by using (H,50), derive the following expressions for the optimal growth path
and the equilibrium growth path, respectively.
By substituting (11.61) in {n.60) and cancelling out the growth rate of 6j by means
of the derived expression and (n.62) / (11.63), one arrives at expressions for p in
terms of exogenous parameters in the model. For the case of an optimal growth
path (u,,), this rate is defined as follows.
«o
(11.64)
For the case of the equilibrium growth path (p.), it Is equal
The difference between these two rates is equal to
Note that equation (n.66) theoretically allows for a welfare gain along a private
equilibrium growth path, if the expression on the rhs is negative. However, foi?
'reasonable' parameter values (0>l-[p7(p+y)H(p-i>)/S]), the expression is positive.
This establishes the result of a positive welfare gain through public innovation
policy already indicated above.2.4. The JRofe o/ Tec/mo/ogtcflJ Change
Having reviewed the basic growth models of modern economic theory, it is now
time to look more closely at the role of technological change. Two observations
about the assumptions on the role of technological change stand out from the
above. First, the formulation of the production process in neoclassical theory leads
to a distinction between f/ie state o/ tec/ino/ogtcn/ Jcnou>/edge and f/ie /ediniqui wsei.
This distinction is related to the difference between short and long-term analysis.
In the short run, the firm chooses the optimal technique, given the general state
of knowledge. In the longer run, this general state of knowledge is growing (in the
early models, exogenously), and thus increases the (total factor) productivity of the
production process.
In terms of the production function, a technique is defined as a combination (ratio)
of the production factors labour and capital. Some techniques are labour-intensive,
others are capital-intensive. The production function is supposed to give the
relation between output and the technique chosen, given the state of knowledge.
The technique chosen depends on the factor price ratio, in the sense that given
factor prices, there is only one technique that maximizes profits (or minimizes
costs). Changing factor prices therefore invoke a different capital labour ratio, or,
in other words, cause subsftrufion. Usually, it is assumed that there is an infinitely
large amount of techniques, so that the set of techniques in the production function
can be represented on a continuum.
The production function can take on different forms, usually to be distinguished
by the possible degree of substitution between the factors (or the elasticity of
substitution, defined as the percentage change of the capital labour ratio due to a
one percent change in the factor price ratio). On the one end of the spectrum is the
Leontief production function (as in the above post-Keynesian growth model), with
'fixed coefficients' and thus zero elasticity of substitution. On the other end is a
production function with infinite elasticity of substitution (such as the consfanr
eterictry o/swfeMuft'on, or CES-production function with a substitution parameter
equal to -1). In between is the Cobb Douglas production function (as in the Solow
model) with an elasticity of substitution of 1.
Thus, the general state of technological knowledge is assumed to be something
quite different from the choice of techniques. For a given (infinite) set of
techniques, an increase in the general state of knowledge (or tedino/ogicaJ progress)
is assumed to increase only the productivity of each technique, and not to
influence the amount of techniques available. The extent to which separate
techniques are influenced by an increase in technological change might be different
(in which case one speaks of a bias in tedmo/ogiai/ dwujf) as in the Solow model,
or equal (in which case technological change is said to be neutral). A bias in
technological change might either be labour- saving or capital-saving. The concepts
of biases and neutrality can be defined in different ways, so that in production
function theory a distinction is made between Harrod, Hicks and Solow
neutrality/bias.
As a critique to the neoclassical production function, it has been argued that the
40distinction between the choice of technique (substitution) and technological
progress is artificial and leads to insights which are, however elegant in a
mathematical way, irrelevant in practice. One of the arguments in favour of this
view is that in practice one does not observe substitution and technological
progress separately. For example, Rosenberg (1976: 253, original emphasis) states
that
*(..,) the analytical distinction between technological change and mere factor
substitution becomes extremely difficult to maintain, //itomw!^, establishing new
possibilities for factor substitution has typically been the outcome of a search process
involving substantial costs and the use of specialized knowledge and creative skills. The
kinds of new knowledge underlying both substitution and innovation possibilities are,
in other words, the historical OKWWC of research activities. The range of substitution
possibilities conveniently summarized on a single isoquant are the product of"such past
research efforts and their resulting technological changes, TW&jjr Factor substitution
possibilities are made possible by/«ftT<^yi technological innovations".
Thus, Rosenberg argues that substitution does take place, but that it is not due to
factor price differences. Rather, there is a general tendency connected to
technological change which brings about a historical trend towards more capital-
intensive production. The neo-Keynesian approach outlined above seems to be able
to deal with this critique in a natural way. The Kaldorian technical progress
function (11.25) assumes a relation between technological progress in the form of
labour productivity increases and capital accumulation. Applied to Rosenberg's
view and the substitution principle, this means that technological change causes
a tendency to using (relatively) more capital and less labour.
Another strand of research, this time in the neoclassical tradition, which seems to
take up this point is the literature on 'induced bias' in innovation (see also section
2.1). Papers in this field develop the argument that innovation efforts are directed
towards the direction in which it is most profitable, given (current) factor prices.
The result is an endogenous bias into the labour- or capital-saving direction,
leading to an expansion path along which substitution and innovation occur
simultaneously. However, contributions in this field more or less stopped in the
1970s (although there seems to be an increase in interest again, as in Diederen
1991).
Second, in two of the three early growth models, it is assumed that technological
progress falls like 'manna from heaven' (Jones 1975: 158) (with the exception of
Kaldor's growth model). In less metaphorical terms, technological progress is
assumed to be exogenous to the economic system, while the choice of techniques
is endogenously determined. Thus, in the Solow growth model, a and » are
assumed to be constant and determined outside the model, while the growth of
K and thus the ratio between K and L is determined within the model.
As already argued in section 2.1, microeconomic theory, on the contrary, has
devoted a great deal of efforts to finding ways to endogenize technological change.
Recognizing that R&D efforts undertaken by firms (and thus endogenous to
microeconomic theory) are a main determinant of technological progress in
41modern society, economists in the tradition of industrial organization have
developed theories and models describing the influence of market structure, firm
size, technological opportunities and the growth of demand upon R&D efforts. A
survey of these models is given in Gomulka (1990).
Since innovation is at the core of the analysis in the rest of this thesis, the growth
theories assuming exogenous innovation are not suitable for the theoretical basis
of further work. This leaves the new neoclassical growth models and neo-
Keynesian theory as candidates. The most important difference between these two
theories with regard to the way innovation is endogenized is related to the basic
motivation behind economic (firm) behaviour. Neoclassical models assume that
firms strictly maximize profits, usually under the assumption of full information
(see above). The neo-Keynesian approach has a less clear idea of what motivates
behaviour. Keynes' idea of 'animal spirits' seems to be underlying much of the
ideas in this tradition. Most of the next chapter will be devoted to a discussion
about the usefulness of the profit maximization assumption. At the end of that
chapter, which also introduces evolutionary theories of economic development, a
definite choice of theoretical paradigm will be made. As a quick advance on this
discussion, it is useful to cite Gomulka (1990: 27-8), who states:
"The (...) important characteristic of the inventive/innovation process is that it involves
'••.••;.. in an essential way uncertainty or even ignorance (...) Consequently, very different
'optimal' choice might be made by different research teams."
2.5, Ejfpl«i«i«g Growth JRitfe D«//erc«fifl?s
The last question (briefly) addressed in this chapter is: What can be said about
growth rate dr/jferenfiafe on the basis of the above theories? First, the models offer
an explanation for growth rate differentials in the form of different parameter
values. Thus, countries would typically grow at a faster rate than others because
their natural or warranted rate of growth is larger. The rate of population growth
and the rate of technological change (both exogenous) will then explain growth
rate differentials. In the various models, it is also possible that other variables than
Just these influence growth rates during the transition phase from one to another
steady growth path. In case of the Solow model, for example, the growth rate of
countries still in the transition phase (not having reached it* yet) is influenced by
the savings rate and the value of it.
The method of growth accounting is basically a (neoclassical) application of this
way of looking at the models". This method, which was explained briefly above
while discussing Solow's model, has been applied to a cross-country sample of
countries by among others Denison (1967), Christensen rt a/. (1980) and Maddison
(1987). Empirically based as it is, the growth accounting approach does not only
explain growth rates from the perspective of exogenous parameters (a, p), but also
assumes that some variables that are endogenous in the above models (such as K
or M) are exogenous.
" For an interpretation of growth accounting in this context, see among others Fagerberg
(1988b).
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from a theoretical point of view, since it does not answer any real questions. The
parameters and variables (the rate of growth of TFP, labour or capital input) are
all assumed to be exogenous. Thus, in order to explain why growth rate
differentials occur, these methods have to fall back on exogenous explanations for
the different patterns in knowledge and capital accumulation being observed, such
as cultural, geographic or even religious explanations. It seems to be very difficult
to provide a real economic explanation on the basis of such an approach. This is
not to say that there is no merit at all in the growth accounting approach. Its
applied nature has led to a number of interesting observations regarding the
sources (as opposed to explanations) of growth in various countries. Moreover, it
was in many ways Solow's (1957) original growth accounting contribution that
aroused mainstream theorists' desire to learn more about the topic of technological
change.
Second, the neo-Keynesian tradition offers an additional explanation for growth
rate differentials, besides differences in parameter values. As will be seen (also in
Parts Two and Three), this explanation is much more satisfying from an economic
point of view, since it is an economic mechanism which is underlying the process
of diverging / converging growth, r « R •> .^
On the basis of Kaldor (1966), Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) presented a model
explaining international or inter-regional differences in economic growth. Their
model is based on the principle of cumulative causation and provides an
explanation of growth rate differentials persistent in time. Contrary to the idea of
catching up to be introduced below, their model predicts that divergence of
growth rates (at least up to certain point) will (can) take place. In the model set
out by Dixon and Thirlwall, productivity is the main determinant of a country's
growth rate. High productivity growth improves the country's competitive position
and has a positive influence on exports and thus economic growth. This
relationship is combined with Verdoom's law, and yields a circle of cumulative
causation. Suppose that in a world characterized by the Dixon and Thirlwall model
two regions initially have the same growth rate. Then, due to an exogenous event,
one region gets a (one period) stimulus of the growth rate. This higher growth rate
will yield a higher rate of growth of productivity via Verdoom's law, and thus
generate a new impulse for a higher growth rate. Since the other region did not
experience the exogenous shock, growth rates will diverge. Under the assumption
that certain parameters take specific values (see Dixon and Thirlwall 1975: 207-
208), the self-reinforcing growth effect of the model will damp out, and the
region's growth rate will converge towards an equilibrium rate, leaving, however,
a sustained growth rate differential.
Another important concept in explaining growth rate differentials, which has not
been mentioned until now, is the principle of catching up. Like the previous
example, catching up gives an endogenous logic for differential growth rates,
which makes it attractive from the point of view of the present analysis. Catching
up is a phenomenon that is not specifically related to one of the theoretical schools
discussed above. It has been applied in historical studies (Gerschenkron 1962),
neoclassical production function models (Dowrick and Nguyen 1989), more
43evolutionary inspired studies (Perez and Soete 1988), Keynesian type models
(Cornwall 1977) as well as empirical studies without a clear theoretical background
(Baumol 1986, Abramovitz 1983, 1986). The literature on catching up is also
referred to as the 'convergence' literature, for the obvious reason that if countries
with low initial per capita incomes tend to grow faster, per capita income levels
and growth rates will eventually show a tendency to converge.
On the pure basis of neoclassical theory, catching up is related to the difference in
marginal capital productivity between nations. The neoclassical production
function has the property of decreasing marginal returns to capital. Applied to a
cross-section of nations, this means that one unit of investment in a country which
is at a low level of development will pay off more than the same amount of
investment in a more developed country. Thus, countries at a lower level of
development have a larger potential to grow fast than the most developed
countries (Rebelo 1992).
In a broader (theoretical) concept, catching up refers to the principle that countries
with relatively low technological levels are able to exploit a backlog of existing
knowledge and therefore attain high productivity growth rates, while countries
that operate at (or near to) the technological frontier have fewer opportunities for
high productivity growth. Therefore, countries with lower levels of technological
knowledge will tend to achieve higher growth rates. Some early approaches to
catching up in this vein can be found in Ames and Rosenberg (1963), Nelson
(1968) and Gomulka (1971). Implicitly, this interpretation of the catching-up
hypothesis is based on the intuition that technological change is to some extent a
'public' good, i.e., it can be used 'freely' by countries other than the initial
innovator. International knowledge spillovers enable countries with lower
technological levels to achieve faster productivity growth.
Empirical studies that investigate the strength of the catching-up phenomenon,
such as Abramovitz (1979,1983,1986), Baumol (1986), Dollar and Wolff (1988) and
Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), generally arrive at the conclusion that there is indeed
a strong (negative) correlation between growth rates and (initial) per capita income
(the latter is taken as a measure of the technological level of a country)". But
while there is agreement on the relevance of the argument for some countries, it
is also clear that catching up is not a global phenomenon. Most studies only take
into account the industrialized (OECD) countries, and do not look at convergence
between the industrialized world, socialist economies and developing nations.
Baumol (1986) is a notable exception to this rule. The conclusion reached there is
that "rather than sharing in convergence, some of the poorest countries have also
been growing most slowly" (Baumol 1986: 1079). Lucas (1988: 4) connects these
growth rate differentials directly to the per capita income level of countries: "the
poorest countries tend to have the lowest growth; the wealthiest next; the 'middle-
income' countries highest". De Long (1988), in a comment on Baumol (1986), has
also convincingly shown that catching up is not a global phenomenon. His analysis
demonstrates that some countries which could initially be identified as 'candidates'
" However, Quah (1990a, b) has applied a convergence model with a stochastic trend with
mixed success.
'44.for taking part in the catching-up process, have failed to do so in actual practice.
Baumol ef a/. (1989) have demonstrated that education might be an important
variable in explaining this failure.
There is an obvious relation between the catching-up idea and the method of
growth accounting. One of the explanations for cross-country differences in total
factor productivity might be the catching-up phenomenon. For example, Denison
(1967:287 ff.) divided the total factor productivity growth of the lagging countries
in the sample (all except the USA) into a part that is due to the rate of growth of
knowledge (equal to the USA total factor productivity growth) and a part that is
due to other sources, including a lag in the application of knowledge. A more
direct application of the catching-up principle is provided by Dowrick and Nguyen
(1989). Their attempt to explain growth rate differentials is essentially a growth
accounting method, in which a model relating total factor productivity growth to
the level of per capita income is specified. On the basis of this variable they
present estimates for growth rate differentials that are 'adjusted' for the influence
of catching up.
What do the new neoclassical growth models have to offer with respect to
explaining international growth patterns? First, broadening the application of the
new growth theories to the open economy case leads also to important conclusions
about trade and technology policy. In line with 'strategic' trade theory (Krugman
1990), the basic conclusion is that the arguments in favour of free trade no longer
have unlimited (with respect to time and place) validity. In some specific cases,
trade policies, in the form of tariffs, or technology policies, in the form of research
subsidies, may influence aggregate economic growth or welfare by changing the
factor proportions devoted to research and/or manufacturing (Grossman and
Helpman, 1990, 1991a). The exact outcomes of the policy measures are not,
however, very clear cut from the international perspective. Much depends on the
'comparative advantages' with regard to technology and manufacturing activities.
The basic mechanism that leads to this conclusion is the general equilibrium
framework that is applied in the new growth models. As a result of this, the world
growth rate is dependent upon the allocation of resources (human capital) between
sectors or countries and the structure of demand. For example, relatively higher
demand for consumer goods produced in the country with a comparative
advantage in research will lower the world's growth rate, since human capital is
pulled out of research activities in that country. A rise in human capital resources
(both total resources and resources in the country with comparative advantage in
research) spurs research and therefore has a positive influence on the growth rate.
Also, a reallocation of human capital resources can influence the growth rate
(positively if the share in effective labour of the country with comparative
advantage in research grows).
Second, endogenous technological change modelled in this way has important
implications, for growth rate differentials. However, this aspect of new growth
theories has received little attention up until now. Both closed and open economy
approaches have strongly focused on welfare properties of growth paths, and not
so much on growth rate differentials. Moreover, the empirical implication of new
45growth theories is still in an early phase (the contribution in Romer 1989 shows
the limitations of applying these models to a broad sample of countries, another
useful contribution is in Amable and Boyer 1992).
Nevertheless, the scope for further investigation of the consequences of the ideas
found in new growth theory for the current topic is undoubtedly a promising
avenue for further research in this area. However, this will not be done in the rest
of this thesis. Instead, the focus will be on developing some approaches based on
the endogenous economic explanations for growth rate differentials found in the
evolutionary and neo-Keynesian traditions, as well as the more hybrid catching-up
approach. The catching-up idea, interpreted in terms of knowledge spillovers, will
be applied in a theoretical and empirical model in Part Two below. The neo-
Keynesian logic of cumulative causation, combined with an evolutionary view on
the economic process (to be introduced in the next chapter) will be applied in Part
Three.
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Economic Grow»f/i rind T«?c/mo/ogic<i/
O The Bastes
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the idea of economic growth as an
evolutionary process. Whereas other theoretical approaches to economic growth
have been outlined in Chapter 2 by means of small stylized models, this is not
possible in the case of evolutionary theory. The reason for this is that the body of
evolutionary theorizing in economics has not made much use of formal methods,
and the few papers that have done this cannot easily be grouped under one
general heading. Therefore, the approach in this chapter is somewhat different.
First, a general description of macroeconomic growth as an evolutionary process
will be given. Then, the microeconomic logic behind economic evolution will be
explained. Finally, some ideas about how to formalize these microeconomic
propositions will be summarized.
3.2. Economic Growth as «« Evolutionary Process: A MaawcoMomic Interpreta-
tion
Dosi (1982) argued that technological progress is (in most cases) grouped around
certain key items of attention. Instead of the 'production function' viewpoint of
technological change as a global phenomenon without a specific direction, Dosi
assumes that 'normal' technological change consists of relatively small
improvements upon bigger, revolutionary (and therefore 'scarce') technological
breakthroughs. He draws an analogy with Kuhnian philosophy of science, and
develops the hypothesis that technological discoveries are grouped in 'fec/mo/ogroiJ
paradigms'.
A technological paradigm is defined as a "model and a pattern of solution of
se/ected technological problems, based on sdectef principles from the natural
sciences and on se/ecterf material technologies" (Dosi 1982:152, original emphasis).
The discovery of such a 'model and pattern of solution' corresponds to Kuhn's
notion of a srienft/fc raw/Mfion. In economic theory, it closely links up to
Schumpeter's innovation theory, in which an important innovation creates a
fcaniwagon effect of smaller (incronmbiO follow-up innovations. Dosi (1982) uses
a similar concept when he makes the distinction between technological paradigms
and fec/inological fra/ecfories. In his view, 'normal' technological change (compare
the Kuhnian term 'normal' science) takes place along a direction set out by the
discovery of an important general principle which provides the opportunity for
application in a number of economic sectors. A technological trajectory is the
development of a technology along the lines set out by the technological paradigm.
The notion of a technological paradigm stems from empirical observations in the
47history of technological change. Examples that can be found in the period since the
industrial revolution are steam technology, electricity, (petro-)chemical technology,
the internal combustion engine and semi-conductors (or, more in general,
information technology). These are all examples of a fundamental discovery which
opened up possibilities for economy-wide application, thus giving rise to large
productivity increases and the emergence of new products and services. The actual
achievement of these productivity gains and new products and services does not
take place at once, but rather comprises a long period of 'normal' technological
change, or the development along a technological trajectory (Freeman and Soete
1990).
It is indeed an important characteristic of some technological paradigms that their
influence goes beyond that of a single, isolated part (sector) of the economy.
Examples of technological (scientific) discoveries which might well be labelled as
technological paradigms, but which have not (as yet) had an influence upon the
whole spectrum of economic sectors are optics and nuclear technology. To stress
this aspect of technological paradigms, Freeman (for example 1991) has introduced
the concept of perajsipeness of a technology. If a technology only affects the
production structure in one sector, the emergence of a new paradigm will not have
strong effects upon the whole economy. If, on the contrary, the pervasiveness of
a technology is very large (i.e., it affects most sectors' productions structure), the
macroeconomic effect will be large.
In this respect, Perez (1983) has introduced the term fec/mo-economic paradigm to
make a distinction between pervasive and non-pervasive technological paradigms.
A techno-economic paradigm describes the economic, institutional and
technological inter-linkages between sectors. A new technological paradigm will
thus also imply a shift towards a new techno-economic paradigm if the
technological principle (or the products associated with it) can be used throughout
the economy, so that institutional and economic relations between all economic
agents are affected'. Without doubt, technological paradigms such as steam
power, electricity and iron and steel fall in the category of techno-economic
paradigms.
If it also implies a new techno-economic paradigm, a new technological paradigm
will have a large effect upon the whole economy. A takeoff of such a paradigm
will require new investment and thus imply crearice destruction of old capital in
most sectors. On the other hand, if a new technological paradigm does not imply
the change of the techno-economic paradigm as a whole, the macroeconomic effect
will be much smaller. In that case, the main effect will be limited to one or a few
sector(s).
The idea that the emergence of technological paradigms are not distributed
randomly over time has led to the interesting hypothesis that long-term economic
development occurs in long-wave patterns. It was Schumpeter (1939) who first
raised the idea that major technological breakthroughs would lead to such a long-
* One could argue that microelectronics is a recent example of such a techno-eeonomic
paradigm.
43term cyclical growth path*. However, the details of the long-waw debate that
emerged in the 1980s will not be discussed here. The reason for this is that, for the
present interpretation of the relation between economic growth and innovation, it
is not really relevant {yet, see Chapter 10 for a more extensive discussion) whether
or not long-wave patterns exist. Therefore, reference will be made only tht
arguments used in the debate useful for the course of the argument developed
here.
The rest of this section will go into the process of (possible) introduction of a
technological paradigm with a level of pervasiveness which assures a fundamental
effect on the nature and level of macroeconomic activity. It will be concerned with
the question of how the process of introduction and (possible) retardation of such
a paradigm takes place, and look at the forces determining this process.
The concept of technological paradigms is, in the first place, a concept thai arises
from observing technological change at a level beyond that of the firm (i.e., it
sector or the whole economy). A single decision unit (firm) cannot launch a (new)
technological paradigm by iteelf. A new technological paradigm manifests itself
only when a whole set of firms begins to apply a new basic principle on the
market. Therefore, in general, the emergence of a new technological paradigm can
be regarded as exogenoHS at the single firm level (microeconomic level). It can,
however, not be denied that the emergence of a new technological paradigm
depends on decisions taken at the microeconomic level.
To a certain extent, technological paradigms will always be exogenous to the
economy, even at the macroeconomic level. What is economically possible is
bounded by what is technologically possible. And what is technologically possible
will always be limited by scientific principles (or Jaws, if one may call it that way)
like gravity, the speed of light, etc. (note that this is a ^uoiitafiiv limitation rather
than that it implies that the set of te/mologica/ possibffifi© is limited in a
quantitative way). This does, however, not mean mat technological change is
completely exogenous to the economic system, as it was assumed in the old
theories of economic growth. The emergence of a new technological paradigm
depends upon the availability of a technological (scientific) principle that can be
at its basis. The steam-power paradigm could not have been developed without
the invention of the steam-engine, and the same goes for other paradigms that
have emerged during the development of capitalism. Obviously, the chance that
a 'basic invention' (as Schumpeter called it) takes place varies with the quantity
of efforts devoted to it. In the present-day industrialized world, these efforts
mainly consist of industrial research and development (R&D) and related activities.
In the debate on long waves it has been suggested that more efforts are devoted
to finding a new technological principle (or paradigm), the less satisfactory the
(economic) results from an old, existing paradigm are. Mensch (1979) and
Kleinknecht (1987) have called this effect the depression trigger effect: Whenever the
payoffs of an old technological paradigm begin to diminish, the direction of search
* For a treatment of Marx* vision on the relationship between technological change and (shorter)
business cycles, see Gourviteh (1940).
49and the efforts devoted to R&D react in order to find an alternative. So far, the
empirical evidence on this depression trigger effect has, however, not been given.
A related argument which has some more, although still scarce, empirical backing
is the so-called sai'/ing s/zip effect. The invention of a new technological paradigm
(regardless its underlying factors) means potential (technological) competition for
the old paradigm. Firms with a firm technological base in the old paradigm will
therefore respond by devoting more efforts to improving their competitive
position. Even if the new paradigm has a higher potential than the old one, the
latter may 'rule' for some time because the new paradigm is still in its infancy. In
Rosenberg's (1976: 205-206) example of the competition between the (existing)
sailing ships and the (newly invented) steam-powered ships, a series of minor
inventions in the field of sailing 'technology' was able to keep off the competition
for quite a long while.
These two specific (and rather ad hoc) effects illustrate a more general principle.
The introduction or retardation of a techno-economic paradigm depends on the
specific way in which the economic potential of the paradigm itself and the
economic, social and institutional environment interact with each other. A
paradigm might take off quickly because the specific historical context is suitable,
or it might, on the contrary, not take off at all because this context is highly
unsuitable. Much in the sense of this interpretation, Freeman (1991) draws an
analogy between biology and economics, suggesting that the emergence and
retardation of technological paradigms is an evolutionary selection process. The
process of evolutionary selection is essentially a process of competition. The
relative competitiveness of different paradigms together with the selective
environment determines the outcome of the process. In case of two competing
paradigms, the introduction of a new paradigm is more likely to occur as the old
paradigm is more vulnerable (this idea has been developed in a context of
institutional change and North / South relations by Perez and Soete 1988). In case
of two complementary paradigms, the introduction of the one is more likely to
occur as the other is stronger. « ? : : ^; •••.*••., *:!; r^i
An important question in this respect is: What determines the competitiveness of
a paradigm? A distinction between technological, economic and institutional
factors that have an influence on this can be made'. Tec/raofogicaJ compefihwness
relates both to production costs (process innovation) and quality (product
innovation). Technological competitiveness is increased by incremental innovations
('normal technological change'), which to a large extent take the form of learning
effects. Due to their cumulative nature, the impact of incremental innovation and
learning effects is likely to vary over the lifetime of a technology. In the initial
(laboratory) phase of the development of a technology, progress may be very slow.
But after a certain period of introduction, it is likely that incremental innovations
and learning effects take place at increasing rates. In the later phases of the
development of the paradigm, so it is often heard, decreasing marginal returns to
research efforts set in and learning effects become smaller and smaller. This is due
to the effect that the technological base of a paradigm is not infinite. This principle
* For a more detailed discussion, see Freeman (1991).
50of decreasing marginal returns to research is also known as Wolffs law*.
Therefore, in the later phases of the technological paradigm, 'normal' technological
change will take place at decreasing rates.
Note that the emergence of decreasing marginal returns to innovation efforts fllonj
a tecfcRofogtcai fra/ecfory (i.e., given a technological paradigm), does not imply that
in general there are decreasing returns to innovation efforts. Because successive
paradigms improve upon each other, the pattern of marginal returns to innovation
efforte is most likely to have the form of a cyclical pattern which develop around
a (monotonicaUy) increasing trend (see also Dosi 1988a: 229-230).
Another aspect that plays a similar role in most (although not all) technologies is
the presence of network externalities. These may cause the takeoff of a technology
to be quite slow initially, but after a certain critical mass of users has been
established, network externalities may cause a boost of the number of users. Again,
at some stage saturation sets in (almost all potential users are served). The
existence of network externalities and the implied sigmoid pattern of technological
competitiveness has important consequences for the possibility of lodfc-in #/jtos and
paf/i rfep<?ftttettcy. Due to specific historical circumstances, such as the existence of
a competing technology or the specific institutional setting, a new paradigm may
not reach the stage in which increasing returns set in. Thus, it might simply not,
or only very slowly develop. This argument has been developed in more detail by
among others David (1990) and Arthur (1988).
Turning to economic factors, marker demand is an important factor that plays a role
in the competitiveness of a paradigm. This factor basically works through the
aspect of (firm-level) profitability; in fact, without market demand a product
cannot be profitable. In the economics of technological change, this has already
been emphasized by Schmookler (1966) and work following his demflnd /wrt
%xrttesis (see Mowery and Rosenberg 1979 and Kleinknecht and Verspagen 1990
for critical reviews). A useful, dynamic, way of taking this aspect into account is
provided by Pasinetti (1981). In his analysis of srrucrwra/ cfowge, he uses the
concept of the En^d curve. The Engel curve gives the relation between (macro or
micro) spending on one (group of) product(s) and income. The shape of the Engel
curve is such that for some range of income, the marginal increase in spending on
a product diminishes. In other words, at some stage the income elasticity of
demand will diminish for all goods, due to saturation effects. Pasinetti (1981; 72-
73) distinguishes between three different cases. In the first case (basic necessities
of life) the marginal increase in spending diminishes for the whole range of
incomes (a curve increasing at a monotonicaUy decreasing rate). In the second case,
representing luxury goods, the Engel curve is sigmoid, so that the diminishing
marginal increases only occur in the last part of the curve. In the third case, the
Engel curve has a maximum. This case corresponds to inferior goods.
* "Wolff's law: Wolff was a German economist who in 1912 published four 'laws of retardation
of progress'. Essentially, he argued that the scope for improvement in any technology is limited,
and that the cost of incremental improvement increases as the technology approaches its long-run
performance level." (Freeman 1982: 216, note 2).
5fWhat is important here about the Engel curves is not so much the precise relation
between spending and income, but the fact that income elasticities of demand, and
therefore the shares of certain categories of products in total spending, may vary
over time. Since a technological paradigm consists of some basic technological
principles, there are also some basic categories of goods associated with it. These
goods may either be intermediate goods, related to the input-output relations
within the paradigm, or they may be consumer goods. The paradigm of the
internal combustion engine is associated with the automobile. The paradigm of
computer technology (or more generally information technology) is related to
(intermediate) demand of semi-conductors. If the attention is limited to consumer
goods for a moment (i.e., following Pasinetti's framework of vertically integrated
sectors), the demand for the paradigm's 'basic' good(s) will vary with income and,
thus, with time. The demand effect given by the Engel curve can be a strong factor
in 'launching' or slowing down a paradigm. On the one hand, if the demand for
the paradigm's basic good is particularly high in the beginning phases, this can
stimulate its emergence. On the other hand, if the demand for the paradigm's basic
good is saturating, this might be an important factor in the retardation of the
paradigm. At the point where the saturation effect becomes noticeable in the
consumers market, the overall power of the paradigm will diminish*. This effect
is even increased when input-output relations are taken into account, because the
effect of an increasing / saturating consumer demand will have the well-known
(Leontief type) (negative or positive) multiplier effect. ^' < '-• - , «.
The relationship between prices and demand is also very important. Decreasing
production costs and increased competition along the technological paradigm will
lead to lower prices, which will spur demand, especially when one takes into
account input-output linkages in the case of intermediate (or capital) goods. This
is the reason why decreasing prices (process innovation) is mentioned in Freeman
(1991) as an important factor in the emergence of a new techno-economic
paradigm. -••>. ;=s -• • . ••••'.••••.••.<•-.••.• ....=. -;-,».•'--.••>•. ..;;»*•..;;.:- ;,;.•.
Finally, the general institutional setting of the economy has an influence on the
competitiveness of a paradigm. Freeman (1986) and Perez (1983) have argued that
there are strong links between the technological (and economic) paradigm and the
institutional setting in society. If the two match, this increases the power of the
paradigm, while the opposite holds in case of a mismatch. Institutional factors that
are of particular importance with regard to long-run growth are education and
schooling systems (see for example the recent debate in the USA, Baumol ef a/.
1989 and Baily and Gordon 1988), labour relations (for example the differences
between Japan and the USA, see Freeman 1986), politics (for example differences
between centrally planned economies and market economies, see Gomulka 1990)
and legal issues (for example a patent system, see Taylor and Silberston 1973).
Freeman (1986) has suggested that the mismatch between the information
technology paradigm and the current institutional setting in the industrialized
countries (except perhaps Japan) is one of the explanations for the so-called
productivity paradox. Of course there are all sorts of interconnections between the
* Note the similarity to product life cycle theories found in business economics, for example
Utterback and Abemathy (1975) and Abemathy (1978).
52institutional setting and the previously mentioned points. For example, labour
relations in the post-war period allowed for sufficient real wage (i.e., effective
demand) growth to make mass production profitable (see in particular the so-
called regulations school, for example Boyer 1989).
3.2, Economic Grcn&flt as a« Efolwrtonfli-y Process; A Mfrroeeonomie rwferprrffl-
fion
Attention will now be switched to the individual firm. In line with the new
neoclassical growth theory, the firm cannot take the general state of knowledge for
granted, but must make investment decisions in order to enlarge the quantity of
knowledge available to it. As will be argued in more detail below, this is even the
case if the firm follows an imitative rather than an innovative strategy (i.e., firms
try to copy innovations made by other firms), since even imitation requires skills
from the imitator. Technological progress can therefore not be taken as a datum
of the economic analysis of the firm, but must indeed be a variable explained by
any theory aiming to explain firm behaviour*.
In order to endogenize technological change at the microeconomic level in an
evolutionary way, it is useful to redefine the concept of technological change.
Instead of the neoclassical definition of technological change as the increase in
productivity of all techniques available, technological change is now defined as the
search for an increase of the known set of production techniques (see also Gomulka
1990, Chapter 1, where a similar definition is given). Note that the term technique
is given a different interpretation here. 'Technique' should be interpreted as being
a mode of production, characterized not only by the quantity of capital and labour
used, but also (and most importantly) by the quality of these factors. Two
techniques may have the same factor intensity (in whatever way this intensity is
measured), but still require completely different skills (from the side of labour) and
capital good varieties. The motive driving the firm's search for new technologies
is profit. To conduct the search for new techniques, firms might employ different
methods. Mostly, one likes to think of R&D and related activities as some measure
of inputs into the search, and innovations (and patents) as a measure of outputs
from this process. The exact way in which the process of innovative search is
conducted at the firm level is not the main interest here. Instead, attention is
concentrated on an outline of some general characteristics of the process.
For the characteristics of microeconomic firm behaviour with regard to
technological change, inspiration can (again) be drawn from Dosi. Dosi (1988a) has
defined five different stylized facts of technological change which can be the
starting point of a microeconomic description of the process of technological
change. These stylized facts are:
(i)"(...) innovation involves a fundamental clement of uncertainty, which if not simply
; • a lack of all the relevant information about the occurrence of known events but, more
* Note that it is not the aim of the present analysts to develop such a theory of the firm.
Attempts to do this along the lines set out in the rest of this chapter are in Dosi and Chiaromonte
(1990) and Kwasnidd and Kwasrdcki (1990).
9Sfundamentally, entails also (a) the existence of techno-economic problems whose
solution procedures are unknown (...) and (b) the impossibility of precisely tracing
consequences to actions"
(ii) "The increasing reliance of major new technological opportunities on advances in
scientific knowledge"
(iii) "the increasing complexity of research and innovative activities militates in favour
of formal organisations (...) as opposed to individual innovators as the most conducive
environment to the productbn of innovations. Moreover, the formal research activities
in the business sector tends to be integrated within more or less integrated
manufacturing firms"
(iv) "a significant amount of innovations and improvements are originated through
'learning-by-doing' and learning-by-using'"
(v) "technical change is a cumulative activity".
These (microeconomic) stylized facts are largely consistent with the
(macroeconomic) view of the innovation process adopted above. Points (i) and (ii)
stress the character of innovation as a search activity, as opposed to a planned
activity. Points (iv) and (v) cause a tendency towards path dependency in the
innovation system, which is consistent with the description of the techno-economic
system as paradigmatic.
What is the relevance of these stylized facts for microeconomic theory? Consider
the following three suggestive claims as a first answer to this question.
(a) It cannot be assumed that firms can maximize their profit function,
especially not in an intertemporal sense. Rather, firm behaviour is profir-
sedbr'ng.
(b) There is no such firm as the representative firm, since all firms react
differently to changing business environments.
(c) The ability to innovate is dependent upon some firm-specific learning
skills. *
The motivation behind these claims is as follows. Regarding point (a), the usual
optimization routines applied in (micro)economic models depend either on full
certainty or rational expectations, or on a known distribution of some uncertain
(risky) events. In the first case (full certainty or rational expectations) the firm
simply puts its expectations in a mathematical function to optimize and finds the
optimal value of the variable to decide on, which will always (full certainty) or on
average (rational expectations) prove to be correct. In the second case (a known
distribution of some uncertain event) the factors in the function are weighted by
their expected chance of appearance, and then the optimum of the expected value
of the variable to be optimized is found (like in the well-known Von Neumann-
Morgenstem utility function). This leads to a risk-premium on the normal rate of
return under circumstances of full certainty. The weighting of alternative outcomes
by their likelihood or the introduction of rational expectations both come down to
54. •assuming that aggregate (over individuals and over time) Ml certainty exists.
In the event that neither rational expectations or full certainty applies nor the
chance distribution of an event is known (i.e., if there is a situation of strong
uncertainty), these methods do not hold. In those cases, the concept of iw«M«W
rafwiMiiry (Simon 1986) seems to be more appropriate. The bounded rationality
hypothesis says that economic decision makers do not work with a model which
represents influences from the total economy, not even in an implicit way. They
rather attend only a small part of the world around mem, and (implicitly) make
a highly simplified model of their environment, in which some highly subjective
attitudes towards strong uncertainty are incorporated. The outcome of the decision
rules used in such a bounded rationality context will differ (except by chance)
from the outcome of a fully rational procedure under full information.
Of course firms' behaviour is motivated by making profits, even in a context of
bounded rationality. But instead of maximizing profits in a fully rational model,
firms can be assumed to try to enlarge their current profits by changing their
behaviour. This latter motive for firm behaviour can be called pn^if-«dttn£. The
difference between profit-maximizing and profit-seeking behaviour may appear to
be only very subtle and unimportant (and indeed most neoclassical economists
tend to present it this way), but as will be seen in the next section it might have
consequences for the nature of an economic theory or model.
How does profit-seeking behaviour work in a world of bounded rationality?
Instead of a mathematical function that firms optimize, one will typically see that
simple, standardized rules of thumb are used to make decisions about investment
in (the search for) new technologies (see for example Silverberg cr a/. 1988).
Gomulka (1990:29) calls these rules 'conventional rules'. As a consequence of their
simple nature, these rules yield outcomes that are sometimes positive and
sometimes negative. They are, however, the best a firm can do, given the strong
uncertainty it faces. ,, .. , ,. > ,«
Point (b) follows from the above reasoning. Firms do not behave according to
some fully rational model, but apply rules of thumb instead. Almost by definition,
these rules are not the same for every firm. They are based on such things as past
experience, the efficiency of a firm's information system and psychological factors
determining the way managers react to changing circumstances. Put in one term,
the subjective rules of thumb are closely related to the 'animal spirits' of business
(wo)men. Examples of rules of thumb are the pay back rule (Silverberg 1987),
markup pricing and the discounted cash flow method, both methods well known
from the field of business studies. Of course, the actions of entrepreneurs using
this type of rules might at some point in time resemble each other, especially if
one takes into account the existence of some general 'market expectations', or
common factors influencing decisions. Therefore, the actions of different
entrepreneurs may look coordinated, i.e., they point in one general direction^. For
' THs suggests that there is a se/f-orgiwizing femtency in the system, for an introduction of the
(mathematkaJ) concept of self-organization see Silvert>erg(1988), For an application to management
of the firm, see Ronwne (1992).
55the emergence of a new technological paradigm, as described in the previous
section, it is necessary that such coordination exists. However, since the period of
introduction of a new paradigm is also the one in which uncertainty is strongest,
one might expect that it takes some time to reach the necessary degree of
coordination.
For the present analysis, however, it is important to stress that while the actions
of different entrepreneurs may look coordinated, they may still be based on wrong
interpretations of the business environment, and therefore might imply ex posr
inefficient behaviour. Moreover, even if the genera/ market expectations prove to
be right ex post, the specific way each of the entrepreneurs has used them in
decision making will differ, and therefore the outcome will, in general, be different
from a full-fledged optimum in the neoclassical sense.
The third and last point follows from the (cumulative) character of technological
change combined with the second point. Cumulative technological change means
that "[w]hat a firm can hope to do in the future is narrowly constrained by what
it has been capable of doing in the past" (Dosi 1988b: 1130). And since firms take
different decisions with regard to a changing business environment (due to their
different rules of thumb), "what the firm was doing in the past" is different from
what all other firms were doing in the past. Hence, "what the firm can hope to do
in the future" is different from what all the other firms can hope to do in the
future.
3.3. Towards «« EfofMri'owflry TTieory
Is it possible to formulate a microeconomic foundation for an evolutionary theory
of economic growth on the basis of the above? In most microfounded economic
models, the 'regulation' principle that governs the outcome of the economic
process is the market equilibrium. There are two aspects regarding the market
equilibrium that make it less attractive as a regulation mechanism in a theory built
on the basis of the above. The first of these is the inherent sfar/c character of the
concept. The second is the idea of the representafiw agenf that underlies most
procedures to calculate the market equilibrium. Both points will be discussed
below.
First, the idea of a market equilibrium is taken from the Newtonian mechanics
developed in the previous century. The general idea here is to see how different
forces (for example in physics: gravity and friction, in economics: supply and
demand) interact with each other, resulting in a motionless situation in which each
of the forces is exactly cancelled out by all the others. Thus, the emphasis is on the
motionless situation rather than on the stage during which the system (object) is
still moving. This has resulted in the characterization of market equilibrium as an
essentially static concept. The basic demand and supply framework is perhaps the
most clear example to illustrate this. In most economic models, the emphasis is on
the state of equilibrium as such, and not on the way it is reached. Given the
demand and supply functions, economists are supposed to calculate the
intersection point, and draw conclusions on the basis of (ceteris paribus) changes
in some parameters of these functions. Only in exceptional cases, the emphasis is
56on the dynamics behind the process of reaching this equilibrium (the cobweb
theorem is one such exception).
In contrast, the picture of the macro- and microeconomics of innovation sketched
above emphasizes the importance of the stage of motion. The emergence,
development or retardation of paradigms constitutes a field in which the net
effects of the different forces are rarely zero. The same goes for the firm which has
to operate in this general environment. Thus, the market equilibrium as a static
concept cannot be used as a way of describing what is actually going on in the
economy. Schumpeter (for example 1934) has therefore argued that the concept of
market equilibrium can only be used as a sort of 'moving target' to which the
economy tends, but which it can never reach. Although this is already a much
more realistic way of using the concept of equilibrium, there are two problems
connected to this approach. First, it might be the case that in a situation which is
not characterized by equilibrium, the implied behavioural patterns are quite
different from those in equilibrium. This might lead the economy away from rather
than towards the equilibrium. Second, the equilibrium itself might be (locally)
unstable, so that the motion of the system is away from equilibrium.
The second point concerns the use of the representative agent. The assumptions
of a representative consumer and firm are usually necessary to be able to calculate
the market equilibrium. On the basis of the rationality assumption and some
specification of the functions to optimize, one can deduce some general pattern of
behaviour of an individual agent, for example the general form of a supply curve
(upward sloping linear). Different agents all have a behaviour pattern that has this
general form, but may differ from other agents' pattern by some parameter values,
for example the magnitude of the slope of a supply curve (following from
underlying exogenous differences such as risk aversion or age). These parameters
transform the general form of the behaviour pattern into the individual pattern.
The agent whose parameter values are exactly equal to the (weighted) average of
all agents' values, can be called the representative agent.
Of course, this concept is only an analytical one, and the representative agent
simply cannot be found in reality. Nevertheless, the representative agent is very
important, for it enables one to calculate the aggregate market equilibrium. The
usual procedure to do this is to substitute the behaviour pattern of the
representatives of the different types of agents into the (microeconomic)
equilibrium condition, and call the outcome (multiplied by the number of agents)
the aggregate market equilibrium*. Obviously, if no generally valid pattern of
behaviour exists, and moreover, agent-specific behaviour cannot be quantified in
an exact way, this procedure is no longer possible. If the behavioural pattern of all
agents is based on different rules of thumb whose exact nature is unknown to the
model-builder, and might yield different reactions to identical stimuli, the
representative agent looses its use as an analytical concept
* As an experiment to see the need for a representative agent, the reader is invited to solve the
stylized new growth model in Chapter 2 under the assumption of n agents with different
parameters in the various functions.Recently, it has been suggested by among others Silverberg (1988), Nelson and
Winter (1982) and Boulding (1981) that the evolutionary principle of selection might
be a useful substitute for market equilibrium. Drawing an analogy with biology,
one would then speak of 'economic selection' (vs 'natural selection' in biology).
The general idea behind the principle of (economic) selection is that it is based on
deferences in microeconomic behaviour. Each agent that takes part in the economic
process, for example a firm, will have some specific degree of competitive power
which stems from its past behaviour. On the basis of the above argument, this
competitive power will in general differ between agents. In the selection process,
these differences are the very driving force of the system. Agents whose (past and
present) behaviour resulted in highly competitive power will grow (in terms of
market share or profits), and others will loose the race, eventually forcing them to
leave the market*. The selective en^ironmenf makes the link between the
behavioural patterns and the realized growth patterns.
Thus, the selection mechanism is essentially a dynamic way of describing the
economy, since it explains the motion of the system (in terms of growing
importance of some groups of agents) instead of the motionless equilibrium that
might (theoretically) result. The notion of an <?wi«*ionflry «jMi7»briwm (Dosi rt a/.
1990) or eco%icfl/ afwtfi&ram (Boulding 1981) can be defined to represent a steady
state in which there is still motion. In this case, the different forces in the system
do not cancel each other out to yield a motionless state, but their effects work
together in such a way that the system is 'stable'. An example of this is the
situation in which there is an imitator and an innovator, where the latter
constantly invents new products, and the first constantly imitates these products
(after a lag), and these two tendencies work together in such a way that the net
market shares do not change. Thus, while an evolutionary equilibrium might arise
from the selection process, this equilibrium can still be characterized as being
dynamic'".
To sum up, the evolutionary way of looking at the world takes heterogeneity of
individuals as the starting point, and, when applied to economic processes, leads
to an explicit dynamic representation of the market process. Thus, it closely meets
with the two points of critique to the use of market equilibrium as a regulatory
mechanism in economic models, and seems to be an obvious candidate for
replacing it in a theory of economic growth and technological change along the
lines outlined above. Of course, this reasoning is nothing like a 'full-proof piece
of evidence' that the concept of market equilibrium should be abolished in favour
of the selection mechanism. Such evidence can never be given. The only way to
make plausible that the selection mechanism is a useful concept, or better, is a
more useful concept than the market equilibrium, is to apply it in economic theory.
Among others, Silverberg et a/. (1988) and Iwai (1984a, 1984b) have already done
* It has sometimes been argued that the process of selection leads to a situation which can be
characterized as a neoclassical, profit-maximizing equilibrium Hodgson (1990) has convincingly
shown that this is, however, only true in some special cases.
'* For a useful discussion of the notion of equilibrium in a dynamic framework, see Clark and
junta (1987).
58this. In Part Three of this thesis, an effort to do this will also be made.
One cowiifK) sine <jwa non in modern economics (at least among practitioners of its
neoclassical variant) seems to be that the arguments have to be put in
mathematical terms". Discussions about the value of mathematics in economies
have been existing for a long time, like many other discussions in economics. One
advantage of putting economic theory in mathematical terms is that it allows for
a discussion in exact terms, without too great a risk of getting stuck in definitional
and conceptual discussions. A dear disadvantage of mathematics is that it
provides a much less rich language, thus leaving aside many interesting topics and
leading to concentration on isolated parts of reality". This discussion will not be
pursued further here, but instead the argument will follow Gomulka (1990: 72)
when he states that
"The behavioural and evolutionary ideas are usually phrased in a manner that Is too
general to be suitable for conducting a (theoretical) analysis capable of generating
specific propositions that could be subjected to empirical tests. For that effort a further
modelling effort is needed that would give the ideas an operational quality".
Based on this assertion, the point is taken that evolutionary theory, in order to be
able to provide a useful alternative to neoclassical equilibrium analysis, should aim
at developing formal methods which can compare to neoclassical models with
respect to analytical and mathematical rigour. Of course, this does not mean that
the non-mathematical theorizing in the evolutionary tradition is not useful. On the
contrary, the strength of evolutionary theory is that the two types of analysis can
closely interact.
In the sciences of biology and (mathematical) ecology, evolutionary concepts have
already been put in mathematical terms. An overview of (mathematical) methods
used in these fields is in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988). The selection dynamics
can easily be described by a system of differential or difference equations.
Together with some other relations between variables in the system, one can thus
specify a formal model describing the interactions in part of the (biological,
ecological) problem in question. Basically, the selection mechanism can be




where X denotes the share of an individual (species) j in some variable, E is
competitiveness (/irness), and a bar indicates an average level. Thus, the replicator
"The following quotation is illustrative of one point of view regarding this issue: "The
individual intent on pursuing a career as economist has to be bright enough to understand the
abstract ramifications of neoclassical theory and dumb enough to have faith in them" (Kay 1984:
138).
" One particular interesting contribution to this debate is Romer (1990b).
59equation says that the proportionate rate of growth of the share of some individual
(species) is a (linear) function of the difference between this individual's (species')
competitiveness and the average competitiveness.
Very similar to the way in which the basic methods of neoclassical economics were
taken from physics during the end of the previous and the beginning of this
century, one can imagine that present-day evolutionary economics would borrow
heavily from these biological and ecological methods (see Allen 1988). A discussion
of how these methods of formal modelling can be incorporated in economics is
given in Silverberg (1988), while equation (III.l) - (III.2) will be applied in Part
Three below.
Contrary to the idea that economics can learn from biology, is Gould's (1977: 88)
assertion that Darwin took the basic idea for his evolution theory from Adam
Smith's work. However, analogies between economics and biology are not
uncontested. Throughout the classical era, there were some 'flirts' with biological
sciences, and Darwin's work in particular, Clark and Juma (1987: 46) cite Marx'
view of Darwin's work (expressed in a letter to Engels) as follows: "this is the book
that contains the basis in natural history for our view". But they also show that in
their later work, Marx and Engels "returned to a classical Newtonian world-view"
(Clark and juma 1987; 48). However, after Veblen (1898) the interest in biological
analogies almost vanished. The general opinion about biological analogies during
the neoclassical era is perhaps best illustrated by a quotation from Samuelson
(1967):
"All this prattle about biological methods in economics (...) cannot change this feet:
any price taker who can sell more at the going price than he is now selling and who
has falling marginal costs will not be in equilibrium. Talk of birds and bees, giant trees
in the forest, and declining entrepreneurial dynasties, is all very well, but why blink
at such an elementary point".
However, in order to make use of the selection mechanism in economics, some
important questions remain to be answered. In which way is performance
measured (what does X stand for in the above equation)? What is the unit of
selection (what does »denote)? How is competitiveness (E) measured? Obviously,
these questions cannot be seen independent of one another. Some preliminary
answers could be to use the firm as the unit of selection, and market share as a
measure of performance. Measures of competitiveness would then be product price
or quality. Market shares would change as a result of firm behaviour, and
technological paradigms would emerge, develop and retard as an outcome of this
firm-level selection process. Another approach would be to use a technology as the
unit of selection, and make the development of firms secondary to this.
Regardless of the answer to these questions, while drawing the analogy between
economic and natural selection, one should take into account the distinction
between Darwinian and Lamarckian concepts of evolution. Darwin's evolutionary
concept says that species are selected (or not) on the basis of the combination of
some of their characteristics and the environment. These characteristics are
exogenous, and only change as a result of random mutations. Consider the
60following example. Among all the animals living in an area where trees are scarce,
the giraffe stood out because it (accidentally) was able to eat from the highest
trees, and thus had a competitive advantage in the daily struggle for food. Other
species, with shorter necks, became extinct because they were not able to eat from
the highest trees. After Darwin, an explanation of this process was built on the
basis of the laws of inheritance, as formulated first by Mendel (see Hofbauer and
Sigmund 1988).
The Lamarckian idea is that species survive the selection process because they are
able to change some of their inherent characteristics, i.e., they have an ability to
learn. To continue the above example, giraffes were able to survive because their
necks became longer and longer while reaching out for the high trees. Species
which were not able to develop longer necks (through learning) did not survive,
Thus, while the Darwinian view stresses the concept of selection of the 'survival
of the fittest', the Lamarckian concept stresses the importance of the learning
capability. One way to interpret this difference is to say that in Darwinian
selection, mutation is exogenous (random), while in the Lamarckian view it is
endogenous. While in biology the Darwinian concept might be more appropriate,
the above discussion on endogenous innovation has shown that the Lamarckian
concept might be more useful in economics. Obviously, in economics individual
agents learn. Firms can change their behaviour on the basis of experience.
Therefore, an evolutionary theory of economics would necessarily include some
elements of Lamarckian thought.
A logical venue for modelling the Lamarckian learning idea in economics is the
theory on learning curves (see for example Dosi 1988b, Spence 1981, Fudenberg
and Tirole 1984, and the discussion on the Verdoorn effect in Chapter 2). This
literature captures the idea that experience with new products or processes leads
to higher efficiency in using them. Different modes of learning can be defined,
such as leflrning-by-ioing, /earnmg-by-wsmg, or even fairning-fry-/«jrm'M# (see for
example Stiglitz 1987). The model that will be developed in Part Three below will
mainly look at innovation as a learning process, as the natural way of
implementing the Lamarckian concept of evolution in economics.
To conclude, a useful way of modelling the relation between technological change
and economic growth should be of an explicit dynamic nature, and preferably take
differences between firms as the starring point of the analysis. The model of
knowledge spillovers in Part Two below, as well as the model of competition,
specialization and growth in Part Three will make some efforts in this way.
61CHAPTER 4. Tedmofogy awif Growtfi in fl«
IntefMationaJ Perspecfit/e, 2960-1990. An
After the theoretical perspective of the previous chapters, this chapter will review
the empirical evidence on growth rate differentials and technology gaps in the
postwar period. To do so, the analysis will be split into three major parts. The first
part looks at the available economic data. The phenomena studied are economic
growth at the macro and sectoral level, and structural change (between countries
and over time). The second part looks at technological change, and tries to detect
some regularities in the available indicators, such as total factor productivity,
labour productivity and R&D efforts. The third part tries to connect economic
growth to technological change, and looks at the world trends in technology gaps
and growth rates in a preliminary way.
4,1, Economic Growfft ««if Sfraefwraf Cftange
«, Do (Aggregate) Growiffc Kates Di/fer?
Before asking the question 'Why do growffc rate differ?' (Parts Two and Three), it
is useful to look at the data on world economic growth in order to understand to
what extent the phenomenon to be explained actually exists. Recent data sets
developed by the World Bank (Summers and Heston 1991) provide a good picture
of growth performance at the twrW lei>e/. Figures IV.l - IV.3 use these data to
illustrate the degree to which growth rates differ in various subgroups of
countries. The figures give the simple mean, and the dispersion (i.e., one standard
deviation) around it, of the growth rates of real per capita income' for the period
1961-1986. Hundred-and-fifteen countries were used in the calculations for the
figures. ,
What emerges from the graphs first of all, is the variation of growth rates over
time. In all three figures, the recessions in the 1970s obviously leave their traces,
as does the recent recovery of the world economy in the early 1980s. Of course,
this resemblance results because the different economies in the world are not
Independent upon one another. Interacting with each other through trade,
monetary flows and factor movements, growth patterns are exported. Second, it
is clear that means of growth rates differ among subgroups of countries.
Successively removing African and non-OECD countries from the sample raises
• RGDPCH from the PWTS data set in Summers and Heston (1991). The figures give three-year
moving averages of the mean growth rate and the standard deviation. The condusions drawn here
generally also hold tor total income (as opposed to per capita).
62Figure IV.l. Variation around average growth rates of per capita GDP. All
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Figure IV.3, Variation around average growth rates of per capita GDP. OECD
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the mean of the growth rate over the whole time period'. Third, there exists a
considerable degree of growth rate dispersion, despite the interaction mentioned
above. For the first two graphs, the difference between being one standard
deviation below or above the mean implies the difference between a growth rate
well below zero, and one close to 10%. For OECD countries alone, the differences
are less drastic, but still considerable. As in the case of the means, the dispersion
varies among the sub-groups in the sample. Again, successively removing African
and non-OECD countries for the figure leads to smaller dispersion around the
mean. Contrary to the mean growth rate, the dispersion around it does not seem
to vary systematically with time (with the exception perhaps of the OECD, where
some signs of convergence of growth rates over the 1980s are visible).
' Except for the 1970s, which indicates that the world economic crash coinciding with the two
oil-crises shook the OECD countries harder than others,
64b. The Pro«facfio« SfmcfKre
Before investigating whether or not sectoral growth rates also differ, it is useful to
look at the production structure in different countries. To do this, only data about
the manufacturing sector in a limited number of countries will be used because of
the absence of data for other countries. By way of introduction, Figures IV.4 -
IV.4b gives the shares of separate sectors* in total manufacturing sectors for the
Newly /ndusfnalizmg Counrrtes (NiCs), Dewfoperf M«rtef Economies (DMEs)* and the
total of the two groups for 1970 @V.4a) and 1980 (IV.4b), A few points emerge
from the figures. First, it appears that the differences between 1970 and 1980 shares
are not very large. This points to the fact that, at the world level, the production
structure only changes slowly over time. However, since the period under
consideration here is not representative of the postwar period as a whole, the
figure does not prove that, in general, structural change is slow. For example, in
light of the recent technological developments, one could expect that changes In
the production structure are much faster in the 1980s and 1990s.
A second point that emerges clearly from the figures is that there are huge
differences in importance between sectors. While the largest sector occupies about
one eighth of total production, the smallest sectors are typically responsible for less
than one hundredth of total production. Partly, these differences are due to the
arbitrary aggregation logic in the ISIC classification*, which identifies at the 3-digit
level both such large sectors as total food or textiles industries and small sectors
as for example professional and scientific instruments. It is true, however, that
these levels of aggregation are some, although very rough, measure of the scope
of a specific firm operating in one of these industries. The scope of a firm
operating in one particular area of the food industry will certainly be so broad as
to include most (if not all) other activities in this branch, but will certainly not
include something like transportation equipment. Thus, the relative importance of
each of the sectors gives some indication of the extent of the market for the
activities of the group of firms in a country. The figure clearly indicates that it
pays to occupy a large share of the market for food products or transport
equipment*, but that it is less important to have a large market share in industries
like pottery, tobacco or china and earthenware.
A third point that can be seen in the figures is the relative importance of high- and
medium-tech sectors. Most of the largest sectors would fit into the category of
medium-tech sectors (transport equipment, non-electrical machinery, petroleum
refineries, industrial chemicals). Typically low-tech branches rank among the small
' The classification used here and below is ISIC, revision 2. For an explanation see Appendix
IV.2.
* For the explanation of country grouping, see Appendix IV.l. ;
* Since only manufacturing is taken into account, non-manufactured food products (agriculture)
are not considered.
* Transport equipment is an example of the flaws in the aggregation logic, because, for
example, both airplanes and bicycles are included.
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Figure IV.4a. Seaoral shares in total manufacturing production, NIG, DMEs and
total, 1970
o
Flgafe IV.4b. Sectoral shares in total manufacturing production, NICs, DMEs and
total. 1980
66sectors (such as non-metallic mineral products, wood products and paper) or
medium-size sectors (iron and steel, textiles). A notable exception is the food
industry. Real high-tech sectors, of which there are only a few at the 3-digit ISIC
level, can be found all over the size spectrum. Electrical machinery ranks among
the large sectors, other chemicals (of which Pharmaceuticals comprise a large part)
is in the medium-size sectors, and professional and scientific instruments is a very
small sector. , ,, ....• ,.,v,, > .. ., .•.K.-,.. .;•: . , . .
A last point that is worth stressing is that the production structure varies between
NICs and DMEs. In particular, the importance of food products, textiles and
apparel seems to be larger in the NICs, while the share of transport equipment,
non-electrical machinery and printing and publishing is larger in the DMBs. This
points to a certain specialization pattern between NICs and DMEs which is known
from more detailed historical descriptions of the development process in the NICs
(see also Chapter 9). This last point can also be shown by computing indexes of
structural differences between countries. Instead of the usual way of looking at
structural change in the same country, but between different points in time, the
numbers presented here look at structural change between countries at the same
point in time. An index which measures this is the following.
~--•->—r: ~. '.T* feudal >v "" ;r" •>' <iv,i)
In this equation, A is the index for structural differences, subscripts j and it denote
a country, subscripts ;' denote a sector. The index A ranges between zero and two,
a value of zero pointing to no differences in the structural mix of production, and
a value of two pointing to a complete opposition of the structure .
In Figure IV.5, the values for A are presented for combinations of 15 countries.
Each point gives the combination of the distance between two countries in 1970
(horizontal axis) and 1980 (vertical axis). Thus, the points in the graph give two
sorts of information. First, the steepness of the line pointing from the origin to a
particular point gives an indication of the change in the distance between the two
countries. A steep line points to a rapidly increasing distance, and a flat line points
to a rapidly decreasing distance. If a point is below (above) the 45° line, the
distance between the two countries it reflects became smaller (larger) during the
period 1970-1980. Second, the distance of a point to the origin gives an indication
of the average distance between the two countries. Measured on one axis only, the
distance is, of course, that for one of the two years.
' This way of distance measurement is a special case of a more general formula known as the
Minkowski p-metric. This special case is also known under the name of city block metric or
Manhattan metric. Another special case of the Minkowski p-metric is the familiar Euclidean metric.
For more information on the Minkowski p-metric and the interpretation of different special cases,
see Appendix IV.3. Note that a value of two can only be reached in a (mutual) situation of










• Big 5 - Big 5
+ Big 5 • NICs 1
* Big 5 - NICs 2
• NICs 1 - NICs 1
X NICs 1 - NICs 2
• NICs 2 - NICs 2
>/ «x
0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1
structural differences 1970
1,2 1,4
Figure IV.5. Structural differences in the world, 1970-1980
The countries represented in the figure are the Big 5 (USA, Japan, Germany,
France, UK) and ten NICs. NICs are divided into two groups: high-income (1) and
low-income (2) NICs (see Appendix IV.l). These three groups give six different
combinations of country types, each represented by a unique marker type. The first
impression one gets from the graph is that structural differences became smaller
during the period 1970-1980 (almost all points are below the 45° line). Thus, the
NICs have been catching up to the economic leaders with respect to production
structures. Second, the three different groups of countries can be identified quite
well in terms of their location in the graph in a large number of cases. Some of the
marker types used appear in relatively homogeneous clouds in an isolated part of
the graph. This particularly goes for the groups in which the Big 5 are included,
and only to some extent for the other groups. This means that the Big 5 countries
are a relatively homogeneous group. The pointe representing 'internal' differences
in this group are all very close to the origin. The cloud of points giving the
distance between NICs 1 and the Big 5 appears to be further away from the origin,
indicating that the average distance within this group is larger than among the Big
5 countries themselves. Moving further to the top right of the graph, the markers
for Big 5 and NICs 2 countries are found, indicating that the average distance
between these two groups is even larger Internal distances between NICs are all
fairly large and not very homogeneous.Figure IV.da. A Map of structural differences in the world, 1970Figure IV.6b. A map of structural diflFerenccs in the worid, 1980These conclusions can also be drawn from a different way of graphing the
stractarai distances between countries (now for a larger sample than Figure 1V.5X
In Figures IV,6a and i¥,6b, the tediniipte of wrojwftie *B«M$lmewsK>j«l scalwg to
applied to the case. This technique is further introduced and discussed in
Appendix IV.3. The figures have to be interpreted as follows. The configuration
of the points is chosen sudh that the rank order of the distances between (the
centre of) the points to the graph is as close as possible to the rank order of the
distances found in the (half) matrix of distances between the countries in the graph
as measured in the way introduced above. The two dimensions Cor axes)
themselves have no meaning at all. Their only purpose Is to provide enough
degrees of freedom in order to be able to find a 'close enough* configuration of
points. In fact, one could increase the accuracy of the configuration by introducing
another dimension, wMch has not, however, been done because this would make
the graphical presentation more difficult The scales of both dimensions are kept
identical, in order to allow for comparison between the two graphs.
In terms of economic grouping, the graphs reflect to a large extent iirtuitiv®
expectations. It seems as if there are a number of layers of groups of countries. The
Asian NICs (Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and fee Philippines), often highly
specialized (see also Chapter 9), are at the outside of the conf iguratton, after which
one finds mixed layers of Southern American NICs (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia),
the less developed from the DMEs {Turkey, Portugal, Greece) and the smaller
DMEs (The Netherlands, Scandinavian countries). Then there is a core consisting
mainly of the Big 5 countries plus Italy and Belgium*. The position of Yugoslavia
among the'inner layers'is surprising. i
To conclude, one might say that besides differences in growth performance, there
are also considerable differences in production structure between countries.
Moreover, these differences are subject to changes over time.
* In the first figure, the two countries appearing on top of each other are Japan and Great
Britain.
71c. Sectoral Grottrtfe Pa rfems
Coming back to the issue of growth, Figure IV.7 presents sectoral growth rates of
production over the period 1963-1989. The growth trends are calculated by
estimating each country's growth trend by an OLS-regression, and weighting the
results by the country's production share in 1980. This procedure is necessary
because missing values in the data do not allow for the precise 'world' growth rate
to be estimated. Note that for most countries, data for the last few years are
absent, and that for a smaller number of countries data for the beginning of the
period are absent.
15
Figure IV.7. Growth of production in 28 manufacturing sectors, 35 countries 1963-1989
It is immediately clear that there is a strongly positive relation between the degree
of technology intensity and the growth rate of production. The three high-tech
sectors are ranked in places 2-5, most low-tech sectors have grown slower than
average (as represented by total manufacturing), and most medium-tech sectors
rank above average. This correspondence is an important finding because it
confirms the economic importance of high-tech sectors at a more general world
level. This illustrates the importance of the point made in Chapter 3 about income
elasticities and major technological innovations.
With regard to the differences between blocks, it is worth stressing that the NICs'
performance is higher than the rest of the world in almost every sector (with the
exception of printing and publishing). In order to see the influence of this onmarket shares in world production, Figure IV.8 looks at the market share in total
production of NICs and DMEs in 1970 (left bar) and 1980 (right bar). Results for
NICs are only given for ten NICs, because no data for the early periods are
available for two countries. Total production is the production of DMEs plus ten
NICs.
The figure shows that the share of DMEs in total production is still very large,
although decreasing (for total manufacturing) with about 2,5 % points over 1970-
1980. Looking at individual sectors, observe that the loss of market shares of the
DMEs to the NICs is a general phenomenon across sectors during the period 1970-
1980, and almost every sector (for which data are available) during 1980-1985 (1985
results not documented). Only for transport equipment (a medium-tech, large
sector) and electrical machinery (high-tech), the NICs' gain in market share in
1970-1980 was partly lost again during 1980-1985. Sectors in which DMBs are
relatively strong are mainly wood, furniture, paper, printing, industrial chemicals,
plastic products and metal-related sectors. NICs are relatively strong in food and
related sectors, textiles and related sectors and miscellaneous coal and petroleum
products. All in all, the figure indicates that market shares are subject to a
considerable degree of change, even at the level of aggregation of only two
different blocks. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that besides aggregate













Figure IV.8. Market shares in world manufacturing production, 1970-1980
734.2. Technology *"-'
a. How Exogenous te Sofow's ResMaal?
Chapter 2 presented some theories on the relation between technological change
and economic growth. The older theories (Raider's model being an exception)
assumed that technological change is exogenous, i.e., not systematically related to
economic variables. The newer theories tend to look at innovation as an
endogenous phenomenon. This section will address the question of endogenous
or exogenous technological change by means of a preliminary empirical analysis.
The approach followed is to relate numbers on the contribution of technological
change to economic growth (as measured by TFP) by means of regression analysis
to data on R&D activities, investment and initial technology gaps. This will be
done for a sample of 23 OECD countries.
As explained in Chapter 2, Solow's residual (TFP) measures the contribution of
technological change to economic growth. Although the procedure is fraught with
difficulties (such as the strict assumption of competitive market equilibrium and
neglecting of sources of growth such as institutional change), it will be assumed
here that TFP measures this contribution at least to an extent which allows one to
make some inference about the relations between technological progress and
economic variables from the empirical macroeconomic data. Usually, calculations
of TFP assume that technological progress is neutral (as in the formula for TFP
introduced in Chapter 2). It is, however, possible to assume that technological
change has a bias and calculate the according rate of TFP growth associated with
the observed movements in aggregate inputs and output. In this case, however, it
is necessary to assume a specific functional form of the production function.
Therefore, assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas with CRS and
labour-augmenting technical progress, as is the case in Solow's growth model from
Chapter 2, Then, TFP growth can be calculated as follows.
The usual TFP formula, under the assumption that technical progress is neutral,
is reproduced from Chapter 2 and looks as follows.
The subscripts n and s denote neutral and labour-augmenting, respectively.
The value of A, and A, is calculated using aggregate data from the OECD ISDB
databank. The capital stock (JC in the formulas for TFP) is obtained from gross
investment by a perpetual inventory method*. Labour input is measured as the
number of labourers (not hours worked), while labour's share in income is
calculated from the employee's total compensation (multiplied by the ratio of total
employment to employees). The explanatory variables used in the equation for TFP
are gross investment as a fraction of the capital stock (f/K) or as a fraction of
output (I/Q) (taken from the OECD ISDB databank), business enterprise R&D
* The initial capital stock is calculated as J/0 06, the depreciation rate is assumed to be 0.02. It
is assumed that there is a one-year gestation lag for investment.
74expenditures as fraction of output (R&D intensity, or RDD (source: OECD/STHD),
and 1963 per capita GDP in 1980 purchasing power parities (source: QECD/ST1ID),
There are two reasons why the analysis will be restricted to cross-country analysis
rather than time series analysis. First, in the process of technological change, there
are clearly lags involved between innovation inputs (measured by grow
investment or R&D expenditures) and innovation outputs in the form of growth
in TFP. The size of this lag is not clear, and moreover, probably not constant, so
that time series analysis would be difficult. Second, the series used show trends
in the period under consideration. R&D intensity rises steadily in most countries,
while the investment ratio falls. These trends are probably due to systematic
changes of production mode in the countries under consideration, switching from
a fixed capital-intensive way of production towards a more knowledge-intensive
production mode'". While these trends can, and probably will be, related to
productivity performance, a time series regression analysis is not likely to capture
this phenomenon of a more secular nature than the short term regression would
be fitting.
Therefore, the variables (except initial income per capita) used in the regression are
averages over the period" 1960-1989 (TFP and investment) or 1967-1989 (R&D).
As in Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990), it is assumed that this provides a reasonable
way to capture the lag structure of the relation (see also Chapter 8 below). Of
course, this method does not take into account that the period in question was one
of uneven distribution of productivity (and output) growth over time. It is well
known now that productivity and output growth was remarkably slow from 1973
to the early 1980s. This phenomenon was particularly strong in the USA, and to
a lesser extent elsewhere. Some countries (the lower income countries and
Scandinavia), however, barely experienced this productivity slowdown. This
heterogeneity over time is not taken into account in the regression analysis.
Therefore, the only purpose of the regressions can be to explain the average
productivity performance in the post-1960 period. The productivity slowdown
cannot be explained.
The results are documented in Table IV.l. The two R&D intensities reflect total
Business Enterprise R&D (including government subsidies, RD/2), and Business
Enterprise R&D privately financed (RDJ2). What stands out in the results, is the
importance of initial income as an explanation for the variance in TFP, measured
either way. In fact, initial income and the constant are the only variables yielding
significant results". This shows that the catching-up phenomenon seems to be of
great importance. Countries with low initial income tend to yield high TFP growth.
The importance of this trend should not be overestimated, since gross investment in fixed
capital is still about ten times more important than R&D.
" Individual countries may have different periodizatkm due to missing values in the date.
" Besides the variables in the table, regressions were also calculated with the difference
between start and end period RDI and (I/Q) or (I/K) (scaled by the number of years between
them). These yielded only insignificant results, with often the wrong sign, and have therefore been
left out of the tableR&D and investment seem to be much less important. The signs of the regression
coefficients are almost always correct (i.e., positive), but also insignificant.
Intuitively, one would expect the level of investment and R&D intensity to be
correlated with initial income, so that the f-values in the table are probably
underestimated due to some degree of multicollinearity. However, as the analysis
in Appendix IV.4 shows, the effects of this are negligible.
The weakness of these results might be caused by the fact that, as already
indicated above, the measure for TFP includes other variables than just
technological change. Due, to its 'residual-nature', TFP measures all effects other
than those of increases on capital and labour, implying that things such as
measurement errors, institutional change, misspecification, etc., are all included
(see also Nelson 1981). This may well lead to a low 'signal-to-noise' ratio, causing
the low significance of the estimated coefficients. Moreover, the measurement
errors might be correlated to the explanatory variables themselves (for example,
high investment and a high degree of institutional change might go together),
leading to additional problems with the estimations in the table. However, given
the rough character of the test, no attempt will be made to correct for this.
The two last columns of Table IV.l present F-statistics for tests of structural change
of the parameters for different subsamples of countries. Separate regressions are
calculated for high- and low-tech countries (as identified by RDZ2), and for
countries with high and low initial income gaps. The results show that in case of
labour-augmenting technical progress (equations IV.5-IV.8), splitting the sample
adds significantly to the R^. However, the parameter estimates (not presented)
show that in this case the r-values are in the same order of magnitude, and the
parameters have the same sign. Thus, the conclusion of the regression is that the
cross-country variation in Solov/s residual can be explained for a large part by
differences in initial income. The influence of R&D and investment is only weak .
To conclude, one might say that the evidence for endogenous movements of TFP
is quite weak. This preliminary result does not provide much support for theories
of endogenous technological change, such as the new growth theory and Kaldor's
model. If anything, the catching-up potential is an important explanatory variable,
while variables that one would expect to explain TFP movements (R&D,
investment) are generally insignificant. Of course, the tests undertaken are quite
rough, and should not be taken as definite answers to the question of exogenous
vs endogenous technological change. However, what stands out is the importance
of catching up'* for TFP growth.
" A number of other studies have investigated the productivity - R&D relation. Patel and Soete
(1987) have found positive, but not very strong, relations between TFP and R&D at the aggregate
level. Mohnen (1990) gives an overview, and Mairesse and Sassenou give an overview of studies
at the firm level. For a general overview of the relation between technical change and TFP, see
Nelson (1981).
" Dowrick and Nguyen (1W) also find this.





































































































* One, two and three stars point to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level (one sided f- and F-tests), A test for heteroscedasticity was performed, which
resulted in non-rejection of the homoscedasticity assumption. Columns F, and Fj point to F-iests for structural differences between two subsamptes. In
the case of F,, the sample is split into two groups on the basis of R&D intensity (RD1). The grouping is as follows: Turkey, Greece, Iceland, Portugal,
New Zealand, Spain, Australia, Ireland, Italy (low-tech); Denmark, Finland, Austria, Canada, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Japan, Sweden,
FR Germany, UK, USA, Switzerland (high-tech). In the case of Fj, the sample is split as follows Turkey, Portugal, Greece, Japan, Ireland, Spain, Finland,
Austria, Italy, FR Germany, France, Belgium (low initial income); Denmark, UK, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Netherlands, Australia, Switzerland, New
Zealand, Canada, USA (high initial income).Another useful question is whether the rate of technological change varies across
sectors. To test for this, technological change is again measured by TFP, Using the
Solow formula which is familiar by now (this time only with neutral technological
change), an index of technological change is constructed for a number of sectors.
The source of the data is the OECDISDB database, which allows for construction
of TFP indices at the 1-digit ISIC level for six OECD countries: the USA, Canada,
Japan, FR Germany, Australia and Finland. At the 2-digit ISIC level, TFP indices
can only be constructed for manufacturing in the USA and Japan, The period
under consideration is 1970-1986. For this period, a 'cross-country average' sectoral
rate of technological change is calculated by taking the weighted average of
country level TFP growth per year, with country shares in total production used
as weights. Setting the index of technological change at one for the starting year
(1970), a shift factor 04 in the production function) for each subsequent year can
be calculated.
In order to test whether the rate of technological change is equal among sectors,
an equation can be estimated which relates this index to time. Pooling the data
together in one large sample, the model can be estimated for the whole sample,
and for subsamples consisting of data for one sector only. A Chow F-test of the
type used above can then be applied to test whether the split into subsamples (i.e.,
sectors) improves the fit of the equation. In the actual estimation, two different
equations are used. One assumes a linear time trend (i.e., decreasing rates of
technological change), and one assumes an exponential trend (i.e., constant
proportionate rates of technological progress)".
First, these equations are estimated for the 1-digit ISIC sectors agriculture, mining
and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity-gas-water, construction, transport storage
and communications, for the averages of the six OECD countries above. In this
case, the F-statistics for the hypothesis of equal rates of technological change are
115 (linear trend) and 162 (exponential trend), which means that the null
hypothesis is rejected at all normal levels of significance. Second, for the 2-digit
ISIC manufacturing sectors food-beverages-tobacco, textiles, paper-printing-
publishing, chemicals, non-metallic mineral products, basic metal products, and
machinery and equipment, the F-statistics are 32 (linear time trend) and 24
(exponential trend), which are also highly significant. These results show that over
the whole economy as well as within manufacturing, rates of technological change
differ from sector to sector. Table IV.2 lists these differences'*.
" An alternative specification, which has become fashionable recently, is tfte assumption of a
stochastic trend or random walk (see, for example. Stock and Watson 1988), However, while this
assumption provides ample opportunities for sophisticated econometric analysis, it does not start
from the intuitive notion that the (long-term) direction of technological change is towards /ngfcer
productivity and fcrtfer products.
'* Note that the restricted case represents an unweighted average rate of technological progress.
Therefore, the coefficient here might rum up insignificant, white one would find a significant
coefficient if one looked at aggregate data.
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By and large, the table confirms the intuitive ideas about sectoral rates of
technological change. It is largest and positive in manufacturing, but smaller in
sectors as agriculture and banking. Negative values are found in mining and
construction, which can be explained by the (growing) scarcity of land and natural
resources. Within manufacturing, it is largest in textiles and machinery. In order
to test in a more exact way in which sectors the rates of technological change
actually differ'*, Mests on the parameter values in Table IV.2 can be performed.
In this case, the hypothesis that the rate of technological change is equal in two
sectors must be tested by two Hests, which yields the possibility for an
inconclusive result. Applying this method (the exact results are not documented)
to the 1-digit sectors, it is found that all estimated rates of technological change
differ from each other, except the ones for agriculture and transport, storage and
communications. For manufacturing, it turns out that the rates of technological
change are not significantly different from each other in the (typically low-tech)
sectors food-beverages-tobacco, paper-printing-publishing, non-metallic mineral
products and basic metal products.
in a larger sample of countries, indicators of TFP growth in different sectors are
" Note that the F-tests above do not exclude the possibility *at the rates of technological
change are equal in a limited number of sectors.
79not available. However, one can look at the growth rate of labour productivity as
an indicator of technological change'*. Figure FV.9 ranks the 28 manufacturing
sectors used before by the rate of labour productivity growth over the period 1963-
1989. The method of calculation is the same as the one used in Figure IV.7. The
results in Figure 1V.9 confirm the earlier impression of varying rates of
technological change across sectors. As in the above regressions, the high-tech
sectors rank among the highest rates. However, there are also some typically low-
tech sectors where the growth rate of labour productivity has been quite high (iron
and steel and textiles-related sectors are the most outstanding examples). TMs, as
well as the high rate of TFP growth found above, stresses the importance of
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Figure IV.9. Average growth rate of labour productivity in manufacturing sectors, 1963-1989,
NICs, DMEs and toed
With regard to the distinction between NICs and DMEs, it appears that contrary
to the picture for growth performance, the NICs have not achieved the fastest
growth in labour productivity (note that the trend for total manufacturing
represents the average for all sectors). Thus, although labour productivity has
grown at a slower rate in the NICs than in the rest of the world, these countries
have still been able to increase their production at a higher rate than the rest of the
" For some comments with regard to the usefulness of labour productivity as an indicator of
technology, see Chapter 8world This indicates that the growth performance of the NICs is a ewe of 'width'
(arising out of the growth of the labour force) rattier than 'depth' (arising out of
increased productivity}.
43. Tec/trto/o^y and Grawffc Cufidtwf Up or F«H«Hg &M«i? A Gfobtrf /ss«e
As a first way of getting some /irdiug of the retewu teteeen growth rates and
technology to the world, this section will summarize the available evidence by
trying to detect some regularities in growth performance across countries. The
results in section 4,2a raise the question whether the relation between initial
income and growth is also valid for a larger set of countries. This question is
particularly acute if one realizes that most countries outside the sample considered
above face an income gap much larger than fee countries in the above regressions.
Is the growth potential of these countries proportional to this income gap?
In order to answer this question, the dynamics of real per capita GDP (used as a
rough indicator of technological level), denoted by GT^, for a larger sample of
countries Cn-114) will now be investigated. Besides enlarging the sample, the
method of calculating growth performance and the period under consideration
have also been changed. The data used are taken from Summers and Heston (1987)
(ICHGOP, as above). The value of per capita GDP for the United States is taken
as the productivity of the technological leader in the definition of the technology
gap. In order to take into account the /ong-term movement of per capita income,
the period considered is 1960-1986. In order to take into account not only the
beginning and end year of this period, the following method is used to measure
the growth performance of a country. Define the relative per capita income gap
(denoted by G) between country i and the USA as follows.
G=ln (IV.4)
The logarithmic specification is used to obtain the convenient property that for
equal values of per capita income levels, the income gap is zero. In order to
measure the growth performance of a country, the average motion of G over time
can be measured by estimating the following equation for the period 1960-1985 (e
is an error term with the usual properties).
tfv.5)
Figure IV.10 presents the relation between the initial level of the per capita income
gap and the motion over time of the gap, measured by the estimated value of a
in equation flV.5). Note that, by definition, a negative value of the growth rate
indicates a relatively good performance. The lines drawn indicate the estimated
(linear) regression lines for different subsamples.
81motion of G (%) 1960-1986
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Figure IV.10, Convergence and divergence in the world economy, 1960-1985
If there is a systematic pattern in the fora/ cloud of points in the graph, it is the
variance, which grows bigger as the per capita income gap becomes larger. Thus,
the countries close to the world economic and technological frontier (as measured
by the performance of the USA) show smaller (absolute) growth rate differentials
relative to this frontier than those further away from it. The results in Figure IV.10
indicate that there is a dichotomy between catching up and falling behind at the
world level. Part of the countries facing the largest gaps (the developing countries)
have also experienced the largest increases in the gap, which is exactly opposite
to what the catching-up hypothesis predicts. However, within one or more groups
of countries, the catching-up hypothesis seems to make some sense. To see this,
one should realize that the catching-up hypothesis predicts that the regression
using the variables in the graph yields a line with a negative slope crossing the
vertical axis somewhere near the origin (so that most of the line is below the zero-
line). Obviously, this makes sense for the group of DMEs, NICs and oil exporters.
Thus, in terms of the results found, there seems to be some indication that catching
up is a relevant phenomenon only for these groups. This is confirmed by a more
formal analysis. The lines drawn are the regression lines for subsamples of the
total of 114 countries. Running a regression for the total sample, and applying a
Chow F-test for the hypothesis that this regression fits the data as well as the four
separate regressions, yields an F-statistk of 7.59, which rejects the null hypothesis
at the 1 % leveL This is al$o in Mne with the result of empirical studies briefly
reviewed in section 2.5.
82IB orfer to investigate whether the cateMng-up tread, which has now been shown
to be 'local' over the most recent period, is also relevant to a longer time period,
data from MaddteoR (1991) are used'*. Define the convergence coefficient (C) as
ft® mean value across countries of the percentaal deviation from the frontier
fwhich Is defined as the sample maximum of per capita GDP, which is equal to
the USA value for most of the period). Thus, a decreasing value of C indicates
convergence (catching up), while an increasing value points to divergence. Next,
the inverse of fee Thei! Entropy coefficient for GDP (denoted by E) is an Indicator
of comznfntfiaH. Large (small) values of the Indicator go together with high Clow)
concentration, At a given point in time, E only gives an indication of the (spatial)
division of some variable across the country sample. However, it is the time path
of E that is of interest for the analysis here, where a decreasing (increasing) trend
indicates convergence (divergence).
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Figure IV.ll. Convergence and divergence trends in the 20th century
Figure IV.ll gives the time path of C and E for MadcUson's long-run data over the
20th century. An impressionist view of the time series seems to suggest that there
are four main periods which differ with regard to convergence / divergence
" Note that Maddison's long-run data are only available for a limited set of countries;
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands/
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. GDP is taken directly from Maddison, which means it
Is corrected for territorial changes, and population (also from Maddison} has been corrected for
territorial changes by using Maddison's explanation for the GDP case.patterns, In the first period (1900-1920), there is no real trend in either of the series.
As argued in Maddison (1991), this is the period in which the USA slowly begins
to take over technological (i.e., productivity) and economic leadership from Great
Britain. The second period corresponds to the 1920s, in which some (very) weak
signs of convergence are visible. This period is follows by the Great Depression of
the 1930s and the second World War, which have a dramatic impact on both
indicators. The period 1930-1950 is therefore not useful from an analytical point of
view. Around 1950, the dispersion in (per capita) GDP seems to have settled back
again at levels more or less comparable with the pre-1930 period, although the war
seems to have created a gap between the USA and Europe (see Maddison 1991).
From that point on, a very strong trend of convergence sets in. The figure shows
that this period has indeed been an exceptional one from a historical point of view,
and that a large part of the growth in the lagging countries must be explained by
a catching-up effect. The last part of the time series in the graph seems to suggest
that from the mid 1970s onwards, the catching-up effect is becoming less
important, The convergence trend weakens, and the scope for catching up seems
to be diminishing considerably. The combination of this and the previously
mentioned strong convergence trend makes the postwar period in general, and the
most recent decade in particular, a rather interesting setting to study the dynamics
of imitation, innovation and catching up.
Having put the catching-up phenomenon in its historical context, the analysis is
again broadened to take into account more countries. In order to obtain a first
impression about the possible causes of the dichotomy between catching up and
falling behind, the last part of this section applies some additional data and
methods. The technique used is cluster analysis. For each of the two periods 1960-
1973 and 1973-1988% the average yearly growth rate of GDP per capita and
population, the average level of R&D intensity and the investment output ratio,
and the initial level of catching-up potential are calculated for each country for
which data are available. In order to rule out the influence of scale, each of the
variables is scaled on the interval 0-1, with the largest (smallest) value in the
sample equal to one (zero). Then, a distance matrix for the countries in 5-
dimensional space (each variable represents one dimension) is calculated". This
distance matrix is used in a cluster analysis, on the basis of which it is found that
for the period 1960-1973, it is useful to identify five clusters. Figure IV.12 presents
the characteristics of these clusters. The clusters and their members are as follows.
A "Ttor Falling Be/iinrf Countries" (n=24)
Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan,
Guatemala, Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela, India, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Turkey, New Zealand.
This is the group of developing countries (ranging from the poorest African
" The periodization is chosen arbitrarily, although tt« break in 1973, of course, is not
coinddfsntal.
* Eudidaut distance* were used. For some details on distance measures, see Appendix IV3.
84countries to some of the Southern American and Asian countries). These countries
faced an above average initial catehmg-up potential, but were not able to reap the
benefits of it They realized the lowest growth rates. Investment and R&D intensity
are usually low in these countries, while population growth is very high. Note the
presence of New Zealand (!>, Mexico, Turkey and Thailand in this group.
deviations from averag®
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Figure JV.I2, Growth performance to different dusters, 1960-1973
8, "Tfe Worsf ftlfi«g Befo'Hf? Cowrefrfes" (?J=2)
Egypt Malawi.
These countries show more or less the same pattern as the previous group, but Just
a few degrees worse. They can be considered the worst cases of the falling behind
group. Mote in particular the presence of Egypt.
C. "Tfe CBfefej-Up CoKHfnes* (H=15)
Jamaica, Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malts,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria.
These are the countries which have been able to use their catching-up potential,
which was, however, relatively small as compared to the falling behind countries.
They combine low population growth with high investment ratios, but relatively
low R&D intensities. Thus, they appear to rely on the diffusion of knowledge
rather than on the creation of knowledge. Most of these countries can be called
85'developed'.
D. "Tfe? Sfrongly Cate/jing-l/p Countries" (n=3)
Israel, Korea, Singapore.
These countries have realized the highest growth rates. Clearly they had a certain
("critical?") level of catching-up potential, which they used combining high
population growth with high investment ratios. R&D intensity is low. These
countries are textbook examples of successfully catching up. Starting from a
relatively low level of development, they have succeeded in diffusing knowledge
through their economy by realizing high investment levels, and by using a large
(and rapidly growing) labour market in an intensive way.
E. "The Laiding E/rte" fn=14)
Canada, USA, Japan, Belgium, France, West Germany, Hungary, Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Australia, Czechoslovakia, USSR.
These are the countries that can be considered as the core of the developed world.
Their (market) economies are highly developed and industrialized, which typically
go together with high investment ratios and R&D intensity, and consequently, low
catching-up potential. Population growth is moderate. As a result of their
'technological leadership', growth performance is relatively weak, but still much
better than in the falling behind countries. This group is quite large, and includes,
apart from the 'traditional' leading countries (USA, UK, France, Germany) smaller
but highly developed economies such as the Netherlands and Sweden. Japan, a
country which is usually considered as having gone through the development
phase during this period, is also present in this group. As a last 'peculiarity', note
the presence of the USSR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as the leading' elite
among the centrally planned economies.
Thus, the 1960-1973 world can neatly be divided into three major groups: falling
behind, catching-up and leading countries. With regard to the question of catching
up or falling behind, it seems that investment intensity is a crucial factor.
Countries that have (not) been able to catch up are characterized by high (low)
investment ratios, R&D intensity seems to be less important for catching up, since
both the catching-up groups are not characterized by high R&D intensities. The
role of population is not very clear. One (small) group has realized high growth
rates with high population growth, while there is otherwise (especially outside the
catching-up group) a negative relation between population growth and economic
growth. There seems to be also a complex relation between the size of the
catching-up potential and the capability to catch up, suggesting a 'critical' value
of the catching-up potential.
In theoretical terms, the observed patterns in mis period do not support one theory
of growth (discussed in Chapter 2) in particular. The results for the investment
variable can be explained by most of the models, although in the Solow case one
has to assume that the equilibrium growth path (it*) has not been reached yet. The
bad performance of the falling behind countries, as well as the performance of the
catching-up countries, fit these investment-based predictions quite well (see also
86Romer 1989 for an empirical test of the new growth theories in this vein, Manldw
ef «J. 1990 for a test of the Solow model, and Durlauf and Johnson 1992 for a
critique of the latter). For R&D, however, the results do not (exactly) correspond
with the theories. The high R&D-intensive countries have not grown at the fastest
rate. Instead, the diffusion of technological change (as indicated by the catching-up
potential and the way in which it has been used) seems be much more important,
All this indicates that the complex way in which science and technology influence
economic growth goes beyond most of the presently known modelling efforts*
The same clustering exercise can be repeated for the 1973-1988 period, now witfi
a marginally different set of countries (because of data availability reasons). Again,
it appeared to be useful to divide the sample into five different clusters. However,
this time the growth performance of the separate clusters is different from the
1960-1973 period. The characteristics of the clusters can be found in Figure IV.13.
The clusters and their members are as follows.
deviations from average
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Figure FV.13. Growth performance in different dusters, 1973-1988
A. "Tfte EstaWis/ted Fatting BeWwd Cownrries" («=9)
Central African Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan,
Guatemala, India,
Again, this is the group of developing countries (mostly the poorest African
countries). As in the previous period, these countries faced a high initial catching-
87up potential, but were not able to reap the benefits of it. They realized low growth.
Investment and R&D intensity are typically low in these countries, while
population growth is very high. Compared to the previous period, this group is
much smaller, and as a result, more homogeneous.
B. "The Mtsserf Opporrwnifies Fa/ling Be/iini Countries" (n=6)
Guyana, Chili, Argentina, Trinidad & Tobago, Jamaica, El Salvador.
These countries form a second falling behind group, which mainly distinguishes
itself from the first by the lower catching-up potential. As was clear from the
catching-up examples in the previous period, this lower catching-up potential
might have been a positive factor (large catching-up potentials seem to remain
unrealized in the previous period) and therefore, these countries seem to have
missed an opportunity, Some of them (Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago) belonged to
the catching-up countries in the previous period. They have relatively low
investment ratios and low R&D intensity. Growth of population is moderate.
C. "The Nea% Cflfctoig-Lfp Countries" (H=19)
Congo, Egypt, Mauritius, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, Venezuela, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, Turkey,
This group of catching-up countries is new on the scene. In the previous period,
they mostly belonged to the falling behind countries, or were not included in the
sample. A large number of the so-called NICs are classified in this group. They
have a high catching-up potential and high population growth. Investment ratios
in these countries are quite moderate (as compared to the leaders and the
established catching-up countries).
D. "77« Established Catering- lip Couttfrfcs" (n=23)
Seychelles, Canada, Korea, Singapore, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Yugoslavia, Australia, New Zealand, Czechoslovakia, Rumania.
These are the catching-up countries known from the previous period, including
developed market economies as well as some of the (older) NICs. Thus, they more
or less consist of the two catching-up groups from the previous period. Vehicles
for catching up seem to be moderate population growth, high investment ratios
and increased, but still moderate, R&D intensity.
£. TAe Leading Elite" (n=12)
St. Lucia, USA, Israel, Japan, France, West Germany, Hungary, Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USSR.
Here, one finds the highly developed market economies. They are mostly the same
as in the previous period, and have the same characteristics.A Taxonomy of Growth Performance, 1960-1988
1960-1973
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Diagram IV.l. Catching up and falling behind in the world economy, 1960-1988A number of interesting differences with the previous period can be observed.
First, some of the countries have switched from one group to another. These are
summarized in Diagram IV. 1. Groups of countries which appear together under
the same heading on both sides of the diagram are presented in boxes. Most
distinct is the switch of a number of falling behind countries in the first period to
one of the catching-up groups in the second, including many NICs (for example
Egypt, Thailand and most of the Southern American countries). They have been
able to realize an industrialization process which resulted (among other things) in
high investment levels and high growth rates. On the other hand, there are a
limited number of countries which have degraded (from catching up to falling
behind: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago; from leading to catching up:
Czechoslovakia, Australia, Belgium, Canada). Thus, although the starting
conditions were more or less the same in different countries, some of them were
able to catch up, while others were not. This seems to suggest that there is some
scope /or in/IweHcmg #rcwf/i performance, either by governmental policies, or by
differences in cultural or entrepreneurial variables. The dichotomy between
successfully switching from falling behind to catching up and staying in a falling
behind situation is illustrative.
A second difference is the distinction between catching-up groups. In the previous
period, there were two catching-up groups, which were quite similar with regard
to me variables m tne analysis, except id popuihuou giuwuL Hi ulib pcnUu', iiWiv
is one group (the established catching-up), which is characterized by the 'classic'
(previous period) characteristic of catching up (high investment). The other (newly
catching-up) countries seem to have much lower investment levels. Note also that
the scope for catching up has decreased considerably, since the growth rate
differences between leaders and catching-up countries have diminished quite a bit
4.4. SHwmary and Conclusions
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above, which can be summarized
into the following sfy/tzof /acts.
1. Grotvfh rates di/ifier between countries and between groups of countries. This
is true at the aggregate level and at the sectoral (manufacturing) level.
2. Rates o/ tecnnofogieaf change differ between sectors. Evidence from a selected
group of six OECD countries shows that there is a significant degree of
heterogeneity in technological change at the 1-digit ISIC level. Evidence from the
USA and Japan shows the same for the 2-digit ISIC level in manufacturing. At the
3-digit ISIC level in manufacturing, evidence on labour productivity for all DMEs
and all NICs points to the same phenomenon.
3. Production structure a*i/jfers befwmi countries and time. However, within
groups of countries, production structures can be quite similar. Applied to the
relation DMEs - NICs this points to a catching-up phenomenon not only in growth
rates but also in production structures,
904. Tfe mscreeeoRomtc rate 0/ tedbtoJogtcs! cfes»je is rrlaferf fo imfi'itl
pradwcrnJify levels. In a sample of OECD countries, low initial levels of
productivity lead to high rates of TFP growth (catching up). The influence of other
economic variables such as investment and R&D expenditures explains less of the
cross-country macroeconomic variation in TFP.
5. In the world as a whole, /slftHg feefemrf « more refcp«j»* /or rfce ^
fflJKsfpies rftss cafc&f'ng «p. fn general, the high- and middle-income countries
grow fastest, while most low-income countries grow only at a slow rale. However,
some of the lower income countries do seem to succeed in catching up (NICs and
oil exporters). Within the catching-up group of countries, convergence of per capita
income levels is a phenomenon that seems to be typical of the postwar period.
Moreover, the convergence tendency seems to have come to a standstill during the
most recent 15 years.
What are the possible explanations for these 'sly/itgrf /iscfs'? An attempt will be
made in the res! of this thesis to answer this question. In order to give the reader
a taste of what is in store in the following chapters, the different stylized facts will
now be linked in a preliminary way, thus setting out the first lines of the
explanation offered below.
First, the differences in performance across subgroups of countries (stylized fact
1) in combination with the importance of structural change (stylized fact 2-3)
suggest that there is a sfracrura/ explanation. Growth rates differ because
economies differ with regard to their production, consumption and institutional
structures. One useful way of modelling structural differences stems from the
Keynesian tradition, and stresses (sectoral) differences in income elasticities of
demand (Pasinetti 1981, see Chapter 3). Combined with specialization patterns,
these differences will induce growth rate differentials between economies with
different production mixes.
The second explanation stresses the interdependence of economies through trade.
In this way, and by keeping in mind the previous chapter, the process of
international economic growth can be seen as a selection process, with complex
interdependencies between the different actors, influencing each other's
performance and competitiveness on world product markets which act as the
selection environment An explanation based on these two principles will be
further developed in Part Three below.
Stylized fact 4 seems to support the catching-up hypothesis found in the literature
(see section 2.5). However, for one specific group of countries (the poorest
developing countries), the catching-up hypothesis does not seem to hold.
Therefore, one might argue that a more general catching-up model would have to
take into account some additional factors present only in the poorest countries in
order to be able to explain their bad performance. A model which does this will
be developed in Part Two.
91IV. 1. Postwar Economic Wei/arc «M«f ffee Selection o/ CoMwfry Samples
Economic welfare is not distributed equally over the world. The amount of
economic data available is generally positively correlated with welfare. Therefore,
any study that tries to look at growth rates at the world level will necessarily have
to work with a data set that is not a representative selection of what has been
going on in the world. This also holds for this chapter, and the ones to follow.
Therefore, it is useful to look at the representativeness of the different samples of
countries used in this and subsequent chapters. To do so, this section will present
some data on the world distribution of income drawn from the World
Development Report 1990 (WDR), published by the World Bank. The samples of
countries used will be evaluated with regard to their representativeness.
The World Bank divides its 121 reporting members into several categories, based
on GNP per capita. Thus, the WDR makes a distinction between low-income,
lower-middle-income, higher-middle-income and high-income countries. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table IV.A1 give an impression of the relative importance of each of
these groups. The well-known, yet shocking, conclusion from these columns is that
world income is distributed in a tremendously unequal way.
The World Bank categorization is illuminating in the sense that it gives a clear
picture of the relative per capita income position of countries. However, it does not
give an exact indication of the development stage or perspective which the country
faces. Within the group of high-income countries (largely OECD countries), there
is a large homogeneity in this respect. All countries (excluding perhaps a few oil-
exporting countries) in this group have achieved a high degree of industrialization
and economic development. Within the other groups of countries, the differences
are more significant. These groups include the poorest developing countries, with
almost no industrialization, and where agriculture has reached only a modest
degree of development. But, they also include countries which have reached some
stage of industrialization, even up to a level dose to the OECD countries.
Columns (2) and (3) of the table show how well the sample of countries used in
this chapter covers the total WDR sample. All over, the coverage is quite good,
both in terms of numbers of countries and in terms of GDP. The relatively low
coverage in the lowest income group is due to the fact that China, as a centrally
planned economy and responsible for about half of the total GDP in this group,
is left out of the analysis.
To do justice to the phenomenon of different stages of development, a distinction
is often made between different types of countries. Usually, one finds
industrialized countries, oil-exporting countries, Newly Industrialized Countries
(NICs) and Less (or Least) Developed Countries (LDCs). It is not clear which
countries are to be included in which categories; in addition one will find that a
categorization of this type closely corresponds to the categorization in Table IV.A1.
Here, a categorization based on that proposed in the United Nations (UNIDO)
publication /ndusfry in a Ctengmg uwM (1983) will be used. The 114 countries used
in this (and subsequent) chapter(s) are classified as follows.


































































* Calculations based on World Development Report 1990, World Development Indicators, Table 3, Technical Notes, table 1.
* Twelve countries in this sample are not documented in the WDRA, Developed Market Economies (DMEs):
Iceland, Greece, FR Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Belgium,
Austria, France, Finland, Denmark, Malta, Canada, United Kingdom, Turkey, New
Zealand, Australia, United States, Portugal, Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland,
Sweden, Spain, Japan, Israel, South Africa.
Mostly, these are the 'Leading Elite' countries and '(Established) Catching Up'
countries from the analysis above. The presence of Turkey is perhaps a bit strange
in this respect, but serves to keep all the OECD countries under this heading.
B, Newlv Industrialized Countries (NICs):
Malaysia, Hong Kong, Rep. of Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia,
Mexico, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Egypt.
For Taiwan, no sectoral (ISIC-2) data are available, so that all sectoral analyses
exclude this country ('NICs-12'). The group called NICs-10 excludes Hong Kong
and Uruguay for data availability reasons. NICs-10 have been subdivided into
NICs-1 (high income: Argentina, Brazil, Rep. of Korea, Mexico, Singapore) and
NICs-2 (low income: Colombia, Egypt, Malaysia, Philippines).
These are mainly countries that belonged to the 'Strongly' or 'Newly Catching Up'
countries in terms of the cluster analysis above (with the exception of Argentina).
These countries started from a low level of GDP per capita, but were (mostly) able
to catch up by means of an active industrialization process.
C,. Less Developed Oil-Exporting Countries:
Gabon, PR Congo, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Rep, Trinidad & Tobago,
Nigeria, Venezuela, Ecuador, Iran, Algeria.
These countries are a special type of catching-up countries. They owe their
relatively high growth mainly to one of their natural resources: oil.
P, Other (less developed) countries:
Sierra Leone, Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Senegal, Chad, Panama, Haiti,
Somalia, Barbados, Papua New Guinea, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador,
Dominican Rep, Central Afr Rep, Surinam, Peru, Paraguay, Botswana, Fiji,
Rwanda, Benin, Guyana, Bolivia, Angola, Niger, Cameroon, Burundi, Chile, Sudan,
Guinea, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Gambia, Ethiopia, Madagascar,
Nepal, Mali, Malawi, Lesotho, Kenya, Liberia, Pakistan, Zaire, Uganda, Zimbabwe,
Zambia, Tanzania, Swaziland, Tunesia, Togo, India, Morocco, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Burma, Bangladesh.
Most of these countries belong to the 'Falling Behind' group(s) above. * :






























































































Wearing apparel, except footwear
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Misc. Petroleum and coal products
Rubber products
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Professional and scientific instruments
Other manufactured products
Total manufacturing
951V.3. OH Measwroig a«d GrapWreg SffwctMraJ Differences Befween
*
The production structure of a country can be described by way of the shares of each
sector in total production (or employment, or value added, etc.). Similarly,
differences in the production structure between two countries (or in time) can be
measured by differences in the shares of each sector in total production in each
country. As an example, take the two following situations. In situation A, sectors
1 and 2 both take half of total production. In situation B, sector 1 takes all of total
production, and sector 2 takes nothing. In situation C, sectors 1 and 2 (again) both
take half of production. Situations A, B and C may correspond to different points
in time, given the same country, or different points in geographical space, given
the same point in time. (Alternatively, one may vary both time and location, but
this is not likely to be interesting from an analytical point of view). Clearly, the
production structures in situation A and B and B and C are different, while in
situation A and C they are similar.
The question posed here is how the difference between two production structures
can be measured, i.e., how one can give an indication of the distance between two
production structures. In order to answer this question, the concept of distance has
to be made operational first. Suppose that points in an n-dimensional space can be
represented by scores on a (ratio) scale. Then the score of item i on scale ifc can be
denoted by x^. The MinJtousJkt p-mrfrJC, measuring the distance between items i and
/', is then defined by
In this definition, p can take any (positive) value. Note that for the special case of
p=2, calculating the Minkowski p-metric results in the most commonly used
concept of distance: Euclidean distance. This can easily be verified by taking
n=p=2, in which case the Minkowski p-metric results in the theorem of Pythagoras.
Another special case results for p=2, where one has the dry WocJt distance measure,
or the Manhattan metric. In two-dimensional space, the city block distance
measures the distance that must be travelled to reach point; starting from i, under
the restriction that one can only travel in the North/South or East/West directions.
Two observations on the Minkowski p-metric can be made. First, note that the case
of p=l is the only case where differences in distance in one dimension (it) are
weighted equally. In general, differences in one dimension are weighted by their
own size, raised to the power p-1. In the case of Euclidean distance, this means
that each distance in one dimension is weighted by its own size. Second, note that
for different values of p, the iso-distance lines from one particular point take
different forms. In the case of Euclidean distance in the two-dimensional space, the
This section draws heavily on Green rt al. (1989), section 1.iso-distance line is well known: it is a drcle. In case of the dry block distance
measure, the tso-distance line is diamond shaped.
In economics, 'distance* is not a common concept (Linneman 1966 is one notable
exception). Perhaps this is the reason why economists, in the cases they have
applied distance measures, have not (always) conformed their measures to the
commonly used Euclidean measure. In the case considered here - the measuring
of distance between production structures - economists have most often used city
block distance measures. Typically, one finds a measure of structural differences
between situations i and / in the case of n dimensions (sectors) to be defined as
follows.
'••'"' '''• '~ •'••'•-' • "•••'••- i »Y^ br -x t ""' " '••'' «>•'—"'""•"
Note that this definition is the special case for p=f of the above definition of the
Minkowski p-metric. On a priori (economic) grounds, there is no reason at all why
the dry block measure should be preferred to any other measure, including the
Euclidean one. Therefore, the following preliminary conclusion can be drawn; To
measure the distances between each out of f« x (n-DJ/2 possible pairs from «
different situations, one could construct a (symmetric, zero-diagonal) matrix in
which cell ij (and ;i) holds the resulting value of the Minkowski p-metric for i and
;. One could construct a different matrix for each separate value of p.
The next question posed here is whether the data in such a matrix can be graphed
in such a way that one single figure illustrates how the different situations relate
to each other. Obviously, while the matrix itself enables one to quickly look up the
precise distance between any two situations, it does not allow for an easy and
quick interpretation of the whole structure. To find an answer to this question,
imagine a situation in which there are only three sectors and « points. Note first
that while there are three sectors, only two of the shares of these sectors are
independent: The third can be found by applying the fact that the sum of the
shares equals one. Thus, each situation can be represented by a point in two-
dimensional space. Measuring the distance in the usual way (for example by
simply using a ruler) results in the distance matrix for p=2 (Euclidean distance).
The graph of this two-dimensional space would indeed give a quick and precise
impression of the distance relations in the whole set of situations.
Now imagine what happens if the number of dimensions (sectors) is increased. If
n becomes four, the (Euclidian) distances can be represented in the three-
dimensional space, if n becomes five, a four-dimensional space is needed. In
general, to represent the distances in an n-dimensional system, an («-!)-
dimensional space is needed. Clearly, for cases relevant in reality, where for
example at the 2-digit ISIC level nine different sectors are found in manufacturing
alone, the number of dimensions is too high to use this precise Euclidean
framework. Therefore, another method must be chosen. This method can be found
in mwifidimCTsionfl/ scaling techniques. In general, this technique is applied in cases
where (a ranking of) distances between pairs of situations can be given. In the
97present case, imagine that the distances in production structures between three
situations A, B and C are given, or can be ranked in descending (ascending) order.
Clearly, this is the case for a distance matrix as described above. Note that it does
not matter which value of p is used in the construction of such a matrix.
Basically, the technique of multidimensional scaling works as follows. In an n-
dimensional space, points are arranged in such a way that the interpoint distances
have the same ranking (in the case of nonmefrtc sea/ing), or are exactly the same (in
the case of mriric scaling) as the input data. In general (applying the above logic),
it can be shown that for n-I dimensions it is always possible to find a
configuration that represents the original ranking precisely. However, in practice,
one can trade off the number of dimensions for the objective of a perfect
representation of the original ranking. The smaller the number of dimensions, the
farther the resulting configuration will be from the original distances. Thus, one
would typically try to find the lowest dimension for which the representation is
still fairly close.
Essentially, the technique used to find such a configuration is the following. First,
one finds an (arbitrary) initial configuration, followed by a calculation of a
measure of the 'badness of fit', usually called stress, of this configuration relative
to the original distance matrix. Then, one tries to change the configuration in such
a way that stress is decreased. Then the procedure starts again. This process is
repeated until a satisfactory value of stress is found (or not found). In the figures
presented in this chapter, the points were scaled using a nonmefric method, both
because of the simpler calculation procedure and because the number of
dimensions underlying the data (i.e., the sectors) is too large for /u% mefric
methods to yield adequate results.
98JTV.4. Scww Tesfs /or fite
|t>gressto»s in Section 4.2
0/ MnlricoJ/iwearity OM
Table IV.A2 shows the partial correlation coefficients between the variables used
in the regression. It appears that both investment and R&D are strongly correlated
with initial income, which confirms the impression of multicollinearity affecting
the results in Table IV.l.




































Table IV.A3 gives the R*s of regressions of each explanatory variable (except the
constant) on the other explanatory variables (including the constant) for the
different equations. As shown in Johnston (1984: 245-249), the sampling variance
of a parameter estimate grows increasingly for larger values of these R*s, with
critical values around 0.9. Table IV.A3 shows that the R*s found are well below
this critical value, so that the effect of multicollinearity is not likely to affect the
results too much. In addition, it is shown that the parameter estimate for INIT,
which is the only one turning out significantly, is affected most by the
multicollinearity problem.
This result is confirmed by another procedure to detect the influence of
multicollinearity, described in Belsley ef«/. (1980). This procedure looks at the ratio
of the square root of the largest eigenvalue of the squared matrix of independent
variables (which are scaled to one) and the individual eigenvalues. Ratios above
20 point to serious multicollinearity problems. In the regressions in Table IV.l, the
highest ratio does not exceed seven. In order to assess the influence of
multicollinearity on the individual variances of the parameter estimates, one can
then perform a decomposition of the regression variance in order to find the part
of the variance attributable to excessively low eigenvalues. Although there are no
excessively low eigenvalues in the regressions here, this variance decomposition
was still performed, indicating that the coefficient of INIT (and, to a lesser extent,
investment and the constant) is most seriously affected. This is in line with the
analysis of the individual R*s.
99Table IV.A3
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Technology Spillovers in Interdependent
Economies; Catching Up or Falling
Behind?t ; 'CHAPTER 5, A Modd 0/ CateWftg Up or
»•;'••
The first stylized facts to be explained are the two last ones (4 and 5), indicating
that the rate of productivity growth is inversely related to per capita income for
countries in the middle- or higher-income range, but that the poorest countries
grow slowest. These stylized facts stress the importance of knowledge spillovers.
The two key conclusions from the discussion in Chapter 3 with regard to the
theoretical nature of useful models (dynamic, and stressing differences between
agents, in this case countries) will serve as guidelines while constructing the
equations of a model which describes the working of international knowledge
spillovers and their influence on the domestic economy. The dynamic character of
the model is mainly related to its specification in terms of time derivatives. What
is being modelled is not the level of some variable, but its motion over time (using
differential equations). The full selection logic that was proposed in Chapter 3 will
not be applied yet (this will be done in Part Three below). The idea of differences
between countries with regard to technological capabilities will, however, be fully
applied. On the one hand, the levels of the 'knowledge stock' are assumed to be
different between countries (so that there are opportunities for spillovers), as in the
so-called catching-up models. On the other hand, following from the discussion
on Lamarckian evolution concepts in Chapter 3, it will also be assumed that
learning capabilities differ between countries. Thus, the model describes the effect
of fedino/ogica/ mfeniependewcies between countries upon growth rate differentials.
The main economic content from the model will be taken from the neo-Keynesian
Dixon and Thirlwall model, as described briefly in Chapter 2. This approach to
explaining growth rate differentials, taking into account endogenous technological
change, was found to be a promising one. However, the economic interdependen-
ces in the model will be of less importance than the technological ones. Therefore,
this part is primarily aimed at modelling technological relations in an
interdependent world. Part Three will delve more deeply into the influence of
economic interdependencies.
' Parts of this chapter draw on Verspagen (1991).
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The model developed here rests on the assumptions that individual (i.e., in this
model, country-specific) technological capabilities differ (see Chapter 3). This does
not only mean that countries differ with regard to their ability to produce
technological knowledge, but also that the capability to imitate knowledge
developed elsewhere differs. The latter idea has been put forward in literature
from quite different branches in economics. For example, at the microeconomic
firm level, this consideration led Cohen and Levinthal (1989) to formulate a model
in which the degree to which a firm can use spillovers from knowledge generated
by other firms (inside as well as outside the industry) is dependent on the R&D
outlays of the firm itself, At the macroeconomic level of (inter)national economic
growth, Kristensen (1974), Rostow (1980: 259-288) and Baumol «r «/. (1989) have
pointed to the fact that the extent to which a country can apply the backlog of
unused knowledge crucially depends upon its capabilities to assimilate this
knowledge. Kristensen (1974: 24) argues that technology spillovers will not take
place when the capability of the receiving country is too low:"(...) The most rapid
economic growth should be expected to take place in countries that have reached
a stage at which they can begin to apply a great deal more of the existing
knowledge. This requires capital for investment". Support for the hypothesis that
the capability to assimilate technological knowledge is crucial in the process of
international diffusion can also be found in the results from case studies in
economic development and technology transfer. For example, Westphal ef a/, (1985:
168-169), in a case study of South Korea's economic development, observe that
"(...) assimilation [of foreign technology] often seems to be characterized as being
automatic and without cost. If this were correct, assimilation would not merit much
attention. But it is not accomplished by passively receiving technology from overseas.
It requires investments in understanding the principles and use of technology,
investments reflected in increased human and institutional capital".
A model that tries to explain the patterns of international diffusion of knowledge
should pay attention to these considerations.
The cumulative character of technological change is included in the model by
means of the feefmofog/csf tfefance. More precisely, it is assumed that the larger the
distance between the current level of technological knowledge and the technology
to be imitated, the more difficult the process of imitation will be. The general idea
captured by this is that technological knowledge is a highly heterogeneous good
that is (generally) embodied in highly heterogeneous capital goods. Imagine the
range of goods that embody technology as a range that can be ordered according
to technological (or productivity) level. Given that an entrepreneur (or in more
general terms, a country) is using a capital good from the lower part of this range,
it will be easier to move to a slightly more sophisticated capital good than to move
to a highly sophisticated type of capital.
As a stylized description of these aspects of technology gaps and imitation, the
model considers the case of two countries, one of which is technologically
advanced (called the North) and the other technologically backward (called the
104South). Technological knowledge is considered to be the only determinant of
growth, although its effect can be both direct and indirect. The direct effect is
through the value of the knowledge stock, denoted by T, which has a positive
effect upon the country's growth rate. The indirect effect is through the effect of
technological knowledge upon exports, which in turn has an effect upon growth.
The argument of export-based growth is borrowed from the neo-Keynesian
models. Dixon and Thirlwali (1975) argue that, in the long run, exports are the
only form of exogenous effective demand and, therefore, are the factor which
determines whether or not a situation of (Keynesian) full employment is reached.
In an economy operating at full employment and with a stable population (both
in the long run), export growth would not be a stimulus for economic growth.
However, reality seems to prove that full employment is not usually the prevailing
state for all periods in economic history.
Using subscripts n and s for denoting North and South respectively, the equation
for the growth rate of a country's production can be represented as follows.
i = n^
In this equation, X denotes exports. Following the evolutionary logic introduced
in Chapter 3, the dynamics of exports can be described by the principle of
economic selection. As a first approximation*, the selection process is represented
by a Imear relation between a country's competitiveness and the sum of the growth
rate of its market share in total world markets. Then, the growth rate of total
exports is equal to the growth rate of this market share and die growth rate of the
volume of the market. The following equations take the relative knowledge stock
as an indicator of competitiveness in this process.
X,«ntn (V.2)
(V.3)
The logarithmic specification has the convenient property that for equal levels of
T, the first term on the rhs is zero. These equations say that when knowledge stock
levels in the two countries are equal, market shares will remain stable, and the
growth rate of exports in the two countries will just be equal to the growth rate
of the market volume. For differences in productivity levels, the advanced country
will win market share (and thus have higher growth rates), while the backward
country will loose market share (and thus have lower growth rates).
Of course, these equations capture only some of the real-world dynamics of export
growth. For example, the wage rate is a factor that is likely to play a much more
* A more realistic mode! of economic selection is the replicator equation (III!) - (IIL2), which
will be introduced in Part Three. The approach used here closely links up with Dixon and Thirlwall
105important role than accounted for here. To the extent that high knowledge levels
are reflected in high productivity, the competitive advantage stemming from this
might be offset by high wages, or the other way around. For now, this effect will
not be taken into account, in order to keep the model simple and solvable. In Part
Three, wage rate dynamics wUl be included in a model.
Following this, the advance in technological knowledge is modelled. First, define
the knowledge gap (technology gap) between North and South (denoted by G) as
follows.
(V.4)
This is the same term as the one in equations (V.2) and (V.3), so that export
performance is directly related to the technology gap. Growth of the knowledge
stock results from an exogenous part (conveniently called the research sector
output) and from dynamic learning effects, as in the Verdoorn law. The Verdoorn
effect is represented by a (linear) relation between the growth rate of technological
change and the growth rate of output (as in Dixon and Thirlwall 1975). No explicit,
formal micro foundation for this relation will be given here. However, Verdoorn's
law provides a reasonable way of formalizing some of the notions on technological
change which have been discussed in Chapter 3 above, such as cumulativeness,
and the absence of strict optimaMzation procedures. An additional source of
growth of the knowledge stock in South are technology spillovers (as in Gomulka
1971). Preferably, the research sector should be endogenized in a more satisfactory
way, but this is not done to keep the model as simple as possible. Thus, the
endogenous sources for knowledge growth will be limited to learning effects and
spillovers.
The final step to setting up the equation for knowledge production in North and
South is to specify the spillover term. On the basis of the observations on
technology (spillovers) above, a distinction is made between potenfM spillovers
and acftm! spillovers. The concept which Jinks the two is the l^rwin^ atpsWfify of
a country. To pick up the discussion about the Lamarckian view of evolution, the
learning capability of a country is assumed to depend on an ttrtrmstc part, and to
use the idea of cumulative technological knowledge expressed above, the
technological distance from the leading country is assumed to be the other factor
influencing the learning capability, For a git«es technological distance, a country's
teaming capability varies with its intrinsic learning capability, which is determined
by a mixture of social factors (Abramovitz 1986), education of the workforce
(Baumol er of. 1989), the quality of the infrastructure, the level of capitalization
(mechanization) of the economy, the correspondence of Hie sectoral mix ol
production in the leading and following country CPasinetti 1981), and other factors.
For a gi'peH intrinsic capability to assimilate spillovers, the overall capability will
diminish with the technological distance.
Spillovers are modelled as net spillovers. It is assumed that net spillovers flow in
the direction of the backward country at al times. If, at some point in time, the
gap is dosed {G=9>, no spillovers will occur. Thus, the value of G itself Is a
106measure for potential spillovers. Then, since the ocfwj/ spillovers cannot be bigger
than the pototfa?/ spillovers, the capability factor must take some value between
aero and one. For targe technological distance, the capability should go to zero, If
the technology gap is dosed, the capability should be at its maximum value, one.
An assumption that satisfies these requirements is the one that the capability to
assimilate technological spillovers decreases with the size of the (relative)
technology gap at a constant rate, say 1/5.
However, this rate of decrease in the capability to assimilate spillovers cannot be
assumed to be given exogenously. It should be a function of the above-mentioned
variables determining the intrinsic capability to assimilate spillovers. Here, these
variables will be treated as policy variables, i.e., it is assumed that the government
can decrease the rate of decline of the capability to assimilate spillovers by means
of an active policy in education, investment in infrastructure, etc. in other words,
the parameter § is a policy parameter.
Taking the value of the technology gap G itself as a measure of the technological
distance, the term *"** represents the capability to assimilate knowledge spillovers
according to these principles. In that case, the equations for the rate of growth of
the knowledge stocks are as follows.
(V.6)
The exogenous rates of knowledge growth are denoted by P, X is the Verdoorn
learning rate', and «G measures the potential spillover. The combination of the
Verdoom effect and the export-based growth link gives the model its strong neo-
Keynesian flavour.
Given the linear (monotonically increasing in G) specification of the potential
spillovers, it can be easily verified that different functional forms of the capability
term can give the tote/ spillovers function three possible forms: monotonically
increasing, monotonically decreasing, or a specification with one (or more) extreme
value(s). The specification here obviously has the latter characteristic (one
maximum for the spillovers function). One might argue that this is an ad few
specification. On the basis of intuition and the evidence considered in Chapter 4,
however, one might safely rule out the second possibility of a monotonically
decreasing amount of spillovers for larger initial technology gaps. This still leaves
open the possibility of a monotonically increasing spillovers function. As will be
shown below, the model used here contains this assumption as a special case, so
that it can be relaxed and tested empirically. The latter exercise will be undertaken
in Chapter 6. Now, the model will be solved.
* Far simplicity, it is assumed mat X,=\=L This assumption will be relaxed in Chapter 7 below.
1075.2, Sofoi»t£ ffte Mode*
First, the equations for the growth rates of the two countries are obtained by




At this stage, the assumption oX<l proves to be useful, since otherwise the rhs of
(V.7) - (V.8) would be negative (otX>l) or nonexisting (aX=l). The economic
meaning of this assumption is that the self-reinforcing effect coming from spirals
of tht Verdoorn (X) and technology (a) parameters cannot be so large as to cause
an 'explosion' of the system, Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) apply a similar
assumption*.
The equations show that the growth rate of output is (among other factors) a
positive function of the technology gap for the North, and a mixed positive /
negative function of the technology gap for the South. Combining equations (V.7) -
(V.8) in one equation for the difference between the growth rates of output gives
the following.
"" *' 1-aX ^" * 1-aX 1-aX
This equation shows that the difference between the growth rates of output is a
function of the technology gap between the two countries, and the difference in
output of the research sector.
The next step is determining the dynamics of the technology gap. Equations (V.4) -
(V.6) and (V.9) allow for an analysis of these dynamics. Differentiating (V.4) with
respect to time, and substituting equations (V-5) - (V.6) and (V.9) yields the
following.
6-f -f «_L_(B -B )^^G- * Of"" (V.10)
• ' 1-oX ^" ^ 1-ocX 1-cd
Equation (V.10) enables one to search for equilibrium values of the technology gap
(in the sense that the size of the gap does not change). Equation (V.9) shows that
for such an equilibrium value of the technology gap and a constant difference
between outputs in the research sector, the growth rate differential does not
change either. Thus, assuming that the difference between the output in the
research sector is constant, the dynamics in this model of growth rate differentials
are determined by the technology gap alone. Searching for equilibrium values of
the technology gap, equation (V.10) is set to zero. This yields the following.
* An alternative specification of the Verdoorn effect that does not require this assumption will
be presented in Chapter 7.
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Equation (V.I 1) can be easily analyzed by means of a figure which looks at the rhs
and lhs of the equation separately (a so-called phase diagram). On the nonnegative
part of the G-axis, the rhs has one intersection point with that axis at G«0, The
slope of the function at this intersection point is greater than zero. The function
has a maximum equal to Ga/e at the point where G=S. For G going to infinity, the
value of the rhs goes to zero. The lhs of equation (V.ll) is a straight line, which
is always above the G-axis for nonnegative values of G (assuming that the output
in the research sector in the backward country is smaller than that in the advanced
country). Depending on the values of the parameters, the graphs of the left and the
rhs parte of equation (V.ll) have either zero, one or two intersection points, which
means that there are either zero, one or two equilibrium values for the technology
gap.
Figure V.I. The dynamics of the technology gap
Figure V.I depicts the three possible situations for the dynamics of the technology
gap. The curves denoted by R represent the rhs of equation (V.ll), while the curve
labelled L corresponds to the lhs of the equation. The curves R2, K2 and R3
correspond to different values of the rate of decline of the capability to assimilate
knowledge spillovers for larger gaps, 1/8. Kl represents a low rate of decline (a
high intrinsic capability to assimilate, 5), while R3 represents a high rate of decline.
The difference between the exogenous rates of knowledge growth in North and
South is denoted by fc (=(*„-&)• Wherever the i? curve is below the L curve, the
109technology gap grows, since the amount of spillovers flowing to South is smaller
than the increase in the technology gap determined by the other factors in the
model (i.e., the difference between outputs in the research sector and the Verdoorn
effect). Wherever the R curve is above the L curve, the technology gap becomes
smaller*.
Thus, in the case of R3, the technology gap will always grow*, because the
spillovers are too small for the whole range of G. In the case of R2, there is one
equilibrium value for the technology gap at the point of tangency between R2 and
L, A small deviation from this equilibrium point to the left will result in a growth
of the technology gap, and thus take the system back to the initial equilibrium
again. A small deviation to the right, however, will lead the system away from the
equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium point is stable from the left and unstable from
the right. For Rl, there are two equilibrium points. The rightmost point is unstable
(a deviation to the left leads the system towards the leftmost equilibrium point, a
deviation to the right leads to infinity). The leftmost point is stable from both
sides. This situation is indeed the most interesting one, since it brings the
possibility of paf/i dependence (or flysferesfs) into the model. If a country starts with
an initial technology gap somewhere to the left of the second equilibrium point
(but to the right of the first), the gap will decrease, while in the opposite case it
will increase.
The dynamic behaviour of the technology gap as a function of the policy
parameter (S) is summarized in Figure V.2, which depicts the biyurcatton diagram
of the equation for the growth rate of the technology gap. On the horizontal axis
of the bifurcation diagram are the values of the intrinsic capability to assimilate
spillovers (8). On the vertical axis are the equilibrium values of the technology gap
and the maximum of the rhs function. A solid line represents a stable equilibrium,
while a dashed line represents an unstable equilibrium. The figure shows that for
small values of S no equilibrium value exists. Then, for some (larger) threshold
value 8* one equilibrium value is established. This point 8* is called a fci/wrc«fio«
poinr*. In terms of Figure V.I, this threshold value is the value of 8 belonging to
the curve R2, and the equilibrium point is the point of tangency between L and R2.
The exact value of this point is not solved for, but since the curve L is upward
sloping, it is clear that it will be to the left of the value of G which gives the
maximum of the spillovers function. For values of 8 larger than the threshold level,
two equilibria exist, as described by the curves in the bifurcation diagram.
* One must retltee that the equation (V.ll) was constructed by multiplying both sides of (V.10)
by 1-oA. Therefore, the curves no longer represent the exact values of the different terms in (V.10),
To arrive at these expressions, one should multiply the curves by 1/(1 -eX). This will not, however,
change the conclusions about the distinction between catching up or falling behind. The same
argument applies to the various curves in Figure V.3 below.
* This, and the other possibilities for the motion of G, is depicted by the arrows in the figure,
* In this context a bifurcation can be defined as a point where the qualitative behaviour (in B»
sense of existence of equilibria) of the system changes.
noFigure V.2, The bifurcation diagram of the equation for the dynamics of the technology gap
To sum up, one can say that both the value of the intrinsic capability to assimilate
knowledge spillovers (8) and the initial value of the technology gap determine the
dynamic behaviour of the technology gap. Countries with a low rate of decline
(high capability to assimilate spillovers) and small initial gaps are likely to catch
up, while countries with a high rate of decline (low capability to assimilate
spillovers) and large initial gaps are likely to fall behind. A second conclusion is
that the technology gap will never close completely, unless the difference between
the (exogenous) rates of growth of the knowledge stocks vanishes. This conclusion
must be understood as establishing the intuitive result that a technology gap can
never be closed completely by imitation alone.
The model has some interesting implications for economic development policy*.
These can be derived from the two conclusions drawn from the model. Starting
from the first of these conclusions, one can easily see that countries which have a
'very high' level of backwardness cannot automatically assume that catching up
will occur. The reason is that their capability to apply the knowledge from the
more advanced country is inadequate. Thus, before catching up can become a
relevant process in very backward countries, there must be a phase in which the
country builds up its intrinsic learning capability {'pre-cato/HM^ «p'). In terms of the
model, this building up of the intrinsic learning capability would consist of trying
' Compare lostow (I960,1980).
Illto achieve a better education of the labour force, a better infrastructure, and other
measures. Most of the measures one could imagine as contributing to a better
intrinsic learning capability would involve puWic rather than prreafe investment.
Therefore, it seems that there would be an essential role for government
(considering 8 as a policy variable) in this 'pre-catching up' phase. In terms of
Figure V.I, this process is represented by the move from a point on Kl to a point
on R3, which must also lie between the two values of G yielding equilibrium
points of the gap. Note that in the 'pre-catching up' phase, time is running against
the policy makers, in the sense that a move to a point on R3 is not enough if this
point lies to the right of the rightmost (unstable) equilibrium. This is caused by the
fact that the technology gap is constantly in motion.
The phase that follows can be labelled as the <ictu«/ catching-up phase. It is this
development phase which has received most attention in the literature. Applying
the knowledge from the advanced country, the backward country now closes the
technology gap up to a certain level, without necessarily increasing the domestic
(exogenous) rate of technological change. This process corresponds to the
movement towards the leftmost equilibrium point on R3 in Figure V.I. At first, the
rate of spillover will increase, until the maximum of the spillovers function is
reached. Then, the rate of spillover will slowly decrease, until the equilibrium gap
is reached. As in traditional catching-up theory, this development phase leads to
(some) convergence of technological (productivity) levels.
Total convergence of technological levels will not, however, be reached by means
of catching up alone. In order to close the gap completely, the backward country
will have to go through one more phase. The relevant feature of this phase is the
expansion of domestic research efforts up to a level comparable with the advanced
country. More specifically, given the positive slope of the L curve, the backward
country will have to generate a higher rate of exogenous knowledge growth than
the advanced country for some time in order to be able to catch up completely.
This 'posf-CBfcMng up' phase, in which the tendency of growth rates to converge
halts, might be a more or less adequate description of the most recent trend in the
long-run picture of convergence and divergence in Chapter 4 (Figure IV.ll).
Note that the model also has an (although admitted very stylized) explanation for
overtaking. One could imagine the situation in which the South successfully
applies a development policy along the lines set out above, and indeed manages
to close the gap completely. From that point on, the negative difference between
the exogenous rates of knowledge growth would place the South in a position in
which it becomes the technological leader. In that case, the model would collapse,
with the North becoming the backward country, and the South the advanced one.
The process would start over again, and the North would be able (or unable) to
catch up. In a multicountry context, the model could thus generate patterns as
observed in the economic history of the modem world (briefly described in
Chapter 1).
Turning to the equation for the growth rate differential, the question arises as to
whether or not it is possible that negative growth rate differentials exist (i.e., the
backward country achieves higher growth rates than the advanced country). As
112noted above, one would expect that, in a long-term situation of full employment,
a country that realizes a higher growth rate of productivity would also realize a
higher growth rate of output Thus, when the technology gap between the
advanced and the backward country is becoming smaller, one would also expect
the growth rate differential to be negative. However, since the Keynesian effect of
a stimulus of effective demand (exports) on output is introduced in the model,
there is an additional source of growth. Because this additional source is positively
related to the size of the technology gap through equations (V.2) - (V.3), the
growth rate differential may be positive, despite the fact that the backward country
realizes a higher rate of productivity growth. As will be shown below, to assume
that the Keynesian relation between exports and growth does not exist would
mean that a negative growth rate of the technology gap implies a negative growth
rate differential.
To answer the question as to whether the growth rate differential Is positive or
negative, one can look at the values of the technology gap for which the growth
rate differential is equal to zero. To solve for these points, equation (V.12) can be
written as the counterpart of equation (V.ll),
1G+B -8 «sG«'"*''* (V.12)
a * *
The result is (again) that depending on parameter values, two, one or zero points
exist for which the growth rate differential is equal to zero.
D
Figure V.3. The dynamics of the growth rate differential
113Equation (V.9) shows that for an increasing technology gap, the growth rate
differential also moves towards infinity. Thus, if a country is falling behind in a
technological sense, it will also fall behind in a growth sense. To analyze the
opposite case, assume for a moment that the initial value of the gap is such that
convergence towards the stable equilibrium point takes place. By looking at
equations (V.ll) and (V.12), it can be easily seen that for the values of a and X
assumed above (aX<l), the slope of the line on the lhs of (V.12) is always larger
than the one on the lhs of (V.ll). Figure V.3 graphs the lhs and rhs of (V.12),
similar to Figure V.I. The L' curves represent the lhs of (V.12) for different
parameter values. The R-curve is the same as Rl from Figure V.I, and the L-curve
from Figure V.I is reproduced for clarity. The growth rate differential is denoted
Assuming that a country starts just a little bit to the left of the rightmost
equilibrium point of the technology gap (i.e., the rightmost intersection point
between the L- and R-curves in the figure), it is clear that initially the growth rate
differential D is positive (the R curve is below the L' curve). At this stage, the
backward country lags behind to such an extent that its disadvantage through
trade is dominating. It depends on the size of a and X (the combined effect of the
Verdoorn effect and the direct link between technology and growth) whether or
not a negative growth rate differential arises at some stage. If the curve L' is not
too steep (such as L'j), it will have two intersection points with the R-curve.
Passing the rightmost of these, the growth rate differential will become negative.
At this stage, the direct effect of knowledge growth dominates the export-based
effect, and the technologically catching-up country also catches up in growth.
However, since the knowledge spillovers are nonlinear, their size will decrease at
some point (after passing the maximum of the R-curve). Eventually, the export-
based effect will dominate again, and the growth rate differential becomes positive.
However, if the export-based effect is too strong, the L'-curve will have no
intersection points with the R-curve, e.g., L'j. The borderline case is L^, with a
point of tangency between the two curves. In case there are no intersection points,
the export-based effect will dominate along the total catching-up process, and the
catching-up country will not be able to generate higher growth, despite the faster
growth of the knowledge stock. (Note, however, that the growth rate differential
does have a minimum). In the borderline case, the growth rate differential will just
'touch' on the zero-level at the point where the spillovers are maximal.
It is not assumed that the parameters a and X can be influenced by policy.
Therefore, a country cannot change the position of the L'-curves. However, by
moving the R-curve through the policy parameter S, the country can go from a
situation of no intersection points (and slower growth) to a situation of rapid
growth. This means that the policy of increasing the intrinsic capability to
assimilate knowledge spillovers does not only apply to catching up in a
technological sense, but also to catching up in growth. Thus, the conclusion is that
if a country is catching up in a technological sense, this does not automatically
imply catching up in a growth sense. In order for growth catching up to take place
(at some stage), the level effect of the technology gap (modelled through trade)
must not be too strong.
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model considered above yields some basic conclusions. The technology gap
may either be increasing or decreasing over time, depending on the value of the
initial technology gap, and the intrinsic capability to assimilate spillovers (5). la
case of a decreasing technology gap, the growth rate of the technologically
advanced country may either be higher than the backward country's growth rate
for the whole period, or it may be smaller for some limited period of time, during
wMch the backward country has an 'absolute' catching-up advantage.
Do these outcomes of the model still hold if one reduces the number of dynamic
links between variables in the model? This section tries to answer this question,
Subsequently, the following assumptions will be dealt with: no relevance of the S
parameter {§ to infinity), no direct relation between output growth and
productivity growth (GS=G), no direct relation between export growth and output
growth {e=Q)*, and no relation between productivity growth and output growth
O)
a. J»/tiftfe/y Large f«r«Bsic Cap<B&iii% to Assimilate Knowledge
Assume that there is no relation between the technological distance and the
backward country's capability to assimilate technology spillovers from the
advanced country (the intrinsic capability to assimilate technology spillovers is
infinitely large). To allow S to go to infinity would mean that equations (V.9) and
(V.10) reduce to
In order for a catching-up relation to take place at all in this case, one must
assume that the feedback of the gap to knowledge spillovers is larger than the
(oppositely signed) feedback from the gap to trade. In mathematical terms, this
means 2en,A<a. If this assumption is not satisfied, the conclusions of the model are
more or less the same as in the neo-Keynesian Dixon and Thirlwall case.
Assuming that catching up is relevant, equation (V.14) shows that in this case the
technology gap will always converge to an equilibrium. The equilibrium point of
the technology gap is stable for the whole range of G. In terms of Figure V.I, this
means that the curve R becomes a straight line with a positive slope, and the curve
L becomes a horizontal line. The value of the technology gap (starting on either
side) will move towards the intersection point of these lines. Equation (V.13) then
shows that in this case the growth rate differential also converges to a fixed value.
Thus, in the event that 8 is infinitely large, the dynamics of the model change
* This is similar to the case of no relation between productivity growth and export growth, as
the reader can easily verify.
115considerably. The possibility of falling behind in the long run no longer exists, and
the country is certain to catch up. Although this case may be less interesting from
an empirical point of view (see Chapter 4), this approach has been followed in of
the catching-up literature (Baumol 1986, Abramovitz 1986 and Gomulka 1971). In
all the models used there, the intrinsic capability to assimilate knowledge
spillovers is implicitly assumed to be infinitely large. Thus, these models can be
considered to be special cases of the model used here. The next chapter will
develop some formal tests to check this assumption.
b. No D^f%<^ Lj'wfc Between rechno/o^jca/ Knowledge and Growffc
The next assumption made is that there is no direct link between the growth of the
level of technological knowledge and the growth rate of output (a=0). This means
that the link between technology and growth is made completely through the
demand side of the economy. One could label this case as the fully Keynesian case.
Here, equations (V.9) and (V.12) reduce to the following.
The structure of equation (V.16) is basically the same as that of equation (V.10).
Therefore, the essential dynamics of the technology gap do not change. What is
different in this case is the relation between the technology gap and the growth
rate differential. This relation, which is described by equation (V.15), no longer
allows for negative growth rate differentials, which means that the backward
country will always grow slower, despite its state of technological catching up.
Equation (V.15) is a straight line which is always above the G-axis for positive G.
Thus, the dynamics of me model are changed to some extent in this case.
c. No Lm& Between Exports and Growth
Setting e to zero means assuming that the link between growth of export and the
growth rate of output does not exist. This is the case in a world where Keynesian
full employment is the prevailing state of affairs, and technological change through
the supply side of the economy is the only source of output growth. In this case,
the equations for the growth rate differential and the growth rate of the technology
gap are as follows.
The structure of equations (V.17) and (V.18) is more or less the same as that of
equations (V.9) and (V.10), with the exception of the second term including G in
the latter equations. It can be easily verified that this does not drastically change
the dynamics of the technology gap. In terms of Figure V.I, the basic form of the
R curves remains the same, while the I curve becomes a horizontal line.The dynamics of the growth rate differential do change, however. Since
technological knowledge is the only source of output growth, a decreasing
technology gap dfreerly implies a negative growth rate differentia!, (the growth rate
differential is simply the motion of the technology gap, multiplied with ex). If the
growth rate of the technology gap is negative, it follows directly that the growth
rate differential is always negative. Thus, in this case, a country that starts a
eatching-up process immediately realizes higher growth rates than &e advanced
country. In flse general case, the (gap level-related) export effect might outweigh
the direct effect through a, which no longer holds here.
if. Mo -Venfoem Effect
Finally, it is assumed that the Verdoora effect is not relevant. Setting &«0 means
that equations CV.9) and (V.10) become as follows.
The form of equation {¥,19} is basically the same as that of equation (V,9), but
equation CV.20) is a little different from equation (V.10), However, the dynamic
properties of equation (V.20) are the same as those of equation (V.10), This can
easily be seen by imagining what happens to the curves in Figure V.I in the case
of equation (V,20). The shape of the R curves remains the same, while the L curve
becomes a horizontal line. Again, there exists a possibility of falling behind (no
intersection points between the curves) and catching up (two intersection points).
Note that, cereris panfews, the rightmost intersection point of the curves (i.e., the
threshold level of the initial technology gap) lies further to the right in this case.
This means that without the Verdoom effect, it is 'easier' to catch up, because an
additional source of knowledge growth, which works against the backward
country in the early catching-up phase (see above), is ruled out.5.4. Conclusions of (fee Afodei : ; ••*-,; , ; ; ,
Combining the neo-Keynesian Dixon and Thirlwall model of export-based growth
on the basis of self-reinfordng growth with a catching-up model, and taking into
account some of the observations from the literature on technology (spillovers),
leads to the following outcomes. Under the assumption that technological distance
is a factor in explaining the capability to assimilate technological spillovers, the
combination of the size of the initial technological gap and the value of the
intrinsic capability to assimilate knowledge spillovers (§) determines whether a
country can catch up relative to the technological leader, or whether it will fall
behind. This outcome holds true irrespective of all the other assumptions in the
model.
Depending on the size of various parameters, catching up in a technological sense
might or might not imply catching up in a growth sense (i.e., realizing faster
growth in the backward country). Raising the intrinsic capability to assimilate
knowledge spillovers will increase the speed of technological catching up, and
thereby realize a shift from slower growth to faster growth. If it is assumed that
productivity growth is the only direct source of output growth (no export-based
growth), faster growth rate in the backward country is the only possible outcome
in the case of catching up. The Verdoorn effect is not a necessary condition for the
outcomes of the model as described above.
Thus, the model can explain both stylized facts 4 and 5 from Chapter 4. The first
of these, that a low initial level of labour productivity favours the rate of
technological progress, was already explained in earlier work on catching up.
However, the second, that the lowest per capita income countries also grow at the
slowest rate, has not yet been explained in a formal catching-up modelling context.
Therefore, this model shows that the use of nonlinear dynamic models combined
with insights from the nonformal part of the literature on international growth
provides a much richer perspective than the existing catching-up models.
However, in order to test the content of the model, a more rigorous test than just
looking at stylized facts is needed. Therefore, the next chapter will undertake an
econometric test of a simple version of the model proposed here.
118CHAPTER 6. An Empirical Test 0/ tfte
Mode/'
In this chapter, the simplest variant of the model presented in Chapter 5, as well
as some other models found in the literature on catching up, will be estimated
using data on a maximum of 114 countries for the period 1960-1985. The aim of
this exercise is to test whether the explanation for the dichotomy between catching
up or falling behind (found in Chapter 4) can be explained in an empirical sense
by the key concept introduced in the previous chapter: the intrinsic capability to
assimilate knowledge spillovers.
SJ, TesftMg P»£*<!K«? OWS" Data SOII««S
The model developed in Chapter 5 is a dynamic model in the sense that it tries to
explain a mopemenf of a variable over time. In the formulation, it was implicitly
assumed that time is a continuous variable and that there are no time lags in the
explanation of variables involved. Moreover, the notion of time was not specified
very explicitly (i.e., it was not explicitly defined in months, years or days). All this
was done because it proved to be 'easy* in the formulation of the model (it enables
one to use simple differential equations). Now that the model is to be estimated
explicitly, it is necessary to pay more attention to these issues. The movements
which the model is trying to explain are not likely to reveal themselves in short
periods. The model is not so refined that it can pretend to be able to explain the
(productivity) growth path of an economy with all its short-run disturbances that
are so well known from practice. It can only attempt to explain the long-run
tendency of the growth path of the economy, i.e., whether a country will catch up
to the technological frontier or rather fall behind, and how fast it will do this.
Therefore, the model cannot be tested by using short-run data on productivity
growth, but by using long-run trends in the underlying variables.
Additionally, the problem of time lags between variables becomes important if one
attempts to estimate the model empirically. There is a lag between the 'invention'
of knowledge and the moment this knowledge will be able to flow to the other
country; there is a lag between 'investments' in intrinsic learning capability and
the actual increase in this variable; there is a lag between the invention (or 'first
spillover/) of new knowledge and the diffusion of this knowledge; etc. While it
would principally be desirable to develop an economic theory explaining these
' Most of the text in this chapter appeared as Verspagen (1991).
119lags, this is not possible in the current framework. Moreover, there is no reason
to assume that the lags would foe constant, or that it would in any way be possible
to determine a satisfying empirical formulation of the processes involved.
Taking these problems into consideration, the following procedure to test the
model will be applied. The model will be estimated in a eross-cownfry sample, with
the /ong-run mopeffienl of f/»e technology (prodwdMry) gap as the dependent variable.
This implicitly means that the model is elaborated to a multi-follower - one leader
context. Although time is assumed to be 'cortstanf in this cross-country approach,
the dynamic character of the model is preserved in the sense that the movement
of a variable over time is explained. This cross-country approach overcomes some
of the problems involved in a time series approach mentioned above. Moreover,
it closely links up to previous research in the field of catching up, as will become
clear from the explicit formulation of the models to be estimated.
The following equations are used, which can be estimated for a cross-country





In these equations, E is a (vector of) variable(s) influencing the intrinsic capability
to assimilate knowledge spillovers, P is a variable representing the exogenous rate
of knowledge growth in the backward country, the subscript 0 denotes initial
values, c,, a,, fe, d, a, &, 8 are parameters to be estimated and e, are random
disturbances with the normal characteristics. In order to avoid problems in the
estimation procedure (i.e., when testing the assumption that the intrinsic capability
to assimilate knowledge spillovers is infinitely large), 8 now appears in the
numerator of the e power, instead of the denominator.
Equation (VI, 1) specifies the simplest catching-up hypothesis, as been put forward
and tested by among others Abramovitz (1979). It simply, and unconditionally,
states that countries with a low initial level of productivity should grow faster. In
terms of the analysis in the previous section, this model assumes that a, X, e = 0,
and 8=«> (assuming that S is in the denominator). Equation (VI.2) adds two extra
variables that have been proposed in Chapter 5 (P, E), but is not specified in the
nonlinear way as proposed in the model there. The extra terms are intended to
measure the capability to catch up and the exogenous rate of growth of the
knowledge stock. Such a linear equation (with the growth of population instead
of the variable P) has been used by Baumol ef ai. (1989). It is applied here mainly
to test whether or not the non/masr specification of (VI.3) improves the goodness
of fit.
Equation (VI.3) is the equation developed from the simplest model in Chapter 5.
In fact, it assumes that a, X, e = 0 (this is done to keep the model to be estimated
as simple as possible in order not to 'ask too much from the data'), but explicitly
120allows for 5<~ {assuming it is in the denominator), The equation is aimed at
taking into account the capability to assimilate knowledge spillovers in the
nonlinear way as specified in Chapter 5. Its characteristics include the possibility
of falling behind (path dependence) and the bifurcation described there.
On the basis of the theoretical exposure in Chapters 2 and 5, it is to be expected
that
% fe, d, ft, a, 8 < 0
and
ft>0.
The constant c, might take on any sign.
Note that equation (VI.1) is nested in equations (VI.2) and (VL3), so that
specifications (V1.2) and (VI.3) can be tested against specification (VI.l) by a simple
Rest with null hypothesis fc=O (in case of equation VI.2) or S=*0 (in case of equation
VI.3, S appearing in the numerator as in the equation here).
Variables are measured as follows (for descriptive statistics and a correlation
matrix, the reader is referred to Appendix VI.l). The level of the technology gap
is measured in the way already applied in Chapter 4: namely by means of per
capita GDP. This is an indirect way to measure what is supposed to be embodied
enough to estimate the model from Chapter 5. Thus, it is assumed that
T.-Qf*' -
» **»
The dependent variable is measured as fee eslifflstef (by OlS) time derivative of
the gap, as in Chapter 4 above (for more details on the measurement of the motion
of G over time the reader is referred to that chapter). G<, in equations (VI. 1) to
(VI.3) is measured as G^g.
Three different indicators for £ are used. The first two of these refer to education
data (as a measure of the quality of the Jabour force), while the latter refers to the
quality of the infrastructure as an indicator for the intrinsic capability to assimilate
knowledge spillovers. The first indicator of education, EDUWB, is taken from the
World Bank. This indicator is defined as the percentage of age group enroled in
secondary education in 1965, and is the same as the one used in Baumoi ef a/.
(1989). The second indicator for education, denoted by EDUL/W, is a irag/ifai
stwsge of per capita enrolment in tertiary education over the years 1965 (weight
0.6) and 1975 (weigh! 0.4), using United Nations (UNESCO) data. The third
indicator for the capability to assimilate knowledge spillovers is related to the
quality of the infrastructure. It is defined as a weighted average (weights between
brackets) of the per capita e/arfnrify-genersf ing capacity for the years 1965 (0.2), 1970
(0.2), 1975 (0.3), 1980 (0.2) and 1984 (0.1). These data are taken from the United
Nations, and the variable is denoted by JNFi?A
The (exogenous) rate of productivity growth due to research activities in a follower
country, P in equation (VI.2) and (VI.3), is measured by the sum of the per capita
number of patent grants in the U.S. over the period 1962-1985. This variable is
denoted by PAT. The data are taken from the U.S. Patent Office, Patent data have
121also been used by Fagerberg (1988b) in an inquiry into 'why growth rates differ',
but he uses the growth rate of the number of patents, and, moreover, takes his
data from another source (the World Intellectual Property Organisation, WIPO).
It should be noted that a patent proxy for the autonomous rate of innovation in
a follower country has several disadvantages. Some of these more general
disadvantages of patent data as an indicator of innovation are well known by now.
In addition to this, the data applied here are exfernaf patents for all the follower
countries in the sample, which means that the advantage of a comparable patent
institution necessarily entails that the data used might just reflect a trend in the
internationalization of an economy'.
6,2. ReswJfs
Using these different indicators, four different variants of equations (VI.2) and
(VI.3), and one variant of equation (VI.l) are estimated. The four different variants
of (VI.2) and (VI.3) relate to versions of the equations with each indicator for £
used separately, and one version with EDUWB and /NFRvi combined. The results
of the estimation procedures are presented in Table VI.l, where estimations of
parameters are denoted by hats above parameter names. Note also that in equation
(VI.3), the estimated constant is to be interpreted as the estimation of P,, while the
estimations ofa, in equations (VI.l) and (VI.2) are listed in the same column as the
estimation of a m equation (VI.3).
Equation (VI.l) is reproduced from the analysis in Chapter 4 (although it was not
explicitly documented there). Note that it was shown there that a version of this
equation allowing for different parameter values for different subsamples fits the
data better than the unrestricted version used here. The efforts made in the
previous and current chapter must be understood as an attempt to explain these
intercountry differences in a more satisfying way than just by means of exogenous
parameter values.
According to the estimations in Table VL1, the explanatory power of the equations,
as measured by the (adjusted) R* statistic, varies from small to almost zero. The
highest R* statistics are found in the estimation of equation (VI.3), while the two
other equations have low R*s. The majority of the estimated parameters has the
expected sign and is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. However,
these characteristics are not equally distributed over equations (VI.1) to (VI.3).
The estimation of «in equations (VI.l) and (VI.2) takes on the wrong sign in four
out of five cases, although it is only significant in two of these four cases. This
points to the conclusion that the catching-up hypothesis is not valid in its most
simple form in this big sample of countries. The significant and correctly signed
parameters for the variable EDtfWB in equations (VL2.i) and (VI.2.iv) indicate that
education is an important variable in explaining the growth pattern in this cross-
country sample, and thus seem to reject the most simple specification (VI.l). The
same result has been found by Baumol rt af. (1989). It should be noted, however,
* Few these genera! drawbacks, as well as some specific problems with the data set used here,








































































• Values between brackets are absolute t-values for one-sided tests, subscripts for parameters S, fc refer to variable names.
** Note that in tWs version of the equation, the & appear in the denominator of the exponential term, Le., they should be interpreted as being equal to
1/5 in die other versions of the equationthat the parameter for EDliUN in equation (VI.2.ii) is not significant, which means
that it does not support the 'education hypothesis'. Moreover, the only variant of
equation (VI.2.ii) that gives the expected sign (although not significant) of a, is the
variant including (only) EDUIVB.
Equation (VI.3) gives the best results in terms of significance of parameters, and
all the parameters have the expected signs. Only the |3,s are weakly significant, and
the 5]NPRA in the variant (VI.3.iv) is not significant. Thus, the evidence in favour of
the specification in (VI.3) is quite strong, particularly when compared to the
evidence found for the other specifications. Note also that it is (again) confirmed
that specification (VI.l) fits the data less well (t-tests on 8).
Summarizing the conclusions from Table VI.l, one might say that there is evidence
of a positive influence of education in the catching-up process. This is also true for
the statistical evidence for the model presented in Chapter 5. At this stage,
specification (VI.l) has been tested against (VI.2) and (VI.3) and it has been found
that the most simple catching-up model does not seem to apply. However, it has
not been tested as yet which of the equations (VI.2) and (VI.3) fits the data better
otherwise than by looking at the R* statistics and the t-values of the parameters.
In trying to conduct a more satisfactory test, two different strategies can be
followed. First, a new equation in which both (VI.2) and (VI.3) are nested can be
estimated, and Hests can be applied to test specifications (VI.2) and (VI.3) against
this 'third' equation, and, thus, against each other. The drawback of this method
is that such a 'third' equation has no (economic) meaning of its own, and that the
estimation of such an equation is most likely to suffer from multicollinearity.
Second, a method for non-nested hypothesis testing can be applied. Such a method
for nonlinear equations (like equation VI.3) is proposed in Pesaran and Deaton
(1978). Both methods will be applied here. The 'nested testing method' runs as
follows.
Equations (VI.2) and (VI.3) are both nested in the following equation.
The two specifications can be tested against each other by testing the following
hypotheses.
If 5 = 0 and d < 0
then the hypothesis mat specification (VI.3) is better has to be rejected;
If 8 < 0 and d = 0
then the hypothesis that specification (VI.2) is better has to be rejected.
Any other parameter occurrences yield indeterminate outcomes.
The results of the estimation of equation (VI.4) are presented in Table VI.2. The
table provides some evidence that specification (VI.3) is better. At the 5%
significance level, all the requirements for a rejection of the hypothesis that (VI.2)
fits the data better are met in all the variants of the equations. However, the



























































• Values between brackets are absolute lvalues for one-sided tests, subscripts for parameter 8, J> refer to variable names.
" Note that in this version of the equation, the Ss appear in the denominator of the exponential term, i.e, they sheuM be interpreted as being e^ual »1/9»l»
other versions of the equation.variables. At the 10% significance level, neither hypothesis can be rejected. The
results in Table VI.2 thus point towards the conclusion that equation (VL3) is the
'better' one, although the evidence is not altogether conclusive.
The second method makes use of techniques for nonnested hypothesis testing. In
order to test two alternative models against each other, one can (in turn) maintain
the hypothesis that one of these two models is correct. On the basis of this
hypothesis a test statistic N ft/ie 'Cox'-stafisfid, which is (asymptotically) distributed
as N(0,2), can be calculated by a procedure which involves estimating four
equations: the two models themselves, plus one more nonlinear regression and one
more linear regression (see Pesaran and Deaton 1978 for more backgrounds on this
method). Since the method to calculate the statistic makes use of ma>dmum
likelihood estimates of the variance of the regression, the best way to proceed is
to estimate the equations by the maximum likelihood method. Appendix VI.2
describes the precise method that has been applied to estimate the statistic for
these one-equation models. Table VI.3 gives the value of the statistic itself, for the
variants (i), (ii) and (iii) of equations (VI.2) and (VI.3). Variant (iv), which yielded
a less significant estimate in both cases, is no longer considered.
Table VI.3 A nonnested test of specifications (V1.2) and (VI.3) against each other





















The evidence in Table VI.3 is quite strong, although again not altogether
conclusive. For all three variants of equation (VI.2), the hypothesis that this model
fits the data better than (VI.3) clearly has to be rejected, since the values of the
statistics (the lower left corner of the table) are clearly significantly different from
zero. The hypothesis that variant (i) of equation (VI.3) is the correct one has to be
rejected (in a two-tailed test) only at the 10% leveP, so that this evidence is less
strong. In the tests of variants (ii) and (iii) of equation (VI.3), the hypothesis that
these equations fit the data less well than the corresponding variants of (VI.2)
cannot be rejected. Summarizing the information in Table VI3, it seems that there
* The situation that in case of variant i (at the 10% level) both equation (V1.2) and (VI.3) have
to be rejected might seem paradoxical, but is a quite 'normal' outcome of the testing procedure
applied here. See Pesaran and Deaton (1978; 678-9) for a discussion of this feature of the procedure.
126is quite strong evidence in favour of specification (VO),
The estimation results obtained in the previous section can be used to elaborate
upon the dichotomy between catching up and falling behind. To do so, the
estimated parameters and the variables will be used to calculate th# exact form of
the function for the motion of the technology gap for each country. Using this
function, one can calculate the eriftatf value (bifurcation value) of the intrinsic
capability to assimilate knowledge spillovers. In the simple form of the model used
in this chapter, this value is found at the point where the maximum of the S-curve
(from Chapter 5) is equal to the level of the exogenous growth rate of the
knowledge gap.
The function that will be used to make these calculations is the following.
This is the estimated form of equation (VL3iv), which gave the highest degree of
explanatory power in the regressions in Table VI.!.
For each country, it is first tested whether the intrinsic capability to assimilate
knowledge spillovers exceeds the critical value. In other words, a calculation is
made to see whether or not the S- and L-curves (the latter of which are horizontal
in the simple version applied here) as in Figure V.I have intersection points. If not
the country will be falling behind. If there are intersection points, a second
calculation is made to see whether the initial value of the technology gap is to the
right (falling behind) or left (catching up) of the rightmost intersection point.
Unlike the previous calculation, this one cannot be solved analytically, so that a
numerical solution must be searched for. However, since the form of the function
to be solved is well-known, the procedure to find the intersection point can be
carried out easily*.
This procedure also gives a good impression of the predictive qualities of the
model. Looking at whether or not the model predicts the sign of the motion of the
technology gap correctly (i.e., whether the country is catching up or falling
behind), the prediction of this sign is correct in 72% of the cases.
Using the results of the calculations, the countries in the sample can be divided
into three different groups. The first group consists of countries which are falling
behind because their intrinsic capability to assimilate knowledge spillovers is so
small that there is no intersection point between the S- and L-curves. The second
group is composed of countries for which equilibrium values of the technology
exist, but which have an initial gap that is so big that they are falling behind. The
third group includes the catching-up countries, for which equilibrium values of the
* One knows that the intersection point must iie to the right of the maximum of the S-curve.
Thtis, an iterative procedure starting at the maximum, and moving slowiy.to the right will at some
point arrive at the solution (or very near to it).
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Table VL4. Catching up or falling behind according to the equation estimated
I. FflZliMg beWnd wifftouf possibility fo cafcft wp
Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Peoples Republic of
Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Papua New Guinea
Group 2, FaWiMg beWiwf with possibility to catefe up
Ghana, Burma, Thailand
Gf0«p 3. Ca*cfcing up
Egypt, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Australia, New Zealand, Mauritius, South Africa, Tunesia, Zambia, Hong Kong,
India, Iran, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Hniand,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
El Salvador
Table VI.4 gives an overview of the sample in these terms. One exceptional case
is Switzerland, which has a value for P which makes the L-curve lie below the
horizontal G-axis in terms of Figure VI.l. This means that Switzerland is catching
up, even though there are no formal intersection points between the two curves.
Following the strict logic behind the formal definition of the model, one could say
that Switzerland should be labelled as the technological leader because of these
characteristics. Although Switzerland certainly is among the most advanced
nations from a technological perspective, this is not done here. Instead, the Swiss
case is seen as a peculiarity of the data and model.
The main feature that can be derived from the table is that the most powerful
distinction between catching up or falling behind emerges from the possibility of
no equilibrium points of the gap at all. With the exception of three, all falling-
behind countries have values of the intrinsic capability to assimilate knowledge
spillovers that are too small to even yield the passiWJify to catch up. Another, more
positive, way of saying the same thing is that almost all countries that have the
possibility to catch up have succeeded in doing so. In terms of numbers, the
largest part (60%) of the sample is on the positive side of the catching-up / falUng-
behind dichotomy. However, as much as 37% of the countries completely lacks the
128possibility to catch up. Individual countries seem to be ranked mostly to the
intuitively correct categories (as already indicated by the 72% correct prediction
of signs). A model taking into account more and better indicators of the intrinsic
capability to assimilate knowledge spillovers would probably help explaining the
few cases which seem to be placed wrongly, such as India, Almost all African
countries are in Group 1, indicating the seriousness of the situation on that
continent,
It is also worth noting that most of the oil-producing countries are classified in
Group 3. This is somewhat surprising, because oil is not considered aa a factor of
development in the model nor the estimations. A possible explanation for tWi
might be that even if these countries would not have had the richness of oil
resources, they would have been catching up because of their high education level
and infrastructure quality. However, it is also likely that part of the oil profits
were used to increase efforts in these fields, so that causality is reverse. Probably,
both explanations are relevant, with the mix of the two being specific to each
country.
6.4. Summary amf Some Policy Conclusions
In an econometric estimation for a cross-country sample of 114 countries, it was
shown that the model proposed in Chapter 5 fits the data well, yielding (mostly
highly significant) parameters with the expected sign. In the statistical procedure,
it was shown that education is indeed an important factor in the catching-up
process, which has also been shown by other research. The specific nonlinear
model proposed in Chapter 5, with its features summarized there, is shown to fit
the data better than linear models involving the same variables. This result is
established by considering the common 'goodness of fif statistics, a procedure
using nested equations to test different functional specifications against each other,
and a procedure for testing (nonlinear) nonnested regression models.
These results point to the value of the arguments about the capability to catch up,
which were put into the model in Chapter 5. Thus, contrary to what the catching-
up hypothesis assumes, being a following country does not automatically imply
that catching up takes place. While technological change in the leading country is
a factor spurring growth in the following country in the simple catching-up model,
the results here show that in the real world, technological change is a mixed
blessing. Only a limited number of countries are able to meet the requirements for
being a successful catching-up country. Therefore, the model in Chapter 5 is
shown to have empirical relevance for explaining stylized facts 4 and 5 in Chapter
4, In terms of the goals set out, attention can therefore be switched to the other
stylized facts. Prior to this, however, the policy implications of the results in this
chapter will briefly be discussed.
Although the development consequences of the model outlined in the previous
chapter are very simple, there is an important lesson to be learned from the
results. In order to change the economic relations in the world in a structural way,Joint* efforts from leading and backward countries* should be directed towards
increasing the elements of an imitation in/rosfrucfHre. Education of the labour force
in the poorest countries, often at the primary and secondary levels, investment in
basic infrastructural projects Eke roads, airports and power supply are necessary
to turn the falling-behind countries into catching-up countries.
In terms of the model, the governments of the falling behind countries should take
the initiative in raising the intrinsic capability to assimilate knowledge spillovers.
However, this often proves to be an unrealistic option. Governments in the third
world usually do not have the funds to increase spending in the mentioned areas
up to the degree necessary. And even if funds are available, the political priorities
are often directed elsewhere. The World Development Report 1991 made a plea for
reducing military spending, especially in the third world. Using funds which are
now spent on weapons and war for increasing the quality of the knowledge
spillover structure is an ideal that is in line with much of the sentiments found in
Western aid projects. However, from an economic point of view, it would be
desirable if international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, as well
as developed world governments would turn this economic logic into strong
requirements accompanying investments in the third world aimed at increasing the
education level, the infrastructure, etc., and make it as important in their
recommendations as stabilization policies, public end external debt reduction, and
financial stability'.
s ' It remains an open question whether tt is in the North's Interest to make these joint efforts.
The setting of economic selection seems to suggest flat it is not. However, there have been
interpretations of evolution which stress cooperation and mutual aid (Kropotkin 1902, for a longer
discussion in an economic context see Foster 1987).
* Although this phrase has become a dfche in 1992, the policy recommendations are also valid
for the former centrally planned economies
' A more detailed model than the one developed here could stress the interactions between
these 'common' points of attention and the capability to assimilate knowledge spillovers.ix V7.1. A ZV«crtprio« of the Date



























Table VI.A2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in section 4

























VL2. o/ (fee N-
In mis appendix, the procedure that was used to estimate the N-statistic (or 'Cox'-
statistic) will be explained. As has been noted above, this procedure is taken from
Pesaran and Deaton (1978). For the derivation of the formulas used in this paper,
and for the application of the procedure to a multi-equation model, the reader is
referred to this original source.
The N-statistic applies in the case where two alternative (nonlinear and) non-
nested equations, denoted by / and g are tested against each other.
Al
A2
In this formulation, y is the dependent variable, x is a vector of independent
variables, and pj are vectors of parameters to be estimated. Throughout, hats above
variables will, as usual, denote estimations.
Here, the calculation of N will be carried out for the maintained hypothesis thatmodel Ho is the correct one. The first step is then to estimate the two models
(using the maximum likelihood method), and calculate the asymptotic (i.e.,
maximum likelihood) variance of the two regressions, denoted by djj and c^ ,
respectively. Step two is to calculate the predicted values of the estimated equation
HQ, which is denoted by /(0^) , and use these as the dependent variable in a
regression estimation H,. Then define
,- • :•• ., , •'• . , *»-«!< . '. V - *?..
where d^ is the estimated variance of the regression g, using the predicted
values of / as dependent variables.
Now define -•' i-,.-''- "V":. ' '"?,?""-
A4
Now proceed estimating the variance of T,,, denoted by ^(T^) , as follows.
Define the following function,
HiT AS'
Then run a regression of # . on the residuals from the regression g on the
predicted values of/, and denote the residual sum of squares of this regression by




Trade and Growth Kate DifferentialsCHAPTER 7. An EuolKftowan/ MorfeJ 0/
Tedtwofogieal Change, Specialization
Economic Grou>r/i'
Part Two has explained the stylized fact of differential growth rates by searching
in depth for an explanation for the dichotomy between catching up and falling
behind at the global level (stylized facts 4 and 5 in Chapter 4). However, due to
the aggregate nature of the analysis, the stylized facts describing the role of
technological change at the sectoral level (2), and the role of the production
structure (3) have not yet been treated. The model to be developed in this chapter
aims at providing an explanation for growth rate differentials (stylized fact 1) from
the point of view of sectoral differences in technological change and economic
importance, and their relation to trade and growth. Thus, the model deals with
specialization patterns and their influence on growth. A recent model concerned
with the same issues and basically set up along the same (Keynesian) lines, but
with a less explicit evolutionary character is in Qmoli (1990).
The model that will be presented in this chapter, can be viewed as an elaboration
on the model in Chapter 5. Although the innovation part of the model no longer
contains knowledge spillovers*, the specification of technological change in the
form of intertemporal learning is richer than before, among other things allowing
for differentials rates across countries and sectors (stylized facts!). The economic
structure is also much richer than before, allowing for a more adequate
representation of international trade, as well as the sectoral mix of production and
consumption.
Consequently, the model primarily looks at economic links between countries,
rather than technological interdependendes in the form of knowledge spillovers.
In Part Two, these economic links were modelled only in a preliminary way. The
aim of the current chapter is to specify a more satisfactory model. To do so, the
relation between growth and technology will be linked by the concept of
compefifiDeness. Setting up the specific evolutionary way of modelling proposed in
Chapter 3, the equations will explain fluctuations in employment, production
growth and productivity in an international context. The analysis will, however,
be limited to the real (i.e., nonmonetary) sector of the economy.
' This chapter draws largely on Verspagen (1992b).
* Including knowledge spillovers between countries and an exogenous research sector, like in
Chapter 5, does not change the conclusions drawn below. This is shown in Verspagen (lV92c).
1357,2.
Simple national accounting identities show that (in Keynesian terms) the open
economy income multiplier is different from (in fact, smaller than) the closed
economy income multiplier, because of import leakage effecte. Simple Keynesian
(open economy) models also show that larger exports (usually assumed to be
exogenous in the textbooks) increase national income. Realising that both export
and import performance are dynamic, endogenous variables, this simple logic
suffices to show that international trade is an important determinant of growth
patterns, which is also the outcome of the open new neoclassical growth models
discussed in Chapter 2*.
An important question that arises in this respect is how the openness of the
economy will affect countries: Will it be beneficial or harmful to them? Standard
(neoclassical) trade theory argues that sW countries benefit from trade (the well-
known Heckscher-Ohlin framework). However, interpreting the relation between
trade and growth using the income accounting identity known from (Keynesian)
macroeconomics, the 'Pareto efficienf trade effect is no longer obvious.
Using the above framework for assessing the relation between trade and growth
basically gives two effects which play a role in the long run. First, the volume of
exports has a positive effect on national income (growth), as in the model in
Chapter 5, Second, there is the effect of import penetration. An increased import
penetration has a negative effect on domestic income, through a smaller value of
the multiplier. Combined, these two effects lead to the well-known prisoners'
dilemma: While it is beneficial to all individual countries to increase their exports
and discourage imports, the sum of these individual behaviour patterns leads to
a clearly inefficient aggregate outcome. The 'logic* behind 'early* (i.e., original)
mercantilism can be interpreted as playing this prisoners' dilemma game in an
unrepeated context, yielding the least efficient outcome*. In purely mercantilistic
terms, a country which cannot increase its exports to the extent of offsetting the
effect of an increasing import penetration, is worse off in the long run. On the
other hand, a country whose increased exports outweigh the increasing import
penetration (or even better, add to the effect of decreasing import penetration) is
better off in the long run. In terms of the trade balance, a surplus is a facilitator
for economic growth, while a deficit is a brake.
This extreme mercantilistic point of view will not be defended here. Instead, the
above (which was, basically, nothing else than accounting) will be applied in the
so-called fwtance of payments approsdi to economic growth (Thirlwall 1979,
Fagerberg 1988a), thus modifying the purely mercantilistic point of view. A
* However, in these models, the effect of trade is mainly through the reallocation of resources,
and the resulting effect on relative prices. In the (Keynesian) model proposed here, the effect of
trade mainly works through the level of macroeconomic activity. > , .,
* Sct> Axelrod (1984) for more details about prisoners' dilemma games In repeated and
unrcpeated contexts.country cannot keep on drawing on its international reserves to finance a trade
deficit in the long run. Therefore, countries with a trade deficit will, in the long
run, have to adjust to a rate of income growth consistent with trade balance
equilibrium. How this adjustment comes about (by market mechanisms or
government intervention) is not the primary concern here (see for example
Fagerberg 1988a for a discussion of this topic). The opposite (the case of a tradt
surplus) also applies. In the absence of capital flows, it does not make sense in the
long run to spur export growth without increasing imports: mis would only lead
to accumulation of foreign currency reserves (or, in the setting of the mercantilist
age, precious metals). Since no direct utility can be derived from these reserves,
society's welfare is not increased by the constantly improving export position,
Direct utility can be derived from consumption, and it therefore 'makes sense' to
keep the demand for consumption in pace with the increasing export performance.
Moreover, even if the countries with trade surpluses wanted to maintain this, they
would not be able to do this because the countries in deficit would have to adjust
to equilibrium in the long run.
b. Trade and Tec/jno/a^y
To find out whether or not it is possible for all countries in the world to benefit
from trade, it has to be investigated what determines the import and export
performance of a country. This is where the attention switches to a second point,
namely the relation between trade patterns and technological capabilities. The
standard view on trade is that it is determined by comparator advantages, which
can arise because of differences in factor endowments. In light of the discussion
in Chapter 3, this approach can be seen as typically static. Following the argument
from Chapter 3, a different view will be taken here: The process of international
trade will essentially be treated as a dynamic process of comprfition.
Leaving out the characteristics of a good (such as the price and the quality) for a
moment, the only difference between foreign and domestic producers is their
location. It is natural to assume that a consumer is indifferent to the location of
production of the product (abstracting from possible nationalistic feelings which
have led to such campaigns as "Buy British", or international politically oriented
boycotts such as recently against South Africa, Iraq, Libya or what is still left of
Yugoslavia). Thus, if a good coming from a foreign supplier is cheaper or has a
better quality (even after transportation), the consumer is likely to buy this good
instead of the domestically supplied good. In other words, the import and export
performance of an industry in a country is determined by the awrage compefrrtpe
sfreng*/i (or compeWfiwness) of the industry relative to the foreign producers. Then,
it is easy to understand that the relation between trade and technological
capabilities lies in the influence of technology on competitiveness. Making a
distinction between price and product competition, one can say that pro«ss
mnouafion is a main determinant of productivity and, therefore, of price
compeftftreness, while product innovation is a main determinant of qwztiry
comprtiftoeness. The remainder of this chapter will only be concerned with price
competitiveness, but this is only done for reasons of simplicity.
One major aspect of price competitiveness are factor costs. In the current model,
137these will be taken into account by introducing wage rate dynamics. This opens
up the possibility that countries lagging behind in a technological sense are still
being competitive because of their lower wage rate. The empirical relevance of mis
is obvious, and will be investigated in the context of the model in Chapter 8.
e. The JttferMatiottfl? Locufton o/ J««owflf!on
As argued in Chapter 3, there are important differences in technological
capabilities between individual firms. At a higher level of aggregation, these
differences are also present between countries (see for example Pavitt and Soete
1982). They consist of both aggregate differences (country A has a higher
technological level than country B) and sectoral differences (sector i in country A
is relatively stronger than sector ii in country A). Following the above arguments,
this means that different countries have different abilities to compete in different
sectors, i,e., in different markets. In a dynamic context, one wonders whether these
differences in competitiveness will vanish over time, or whether they are
persistent, or maybe even self-reinforcing.
Part Two has already identified learning in the form of tefrwoJogy sp/MoPcrs as a
factor that may reduce technological differences over time. The spillover effect
leads to a negative feedback (a /ow level of technological change leads to good
performance). The model in Chapter 5 also had a positive technological feedback
effect in the form of the Verdoorn learning process. The model in this chapter will
stress the cumulativeness of the innovation process, and pay exclusive attention
to the positive technological feedback effect. However, it will also contain a
negative feedback effect in the form of wage rate dynamics, and a feedback effect
with an unspecified a fixed sign in the form of income elasticities.
d. Specirt/itarion Patterns ami Economic Groartfc
It has been argued that a main factor explaining a country's growth pattern is its
trade performance, and, later, that the main determinant of a country's sectoral
trade performance is its competitiveness. In turn, competitiveness is determined
to a large extent by technological factors, So far, it has not been discussed in what
way sectoral growth patterns (and trade patterns) translate into the aggregate
growth path of the economy. The aggregate growth rate is just a weighted average
of the sectoral growth rates, with shares in domestic production used as weights.
The extent to which sectoral competitive advantages translate into aggregate
production growth is therefore (in the short run) determined by the (fixed) share
of the sector in total production.
The sectoral distribution of production at the global level will be determined by
the sectoral distribution of consumption patterns. Due to specialization, however,
consumption and production patterns may differ at the national level. Thus, the
domestic consumption pattern (for the 'nonspecialized' part of production) and the
foreign consumption pattern (for the 'specialized' part of production) wiU be
decisive factors for the determination of the growth potential of an economy. As
argued in Chapter 3 and Pasinetti (1981), income elasticities determine the sectoral
mix of consumption. From the perspective of an exporting sector, the potential
Oft.demand for its product consists of the consumption of the sector's product in all
other countries. As explained above, the extent to which this potential demand can
be reached depends upon competitiveness. The size of the potential demand,
however, depends upon income elasticities of consumption. Therefore, the
(sectoral) opportunities for export (and growth) also depend on these income
elasticities. This means that a competitive advantage in some sector can only
generate an important effect upon aggregate economic growth if the demand
potential in the international markets for the product of this sector is high, and if
the share of this sector in domestic production is substantial. The same argument
holds true for importing sectors. This conclusion has been reached in various types
of literature, such as evolutionary inspired treatments of trade and technology
(Dosi rt «/. 1990), as well as the literature on strategic rrode (Krugman 1990).
7J. 77K; Mode/
a. TTie SefeefioM £«vtro»meKt
The first step in setting up the evolutionary model is to specify the selection
environment. Starting point of the analysis is Thirlwall's (1979) formulation of the
bfl//j«cf of pnymenfs resfricfion to economic growf/i. In a single good context, with R
denoting real income, one can write the following.
r«"2. <viu>
In this equation, a denotes the elasticity of the country's exports with regard to
world exports, and |3 is the country's elasticity of imports with regard to national
income. Assuming that, initially, the balance of payments of a country is in
equilibrium, R' is the balance of payments restricted real income. The ratio of the
elasticities of exports and imports determines whether the country's growth rate
is above, below or equal to the growth rate of world income.
After having described this framework, Fagerberg (1988a: 358) concludes that"(...)
it is not clear what meaning should be attached to the income elasticities of
demand in" equation (VTI.l). Furthermore, he says that non-price factors might be
a factor explaining international differences in these elasticities. This suggestion is
the basis for his further analysis: "However (...), it would be preferable to include
these factors in the equations for exports and imports instead of relying on
estimated proxies (which may be subject to different interpretation)" (p. 359).
Fagerberg's viewpoint that the use of income elasticities as in equation (VII.l) is
not very enlightening is well taken here. However, a different way of specifying
an alternative for equation (VII.l) is chosen. A different specification based on an
evolutionary description of the world economy will be adopted. Define import
penetration (z) in sector;' in country i by
z-^ (VIU)
Cg is the volume of the domestic market for the product of sector /, or domestic
consumption (all goods are consumption goods) of sector;' goods, and Af denotes
real imports. Assuming for the moment that C and z are fixed, the import demand
139for sector ;'s goods is determined by this equation. Using this equation for the 'rest
of the world' (denoted by u>) and taking into consideration that imports into the
rest of the world are equal to country i's exports, one can write
The evolutionary content of the model is primarily achieved by specifying the
motion of 2 in discrete time using the evolutionary selection equation introduced
as equations (III.l) - (III.2) in Chapter 3. These two equations are slightly modified
in order to make them more suitable for the model here. First, average
competitiveness is calculated by using previous period market shares (2), which is
necessary to let market shares count to one in each period. Second, percentage
deviations from competitiveness are used on the rhs of the equation, in order to
rule out influences of scale in the measurement of E. Appendix VII.2 gives more
detailed mathematical information on the selection equation.
Thus, each country's z is determined by an evolutionary market selection process
with two groups of producers (domestic and foreign)* competing with each other.
Consumers tend to buy more of the product when competitiveness is higher. Each
one of the producer groups gains or loses market share, depending on whether its
competitiveness is above or below average market level. This constitutes the
dynamic, evolutionary approach to trade discussed above.
As discussed already in Chapter 3, a crucial feature of equation (VII.4) is the
definition of E. As a first approximation, assume that price competition is the only
important mode of competition in international markets. With P denoting price
and e denoting the exchange rate (1 unit of foreign currency = e units of domestic
currency), it can be written that*
E,»_L, 0«|Kl. (VII.6)
Note that it does not matter in what currency prices are expressed, since
multiplying all prices with one exchange rate does not affect the part between
brackets on the rhs of (VII.4). Note also that the restriction that $ is positive and
smaller than unity rules out the theoretically impossible outcome that 2 becomes
negative (see Appendix VII.2).
* Note that for a model with «>2 countries, one would have n-1 z's: one for each group of
foreign producers (i.e., a country). This is indeed the approach used in the simulation experiments
below. Note also that one could principally write out the equation for p producers, of which ij (<p>
are foreign, and arrive at the above equation for country aggregates by simply aggregating the
equations, which indicates the intuitive way in which aggregates can be interpreted in the selection
equation logic.
* Prom now on, superscripts are omitted in cases where period t is referred to (obviously).
140in order to be able lo write an expression for the balance of payments restricted
growth rate, a number of national accounts identities have to be formulated. First,
real consumption C^ can be identified by introducing the variable Sp wMch
denotes the consumption share of good / in domestic real income R,,
Second, real income cart be defined as being equal to nominal income divided by
the price level that is relevant to the consumer, P.
Third, the sectoral and overall consumer price levels are weighted averages of the
different producer prices, with market shares and consumption shares as weights.
i
Fourth* it is assumed that production is equal to demand (domestic plus foreign),
so that, using CVII.2), one obtains
Now assume that domestic absorption is equal to domestic income, or that the S^s
sum to one in each country i. Then it follows from (VII.7) - (VII.11) that the current
account is in equilibrium. This can be written as follows.
Substituting (VII.7) - (VII.l 1) into equation (VB.12), (logarithmically) differentiating
and re-arranging terms, one arrives at the following equation for the difference
between the balance of payments warranted growth rate for country j's real
income and the rest of the world's real income growth rate.
'"•' ' *\Fl '"" """ "'" "^
With initial condition T P.°X*=y; e",
In this equation, m and x denote nominal imports and exports, respectively. This
equation is the muW-secfor counterpart of equation (VII.l). At the expense of
simplicity, equation (VII.13) explains the elasticities a and |$ in equation (VII.l) in
terms of the factors on the rhs of (VII.13).
The first term between brackets reflects the direct effect of a change in the terms
of trade over time. If world prices increase at a faster rate than domestic prices, the
country can import less given the revenue of its exports. The growth rate
consistent with this smaller value of imports will be smaller than the rest of the
world's growth rate. This explains the (positive) sign of this term. The second term
141between brackets reflects the effect of a change in import penetration in country
t and the rest of the world. It reflects the effects of changes in sectoral trade
positions. A lower import penetration in the country, and a higher import
penetration in the rest of the world (i.e., a better export performance of country j)
lead to a higher growth rate in i. Note that, via equations (VII.4) - (VII.6), this
effect is closely linked, and indeed opposite, to the first effect. The third and last
term between brackets is associated with changes in the consumption pattern over
time. A positive sign of this term means that consumption patterns in country i
and the rest of the world have shifted in such a way that the pattern in the rest of
the world is now closer to the strong points in the export position of i, while the
patterns in t itself have changed such that they are further away from the strong
points of the export position of the rest of the world.
Exchange rate movements also add to the terms of trade effect. This is reflected by
the presence of the growth rate of e^, on the rhs. A devaluation of the domestic
currency (a positive growth rate of O thus increases the growth rate differential
relative to the rest of the world, because it has a negative influence on the terms
of trade. But this is not the only effect of a devaluation. Grfms paries, a
devaluation will also have an effect upon competitiveness, and therefore on the
growth rates of z,j and z™. Thus, there is also an effect upon the second term
between brackets on the rhs of the equation for the growth rate differential. This
effect can be called the compefifroeness ospecf of a devaluation. This effect cannot
easily be quantified in an exact way. However, the following preliminary remarks
apply. First, it can be easily seen and understood that the terms with e^ in them
(either directly or indirectly), bear great similarity to the well-known MarsW/-
Lema" condirion for assessing the effects of a devaluation on the current account.
The effect of an increase in e,«, on the growth rate of the penetration of domestic
producers in foreign markets (z^) is positive, while the effect upon the penetration
of foreign producers in domestic markets (z,p is negative. This ensures that the
competitiveness effect upon the growth rate differential is negative. However, it
remains an open question whether this negative effect is larger, equal to or smaller
(in absolute terms) than the effect of a decrease in the terms of trade.
Second, the exact elasticity of the value of the competitiveness effect with regard
to the rate of change of the exchange rate cannot easily be calculated. What can be
said is that the exact reaction of the growth rates of z^ and 2^ to a one-percent
change in the exchange rate depends upon the current producers' price
differentials, the current exchange rate, and the current values of z in a nonlinear
way.
The different effects can be illustrated more clearly by writing and graphing the
different terms separately for the case of two commodities (sectors). For the sake
of simplicity, the exchange rate will be assumed to be fixed, thus reducing the
number of effects to three. The symbols J,, fj and J, represent the (direct) terms of
trade effect (first term on the rhs of VII.13), the competitiveness effect (the second
term on the rhs of VII.13) and the consumption pattern effect (the third term on
the rhs of VII.13), respectively. Writing out (VH.13) for the 2-sector case, and










Figure VII.la. The /, effect on the growth rate differential
143These inequalities are represented by Figures VII.la - VILlc. The lines in the
figures divide the plane into two parts, one for which the (net) effect represented
in the graph is smaller than zero and another one for which it is larger than zero.
Note that for changes in the trade and consumption structure (and therefore in the
production structure) the dividing lines between those planes will be changing
over time.
In Figure VILla, the (instant) effect of the rate of change of prices is drawn. The
variables on the axes are the growth rates of the domestic producer prices. The
solid line is drawn under the assumption that the price changes in the rest of the
world as a whole (the term b, in VII.14) are equal to zero (or just cancel each other
out). In general, this will of course not be true. A positive (negative) term fr, will
reduce the size of the plane for which combinations of the country's own growth
rates of producers prices will yield a positive (negative) influence upon the growth
rate differential. An example of such an influence is given by the line for which
/,"=0. Changes in the own export structure, as reflected in aj, will not change the
size of the two planes, but will change the location by rotating the line around its
intersection point with the vertical axis. Note that the negative slope will always
remain. An example of a rotation of the line due to a different export structure is
given by the line for which J/=0,
Figure VII.1b illustrates the effect of a loss or gain in competitiveness as
determined by the selection processes in the domestic and foreign market. On the
axes are the price differentials between the own country and the rest of the world.
Since there is no constant in equation (VII.15), the lines drawn in this figure will
always pass through the origin. The lines may have negative or positive slopes
(only cases with a negative slope are drawn). Therefore, the size of the planes for
the (net) effect smaller/larger than zero will always be the same, but the location
may change due to different values of the coefficient a^.
Figure VII.1c represents the effect of the consumption structure in both countries.
Again, the line cuts through the origin. For plausible situations (for example, z^-
!„,,>() combined with z,^-z,,<0), the slope of this line is negatived Shifting
consumption and trade structures will rotate the line around the origin, as is the
case for the dotted line.
In each period, the growth rate differential of a country relative to the rest of the
world can be found by determining the position of the lines and the value of the
variables on the axes in Figures Vll.la - VILlc. Each of the separate figures gives
one of the three isolated effects. Adding them up yields the net average effect.
* Note that for some implausible, but by no means impossible, values of the z"s the slope of the




Figure VILlb. The 4 effect upon the growth rate differential
Figure VILlc. The /, effect upon the growth rate differential
145b, Ewdogeni'ziMg Cowipefifweness.' Learning, Wage Rate Dynamics and Income
After having modelled (and analyzed in a preliminary way) the selection
environment, the way in which Lamarckian style feedbacks shape the learning and
adaptation process of countries will now be specified. This is necessary because,
at this stage, not having specified the motion of some key variables in equation
(V1I.13), one cannot say much about the long-run values of growth rate
differentials.
First, the equation for P is specified. The approach chosen is highly stylized, but
can serve as a means of illustrating some of the mechanisms associated with the
evolutionary approach adopted. For the sake of simplicity, assume that all goods
are produced with labour alone and that profits are equal to zero*. One can then
write the following identity.
W
F«--l (VII.17)
W stands for the nominal wage rate and G is (labour) productivity.
Endogenizing these two variables, the movement of the latter is specified using an
equation which combines principles already applied in Parts One and Two: the
Verdoorn relation and Kaldor's technical progress function (Kaldor 1957). Both
effects capture the notion of dynamic scale effects linked to the cumulative
character of technological change. Although this is only a very stylized description
of technological change which does not involve endogenous investment in R&D,
it still takes into account the basic cumulative characteristics (see Chapter 3) that
are the focus of this model. The following equation is used.
In this equation, y and X are country and sector-specific learning parameters
reflecting differences between sectors and countries in the rate of (dynamic)
learning. These differences may be related to differences in the sectoral technology
opportunities and to institutional differences. The equation says that the current
period growth rate of labour productivity is a nonlinear function (passing through
the origin) of the previous period growth rate of output. Thus, this equation brings
a pasirfoe feedback into the system (high growth leads to high growth), with a
'learning lag' of one period. The function is specified in such a way that the
marginal increases in productivity growth become smaller and smaller (but remain
positive) for larger growth rates of production (decreasing marginal taming rate).
The behaviour of a system in which production growth is equal to productivity
growth (i.e., in which there are no influences from the demand side, like the
neoclassical growth model), and productivity growth is described by equation
* Alternatively, one could specify some mark-up pricing rate and a fixed capital output ratio,
as has been done for example in (respectively) Silverberg et ai. (1988) and CantweU (1989). This
would not change the conclusions In a qualitative way.
146(VH.18) can be easily analyzed. Similar to the analysis in Kaldor (1957; 265-270),
the equilibrium growth rate of the system is found at the intersection point of the
curve describing (V1I.18) and the 45 degrees line. This is depicted in Figure VH.2.
For values to the right (left) of this intersection point, the rate of productivity
growth is below (above) the rate of output growth, and hence the rate of output
growth will fall (increase), leading the system to the intersection point.
45
Figure VH.2. The technical progress function
Thus, in the short run, the rate of learning is either larger or smaller than the rate
of output growth. This means that in the short run, dynamic returns to scale at
both increasing and decreasing rates can occur. In the long run, the system will,
provided fte no offer swodfcs or tendencies occur*, tend to a rate at which output and
productivity will grow equally fast. This 'natural rate' is equal to (lA)*'""*. Note
that, in general, due to technological and institutional differences, one would
expect Y and X, and hence the nararai rates of growth, to differ between countries.
A negflffce feedback results from wage rate dynamics. It is assumed that the motion
of this variable is influenced by two sources. The first is the rate of productivity
* It might be useful to point out that in the present model there are a number of tendencies and
shocks which might prevent the system from settling down at the equilibrium growth rate. These
are the evolutionary selection equation, exchange rate movements, consumption share movements,
foreign demand and wage rate movements.
147growth. The second is the state of the labour market In 'normal' situations, wages
increase as fast as productivity. However, if unemployment is above a certain
threshold, workers are prepared to work for lower wages, in order to increase their
chance of employment If unemployment is above that same threshold level,
workers will demand a growth rate of wages which is higher than productivity
growth, because there is relatively little chance of becoming unemployed. Thus,
only when unemployment is exactly at the threshold level (the 'no inflation rate
of unemployment*) will wages grow as fast as productivity"'. This can be
specified as follows.
In this equation, Lf is the rate of unemployment". L is identified by
L,-£^£ (VIUO)
The aggregate value of productivity (G,) is obtained by taking a weighted average
of sectoral productivities, with sectoral shares in total employment (at r-I) as
weights. Equation (VH.19) implies that the 'no inflation' rate of unemployment is
found at §/£/• Note that the parameters in equation (VII.19) are, again, country-
specific, thus allowing for institutional differences in national labour markets.
An additional feedback (possibly and) partially offsetting wage rate dynamics is
the motion of the exchange rate. Of course, there are many aspects of the exchange
rate, important ones which cannot, however, be taken into account m this model
because of its simple nature. In the (empirical) modelling literature, three
approaches are used to tackle the problem of endogenizing exchange rates. These
are the pwrctesmg pmeer f»r% hypothesis, the psr$W«j approach and the Wssce 0/
t approach Cse® Den Butter 1967).
In the purchasing power parity approach, it is assumed that fee exchange rate
moves in such a way as to guarantee (a tendency towards) equaEty of (consumer)
price levels in the two countries. TMs hypothesis is highly suitable in the present
model, since the consumer price level has already been given a prominent role in
the selection mechanism. Marking fee exchange rate consistent with complete ppp
by art asterisk, it can be specified as follows.
e*»^- fWLH)
Assume that in each period, the exchange rate adjusts partially to a level that
would have been consistent with complete equality of ppp power parities in the
* TWs specificate* fe a simpler way of representing §« bargaining process as in the weH-
known 'Coodwta model' (Goodwin 1967). Introducing a mark-up pricing rale in She model would
allow fer tf« inclusion of the fa! Goodwin effect.
" Define tl as CN-U/N, where N is labour supply and L is labour demand. N is assumed to fee
constant thus ruling out a common sourtt? *rf economic growth found to nwst powtt« models
148 • • .previous period. This can be put in mathematical terms as follows.
, CVIL22)
In this equation, p is an adjustment parameter. Normally, one would assume p<l,
in which case the actual exchange rate smoothly adjusts to the ppp warranted rate
(which might be a moving target). Assuming p>l would imply two^fcooHng. The
logarithmic specification is necessary for the equations for «* and % to yield
consistent results. This is also the reason why p cannot be country-specific (or even
country-pair-specific if mere are more than two countries).
Finally, the motion of the variable S over time is specified. This is where Fasinetti's
(1981) argument about income elasticities enters the model. The following system
of differential equations is adopted".
S* is the share of the sector in total consumption when real income, denoted by R,
is infinitely large. The restriction on the parameters t is that tg is equal to zero and
all other ts are greater than or equal to zero. It is also convenient, but not
necessary, to assume that ts are smaller than one, since in that case the shares
cannot 'overshoot* their 'natural' value 5*. Figure V1I.3 represents an example of
the behaviour of the system of differential equations for the case of two sectors,
The equations describe the 'real income path' of (real) spending in each sector as
a process of adaptation to S". The form of the system of equations guarantees that
the sum of the changes in S is always zero, so that once 'feeded' with Initial values
of S summing up to one, total spending remains equal to total income. In case of
the example in Figure V1I.3, there is one sector only when the system starts. At
1=0, a second sector is introduced, which gradually tends to a share of 0.5 in total.
Naturally, sector l's share also tends to 0.5.
Making the model operational yields one additional specification problem. This
problem results from the fact that for JJ endogenous countries, the model specified
so far is underdetermmed because there are only «-l independent balance of
payment restrictions. Therefore, a country called the rest of the world (denoted by
w as before) will be specified. The growth rate in this country is such that full
employment <at the 'natural' level) is assured", or
" Note that while ftis system of differential equations Is largely consistent with Paslaeftf s
view, he does not narrow his model to any spedic functional tern. It should be realized tfut tf»e
behaviour of this equation, which is specified in continuous time, is different in discrete tew (as
it is used here). If lite same form is fcept, but discrete time changes are used Instead of continuous
time changes, the movement of the S*s will still be consistent in the sense that they always add wp
to one, but each prediction of S will only be a linear approximation to Jhe true value according to
equation (V1I.23). However, this Is acceptable for small steps, and non-negative changes in isal
income,
" Note that tMs rates out She unemployment term fa the equation for this country's wage rate.(VII.24)





Figure VII3, The dynamics of sectoral shares in consumption
ISO7J.
Given the complexity of some of the dynamics defined by the equations above, the
analysis will be limited to simulation experiments'*. The case considered is a
three-country / two-sector case. There are two countries (called 1 and 2) in which
the growth rate is determined by balance of payments equilibrium, and one
country (w, or 'the rest of the world*) where output is always at the full
employment level Initially, the value of all variables is equal in all three countries,
Each sector occupies half of the labour resources in the country (and thus accounts
for half of the production and income). S is equal to 0,5 in each sector. Trade
occurs, although none of the countries has a competitive (or comparative)
advantage in either one sector. Import penetration is equal in the two sectors and
countries, so that trade between i and the rest of the world is balanced (both in a
nominal and real sense) even at the sectoral level. All countries start with a growth
rate of production (in both sectors) of slightly above 2%. The initial values of all
variables are given in Appendix VII.2. The time span simulated is 98 periods,
while two periods of initial data have to be specified.
To assess the simulation results, two indicators are used which capture the basic
results in a number or sign. First, the growth rate differential D is defined as
Second, a specialization index, denoted by F, Is defined as
p.- Q» - ®*' (VTI.26)
First, some simulation runs will very briefly be analyzed by looking at the
resulting signs of D and F. After that, the two most interesting runs will be used
to look at some outcomes of the model in more depth. To start with, some
experiments which yield zero growth rate differentials will be conducted (run 1-4),
After that, experiments which yield uneven growth will be explained (run 5-9).
Although the first group of simulation runs may not be empirically relevant in this
extreme form, they might indicate why growth rate differentials are closer to zero
in some groups of countries (OECD, see Chapter 4) than in others. Results of the
simulations are summarized in Table VII.1.
" The simulation method used is a simultaneous solution to the discrete time model, through
a compiler generating a program using the Gauss-Seidel algorithm. The software is developed at
MERIT (thanks to Adriaan van Zon), and will be available on the market soon. For reasons of
space, it is impossible to give the results for all variables in each run. The complete results are,
however, available on a separate floppy disk (refer to Appendix VIU for more details). In order
to get some feeling for the basic dynamics of the model, simulations with a one-sector model were
also carried out. These revealed that for some parameter values (small f, large 5) me model yields
adjustment paths with exploding cyclical behaviour of key variables like z,« and W. However, me
analysis of the two-sector model is limited to parameter values yielding damping cyclical
behaviour.






































































































































































* Empty cells have to be read as containing a value equal to the basic run.
152Run 1 represents the basic variant of the model. All parameters are equal across
countries, and since all countries start from the same situation, they will all grow
equally fast. Market shares will not change and specialization will not occur. Runs
2-4 represent slight variations to this basic variant, all leading to zero growth rate
differentials.
Run 2 is the so-called nonspedflliajfcn-inrfiicai scale e^cfs run. In this experiment,
the value of S',, is decreased for all countries. As expected, this has no result for
the growth rate differential or the specialization pattern, since the change affects
all countries equally. However, because of increased learning effects at the national
level, caused by higher growth rates in the 'larger' sector 2, world income is higher
in this case. Thus, the system is characterized by dynamic increasing returns, like
in many of the new neoclassical growth models.
The next two runs are illustrations of cases where scale effects are a result of
specialization. Run 3 illustrates srrwcfure-inducai sca/e e^iecfs. This run shows that
in the case of oppositely directed national changes in domestic consumption
patterns, there is an incentive for specialization. The changes in S*», compared to
the basic run are of opposite sign for the two countries. Then each country
specializes in the good with the largest S*^. Since the learning rates are equal in the
two sectors and S*,, is equal to 0.5 in the rest of the world, this specialization
pattern has no influence upon the growth rate differential, but again it leads to
higher growth, even in the country which does not specialize ('consumer surplus').
Typically, differentials in consumption structure cause dynamic returns to scale.
Next, there is the tec/i«ologj/-jnduc«i sca/e ejects case in run 4. Here, the learning
rates are varied in a 'symmetric way\ S*,, is equal to 0,5 again, and each country
has a learning advantage in one (different) sector (in the sense that the intersection
point of its learning equation with the 45 degrees line lies further to the right).
Specialization occurs in the sector where the country has a learning advantage, but
because of the symmetry in the consumption structure, no growth rate differential
occurs. Thus, in this case, the scale effects are caused by technological differences
between countries.
The remaining experiments are cases in which the variations in parameters are less
symmetric, such that the different counter effects do not cancel each other out any
longer. These experiments lead to more interesting conclusions. First, consider the
case in which a country has a learning advantage in both sectors, which can be
labelled iec/rno/ogj'-iniiHced wwepen grcrert/t. This is the case in run 5. Since country
1's advantage is proportional between the sectors (i.e., there is no comparative
advantage), no specialization occurs. Obviously, the technologically more advanced
country continues to grow faster for a long time (the total simulation period).
Run 6 shows sfrwcture-tHrfwcerf M«e»en grorort. Learning rates are equal among
sectors and countries, but in country 1 S*,j adjusts slower (t) to its (lower)
equilibrium value. Thus, during the transition period, S,, is higher (compared to
the other countries). Initially, this leads to a minor negative growth rate
differential, because the country specializes in a sector which is becoming less
important internationally. This does, however, lead to increased specialization in
158this sector. Country 2, like the rest of the world, specializes in sector 2, and has to
fight a severe competitive struggle in this sector ('the rest of the world' is a large
producer). Thus, country 1 finds a 'niche' to specialize in and generates positive
growth rate differentials in the long run.
Run 7 is a mixed sfrwcfura/ / tecAno/ogy-inducerf wnemj growfh case. At first, the
growth rate differential is negative, later it becomes positive. The negative trend
that occurs initially is obvious. Country 2 has a learning advantage in sector 1,
which is (becoming) less important in terms of total world consumption, because
of the S*j,8 being less than 0.5. Therefore, country 1 specializes in a product which
has a smaller market. However, the dynamics are such that the initial advantage
of country 2 lays a heavy burden on the growth rate of its wage rate. At some
point (early in the second half of the simulation period), this leads to cost-inflation
and a declining market share in the rest of the world, and to a declining growth
rate of the market share in country 1. Country 1, being in a situation with a less
tight labour market, is therefore able to catch up, and, quite suddenly, generate a
positive growth rate differential. In the period for which the simulation was
carried out, this was followed by another regression in country 1, because of the
resulting tension on its labour market. An important role in this process of
successful catching up is played by the self-reinforcing learning effects that country
1 captures again when it gains competitiveness. This experiment shows that the
nonlinear dynamics of the model can indeed generate results in which different
effects offset each other to different degrees over time. Thus, the results are
unpredictable in a precise sense by intuition alone.
In run 8 and 9, the parameters have been changed in such a way that almost all
symmetries vanish. This is a mixed wnwe« growtt case, which is most likely to be
found in actual practice. In run 8, exchange rates are (as before) flexible, while run
9 examines the effect of a fixed exchange rate regime.
These last two runs will be analyzed in more detail. Figures VIL4 and VII.5 give
the basic results for this case. The specialization pattern (Figure VII.4) shows a
regular pattern leading to a complete specialization of country 1 in sector 1 and
country 2 in sector 2. On the other hand, Figure VII.5 shows that the pattern of the
growth rate differential is far from regular. The different lines in the figures
represent the two different cases: one with flexible exchange rates (dashed lines,
p<=0,25) and one with fixed exchange rates (solid lines, p=0). In case of F, the two
lines are on top of each other.
First, the case of flexible exchange rates (dashed lines) is discussed. The
explanation of the specialization pattern that appears is as follows. In country 1,
the sectoral consumption share of sector 1 tends to a value smaller than 05 (which
is the starting value), while in country 2, it tends (although slower for a given
Increase in income) to a value larger than 0.5. Thus, one would expect country 1
to specialize in sector 2 goods, and country 2 to specialize in sector 1 goods
(compare run 3 in Table VII. 1). This does not happen because the 'comparative
technology advantages' are the other way around: Country 1 (2) has a higher
(natural) rate of learning in sector 1 (2), so that the selection mechanism in
international markets drives country 1 (2) towards specialization sector 1 (2).
154Because the learning rates do not change along the simulation period, this
specialization tendency drives the two countries towards complete specialization.
13 23 33 43 53 §3 73 83 83
time
Figure V1I.4. The specialization index in runs 8 and 9
The growth rate differential can be explained as follows. In the beginning, there
is a (very) weak cyclical pattern, which can be explained by wage reactions to
unemployment changes, which are in turn caused by the differences in
competitiveness. These reactions are largely the same as those found in the
Goodwin model (Goodwin 1967). No large differentials arise, because the markets
for both goods are by and large of equal size. Therefore, the real income of the
countries 1 and 2 settles roughly on the same level until around period 35. From
that period on, the situation on the labour market and sectoral productivity growth
rates in the two countries become different to such an extent that a substantive
growth rate differential arises. The higher level of specialization of country 1 in
sector 1 and the wage dynamics turn out to be such mat the growth rate of
country 1 is much higher. However, a devaluation of country 2's currency
(compared to currencies in both 1 and o>) sets in immediately. This improves the
competitiveness of country 2 bit by bit, and eventually, leads to a situation in
which the growth rate differential drops again.
Thus, run 8 shows the (combined) effects of technological differences, labour
market elasticities, consumption patterns and exchange rate movements leading
to complex dynamics. Run 9 cancels out one of these effects: exchange rate
flexibility. In the picture for the specialization pattern (solid lines), one can see thatexchange rate (in)flexibility does not influence the specialization pattern between
1 and 2. The reason for this is that the comparative advantages are not reversed
by flexible exchange rates.
-1
- - D run 8 — D run 9
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Figure VII.5, The growth rate differential in runs 8 and 9
There is a more substantive difference for the growth rate differential. In the
beginning, the alternating pattern from the first run is re-produced. Later, the
(absolute value of) the differential is much smoother. However, with regard to
unemployment (not shown), the pattern is smoother in the case of flexible
exchange rates, because price differentials (i.e., differences in competitiveness) are
to some extent 'polished away' by exchange rate movements. Therefore,
employment will react more strongly, with wages following when exchange rates
are fixed. This effect is very strong towards the end of the simulation period. In
the case of flexible exchange rates, unemployment in both 1 and 2 boosts to very
high levels.
This concludes the analysis of the model. Although a lot more experiments could
be carried out (and indeed have been), the ones presented here suffice to indicate
the basic characteristics of the model. These will now be summarized briefly.
1567.4. Swrnman/ and Conclusions
This chapter presented a dynamic, evolutionary model developed along the lines
set out in Chapter 3 and starting from the assumptions that sectoral and national
rates of technological change and income elasticities differ. Thus, the model starts
from stylized facts 2 and 3 outlined in Chapter 4.
First, the consequences of a model were considered without explicitly specifying
the (cumulative) character of technological change, the movement of the wage rate
and the changes in the composition of consumption demand. It was found that
gains in the terms of trade and changes in its sectoral composition have an
influence on (the) growth rate (differentials). In the short run, there is an effect that
allows the domestic country to grow faster when its export prices increase, but in
the longer run, this causes a negative effect through the loss of competitiveness.
Also, changes in the composition of consumption demand in the domestic or
world markets can have a negative or positive effect upon the growth rate.
This was followed by the introduction of evolutionary feedbacks in the form of
cumulative learning (technological change), wage rate dynamics and income
elasticities of (sectoral) consumption. By means of simulation experiments, it was
found that this causes 'Goodwin-like' adjustment paths of the national growth
rates. It was shown that the cumulativeness of technological change causes
specialization patterns. Both differences in learning rates and (adjustment of)
consumption patterns can be reasons for such specialization. Nonsymmetric
consumption structures and nonsymmetric differences in learning rates cause
differences in growth rates. It was shown that zero growth rate differentials are
found only in limited number of cases of more or less complete symmetry between
countries. Interpreting the evidence in Chapter 4, these symmetries might present
a more adequate description of differences between some countries (mostly the
relatively homogeneous group of OECD countries) than others. In other (more




Table VII.A1. Initial values used*
















* Column indicator "results" points to values which follow from the values set
arbitrarily and the fact that an initial value must be a (static) solution to the model.
z^ indicates the market share of producer I on the market in i in sector ; goods.
VZI.2, Softie Mfltftemafica/ Defai/s of rte Selection £<f«afio» is Discrete
ill a general'term, witrt rt agents anam denoting marKet snares, write tne selection
equation as follows,
«, «. ,», A/C /f i\ IVTT AH
f-E««-,E| (VIIA2)
If one adds up over all A agents, the total market share should always remain one.
Suppose that, initially, this condition is met. Then, by adding (VII.Al) up over all
A agents and substituting (VII.A2), one can see that this is always met
(VIIA3)
The selection equation used in this chapter is of the type CVTLA1) - CVTI.A2), so it
is correct to calculate the market share of domestic producers as the residual of all
the foreign producers' market share, which is equal to the total import penetration.
Another condition is that one cannot allow negative market shares to occur. In
order to see whether negative market shares may occur at some time, one can
write the following inequality.
158-l) >0 (V1I.A4)
In our case, where $>0, the solution to this (an be written as follows.
£/£>±l (VII.A5)
Note that for negative values of $, the > collapses to a <• Note that if $<l, as was
assumed in the text, the rhs of (V1I.A5) is negative, so that the inequality always
holds (E is positive).
Appendix VZ7J. Accessing ffce Complete Simulatfon ResiiJfs on Floppy Disk"
The floppy disk that comes with this thesis contains nine databases with the
results from each of the simulation runs in Table VII. 1 above, A program
(VIEW.EXE) on the disk enables one to put these data into graphs on the screen
of an MSDOS-compatible PC with at least 512 KB memory and a graphics card.
These graphs can then be saved in a diskfile which can be printed using any
program that supports the Lotus 123 PIC format.
The program VIEW.EXE is a part of the MADMAN program developed by Menhir
Software, and was programmed by Huub Meijers, rfce/acf tfwf if is dfefribMfaf iMf/i
this thesis does mrf maun ftof the program is puWic domain or shareware. /« /acf, if fe
copynjgiitfld, a«d maJh'ng copies /or other than foictep purposes is i/fegfl/. Moreover,
although due care has been given to putting the program together, the author of
this thesis nor Menhir software can be held responsible for any damage the
program may cause,
The program is started by inserting the floppy disk in the drive, switching to the
current program directory (usually B:\ or A:\, refer to your MSDOS manual for
more details), and typing VIEW followed by return. Then, press a number (1-9) in
order to see the corresponding results, or press 0 to return to MSDOS. Once you
have accessed a database, you will see a screen showing the variables in the
current page. A Page is a set of variables beginning with the same character. The
program provides online help on how to switch pages, how to display variables,
or how to make graphic files. You can also customize the program to your system
defaults, although in most cases, the program will detect your hardware
automatically.
The variable names used in the program differ somewhat from these used in the
text. Table VII. A2 contains the equivalence.
MSDOS and Lotus 123 are trademarks.
IS*Table VII. A2. Concordance between variable names in the text and variable names
in the program.
C,i Ci_j Real consumption of sector / goods in country f
D RDIF The growth rate differential between countries 1
and 2
<fjt Ei_k Exchange rate of currencies in countries i and Jt
F SPEC The specialization index for countries 1 and 2
G,y Gi_j Labour productivity in sector y in country i
GHATiJ The growth rate of labour productivity in sector
y in country i
Afy Real imports of sectors ; goods in country j, in
the simulation experiments, this variable is
implicit, i.e., it is expressed in the equations by
using z and C
Pi_) Producers price of sector y goods in country i
PCiJ Consumer price index of sector y goods in
country i
QiJ Production of sector y goods in country f
Ri Real income in i
SiJ Share of consumption of sector y goods in real
income in country i, only S,j is used in the
experiments, S,^ is set to 1-S,-,
Ui Unemployment in country i
Wi Nominal wage rate in country /
WHATi The growth rate of the nominal wage rate in
country i
Real exports of sectors y goods from country i, in
the simulation experiments, this variable is
implicit, i.e., it is expressed in the equations by
using z and C
Zk_i_j Market share of country i on the market for
sector y goods in country it
160CHAPTER 8. A« Empirical View on tfce
o/ Trade anil Technology
This chapter investigates the relation between technology and trade. This relation
has been subject to earlier research, as for example by Soete (1981,1987), Hughes
(1987) and Dosi d si. (1990) (which will be referred to as DPS from now on). The
difference between this chapter and earlier research lies in the specific aim of the
statistical analysis undertaken. The aim here b to investigate whether the
functional specification of the evolutionary selection equation used in the previous
chapter can survive a confrontation with the data. This means that the analysis in
this chapter will not test the implications of the model in Chapter 7 as a whole, but
will only address a limited part of it. Chapter 9 is aimed at testing the broader
implications of the model in Chapter 7, and will make use of the results obtained
in the current chapter. A second aim of the present analysis is to find out which
aspects of competitiveness play a role in the selection process. To do so, a large
data set will be applied in regressions explaining market shares for 28
manufacturing sectors.
The results of these regressions will be compared to the results obtained in other
research (DPS). To do this, the DPS-type regressions will be 'reproduced'' for the
current sample of countries and years. However, it is not the aim to test the
specific evolutionary specification agaiwsf these other specifications, both because
they are not necessarily conflicting and because the statistical techniques applied
do not allow for such a sharp test.
' Due to data limitations, a complete reproduction of die results is not possible.1.2, Patents as Indicators o
As technology is the main factor explaining growth in this diesis, the current
chapter will have to take it into account in explaining trade patterns. So far, two
sorts of data, R&D expenditures and patents, have been used as indicators for
innovative activities. In the sectoral setting of the previous and current chapter,
R&D data are not available in a country sample larger than the core OECD
countries. Therefore, patents will be used as an indicator of technological change.
However, as already indicated above several times, there are a number of
disadvantages to using patents in this way. These will be discussed before the
actual empirical analysis is carried out.
The underlying idea of using patents as innovation statistics is that the number of
patents is a good indicator of the innovative strength of the applicant. However,
some aspects pertaining to patents should lead one to using them only with
caution. Some of these drawbacks are well known by now (Pavitt 1985, Basberg
1987, Griliches 1990). First, the value of one patent to another may differ, even if
one uses data from one patent issuing-institution like the US Patent Office. The
reason for this is that a patent office only requires mmimwm levels of novelty,
which are generally exceeded by individual patents. Moreover, the real (economic)
value of a patent cannot be known in advance, i.e., at the time of application. Some
work on patent renewal rates (Schankerman 1989) has been undertaken to correct
patent statistics for these differences, but as yet this research has not yet reached
the stage at which its results can be used widely in empirical research.
Second, the propensity to patent might differ among sectors, as a result of which
the value of patents as indicators of innovation varies between sectors. The reason
for this is that there might be other sources of protection for an innovation besides
patenting. The possibilities of these other sources, like secrecy, lead times, etc., are
likely to differ between different technologies, and hence, sectors (for an empirical
analysis of different ways of appropriating technologies, see Levin ef«/. 1987). For
example, in Pharmaceuticals patents are very important, while they are much less
useful in the computer industry'.
There is, however, another - seldom mentioned - reason for considering patents to
be bad indicators of innovation. By linking innovation to the concept of country-
wise competitiveness as in the previous chapter, one aims at giving an indication
of the genera/ (average) level of technological capability of a (sector in a) country.
Thus, one would ideally like to consider a?/ sources of technological knowledge of
the firms in the country. Of course, there are sources of knowledge that are much
more important (in a quantitative way) than invention (as measured by patents).
Diffusion of knowledge (from abroad as in Part Two, or from other domestic
firms) is such a source. The majority of firms will not rely (completely) on the
development of In-house knowledge, but instead imitate innovations from
* This example highlights another aspect of patenting: the patent lifetime Due to severe
development and testing requirements, patent life time is generally considered to be too short in
Pharmaceuticals, while in computing (hardware), the economic life time of an innovation is much
shorter than normal patent duration.
162elsewhere, or, even simpler, Just buy new equipment and recruit skilled labour on
the market Thus, the problem is that patent statistics only measure innovation
activities of the inventing firms, and do not consider what can be put under the
general heading of 'diffusion of innovation through the economic system'. Viewed
in this way, one can even go one step further and state that patents, being
primarily a way of appr^msfing technology, are a tarter to diffusion (compare the
new neoclassical models reviewed in Chapter 2). Consequently, they have a
partially negative effect on the general technological level of a country.
In an international context, the appropriation aspect of patents has an additional
dimension. As will be discussed in more detail below, the international system of
intellectual property rights (i.e., patents) has been under severe pressure in the
past decades. Part of the success of some countries (especially MCs) can be
attributed to their successful imitation of foreign technologies, often through
'violation'* of international agreements on property rights. Moreover, the
internationalization of the world economy has made patents less useful as an
indicator of technologies appropriated on a saWofwf level. Due to the presence of
multinational firms, technologies can easily be used in countries where they have
not been developed.
Yet another reason for considering patents as bad indicators of innovation lies in
the fact that patents might be indicators of economic aspects rather than being
related to technology aspects. Bosworth (1984) has argued that looking at external
patents might reflect the openness of an economy rather than its technological
level. The reason for this is that firms will ordy patent their inventions abroad if
there exists an incentive for this in the form of exports. This 'reverse causality'
would lead to a strong correlation between exports and patenting, but would not
necessarily indicate that technology is important in the determination of trade.
A last drawback of patents as innovation indicators is the obvious relation between
the number of patents and country size. Large countries, crtm's paribas innovative-
ness, are likely to have more patents than small countries. Therefore, it is necessary
to correct for size differentials. However, if one does not know the exact shape of
the relation between size and patenting, the exact form of the correction is hard
to find.
To illustrate some of these points, a simple regression involving some of the
above-mentioned correlations will be performed. Consider the following
unrestricted
In this equation, P stands for the number of patents, K is R&D intensity, N is
population, O is the openness of the economy, v4 is a scale parameter, the 5s reflect
country-specific factors, subscripts i denote countries, and die as are elasticities.
The equation is estimated in a pooled cross-country time series data set. The
* In many cases, one cannot reafly speak about w/afiwi, because the countries in question did
not sign the international agreements on intellectual property.
163sample consists of the 24 OECD countries plus 13 NICs*. Estimating this















A country dummy is introduced in the equation for the USA, Japan and Canada
(i.e., 8 is estimated for these countries, and set to zero for all other countries). The
reasoning behind the dummy for the USA is obvious, because for this country the
patent market considered is the home market. Therefore, one would expect the
USA (cetera psi#ws) to have more patents. It is generally known that Canada has
very close relations with the USA. Thus, one could expect Canada to patent
relatively more in the USA than other countries*. Japanese patenting in the USA
has been observed to be very high, especially for the period under consideration.
This points to some important Japan-specific factors which are not considered here
in detail (such as differences in managers' attitude towards patenting or the
sectoral mix of the economy)*.
The parameter estimates are all highly significant (despite the multicollinearity
between openness and size) and all the signs are correct. Thus, the performance
of the equation can considered to be good, and all explaining factors play a
significant role. A Chow-test for structural change of the parameters between the
periods 1975-1981 and 1982-1987 points to an absence of structural change. With
regard to the estimated elasticities, it is important to note that the R&D elasticity
* Thus, there are 37 countries. In the regressions in the next sections, the same countries are
used, with the exclusion of Switzerland and Iceland, because no price indices are available for these
countries. Also, The Philippines were excluded because inspection of the raw data on exports for
this countries revealed very high (100-200%) increases in export volumes over the (late) 1980s. The
34 countries used in all regressions are Japan, USA, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, West
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Australia,
New Zealand, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Israel, Mexico, Colombia,
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Egypt, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong.
* The period of estimation is 1975-1987. P is measured by the number of patents granted in the
USA, measured by date of application (source: US Patent Office). R is measured by R&D intensity,
which is defined as total R&D expenditure (public and private, source: UNESCO/OECD) over GDP
(source; Summers and Heston 1991). N is measured by the number of people in thousands (source:
Summers and Heston 1991), O is measured by the sum of exports and imports over GDP (source:
Summers and Heston 1991). The sample that is considered is a pooled cross-country time series
sample (13 years, 37 countries). The equation is estimated by taking natural logarithms on both
sides, which requires nonlinear least squares.
* It would be preferable to construct an openness indicator which takes into account the
direction of trade. This will be done below.
* It must be admitted that ttw Japanese dummy is inspired by the data rather than by theory.
The results of the estimations, as other estimations with a Japanese dummy below, are only
changed marginally when leaving it out ,,
litis well above unity, which points to increasing returns fo R£D intensify. The other
elasticities are both around one". This shows that it is reasonable to correct for size
and openness by assuming a linear relation between patenting and these variables.
But even if one corrects patent statistics for these two influences, it is desirable to
use other innovation indicators to check for the possible effects of the other
deficiencies of patent statistics as discussed above. Thus, one would like to have
an indicator that measures the degree of diffusion of new technologies through the
economic system of a country. Unfortunately, indicators of diffusion are only
available at the case study level, and certainly not at the mesoeconomic level in a
sample of countries as broad as the one used here. Therefore, an indirect indicator
is to be used. One such indicator, the one that will be used here, is /dbottr
prafocfro/ry. The idea behind this is that in general, the application of new
knowledge will raise the level of labour productivity, by enabling a firm to
produce more given its labour input. Neoclassical growth theory has argued that
there is another source of labour productivity growth: substitution (induced by
factor price differences). According to this theory, it would therefore be better to
use multi-factor productivity as an indicator of technological change. However, as
argued in Chapter 3, substitution (moving along the isoquant) cannot be seen as
being independent of technological change (moving the isoquant). In this view,
technological development goes hand in hand with mechanization of the
production process and scale economies (or dynamic learning effects), and
increases of production per hour of labour input
Labour productivity is related to unit wage costs (through identity VII. 17).
Therefore, if one is using it as an indicator of technological change, one should not
use unit wage costs as an indicator of price competitiveness. But, rather than
posing a problem, this gives the issue of price competition a clearer dimension.
Obviously, there are two sources for competitive prices. The first one is low wages
(the labour market aspect), and the second one is high productivity (the technology
aspect). Separating these two aspects, as in the simulation experiments in Chapter
7, can only improve the insight into the way global competition works. This
implies that there are now two different aspects of technology in the analysis. First,
the usual technological aspect of competition, which is related mostly to product
quality (this is the one most widely used). Second, the cost aspect of technology
explained above. By using patents and labour productivity separately, one can try
to capture both aspects.
Taking these considerations into account, the next sections will apply both patents
and labour productivity variables in the regressions explaining the sectoral trade
patterns in NICs and OECD countries.,^ « .,= ^? ,, ••••.-...-:-.
* Although a t-test for difference of the openness elasticity from unity would be significant at
reasonable levels. However, this noiUinearity is so small on the relevant range for the variables,
that it is safe to assume a linear relation.
1658.2. SM#mmirizMi£ Some K«oam Correlations
The purpose of this section is to test the present data set for some relations that
have been well established elsewhere in the literature on trade and technological
innovation. The main reference to which comparisons will be made is DPS.
Chapter 6 of that book explored the empirical relation between patenting (as an
indicator of technological development) and trade. Two main tests were
performed'. The first one involves running a regression with export market shares
as the dependent variable and the share in patenting, the capital labour ratio,
population and a distance (relative to some assumed centre of the world) variable
as the explaining variables. The second one is a regression explaining per capita
exports, and using patents per head, investment per employee and wages on value
added as explaining variables. Both tests explain export performance for 1977, and
use cumulated (USA) patents over the 1963-1977 period. The regressions are
performed for 40 groups of manufacturing products. The data are cross-country
data. Countries in the regression are OECD countries only.
The first test explains the relation between technology and exports mainly by
relating shares in exports to shares in patenting. However, DPS do not rely solely
on patent statistics as indicators of innovation, but assume that the capital labour
ratio also picks up some aspects of technological change. This is in accordance
with the suggestions made about patents and labour productivity above. To
control for size differences between countries (which could explain both patent
shares and export shares), the population variable is present in the regression. The
outcome of the test is that the patenting variable is significant in many sectors,
especially the ones that one would characterize as not based on natural resources.
The influence of population, however, is much less clear. Only in a few sectors is
the population variable significant, which is interpreted by DPS as pointing to the
existence of scale economies.
In the second test in DPS, both the dependent variable (in this case export values,
not shares) and the explaining patent variable are divided by population.
Moreover, this test also includes a variable that measures the influence of wage
coste (wages over value added) and investment per employee (a proxy to the
capital labour ratio). Once again, the outcome of this exercise is that the patenting
variable turns out to be highly significant in most sectors. The results for the
investment/employment and wage cost variables are much less significant, and the
wage variable has a wrong sign (i.e., positive) in some cases. The conclusion of this
exercise is that the performance of the technology variable is robust when
controlled for the influence of wage differentials.
To investigate whether these results can be reproduced in the data set used here,
the relation between patenting and export performance is estimated in a different
way. The data used can be described as follows. As in DPS, but contrary to most
* Actually, DPS have two more tests of the relation between trade and technological change.
However, since the variables used in these tests (revealed comparative advantage and net exports)
are not so suitable to the setting of the model in Chapter 7, these will not be considered here.
166other studies dealing with trade (for example, Fagerberg 1991), the sectoral
classification used is ISIC (revision 2), The common classification used for trade
data is SITC (revisions 1-3). Therefore, if one wants to relate trade and production
(related) data, a conversion in either direction is necessary. DPS convert the SITC
variables to (I)SIC, using a self-developed conversion table. They are able to
maintain a large number of sectors, mainly because they concentrate on the most
developed countries.
However, the data construction procedure used here is similar to the one in DPS
only with regard to the sort of classification scheme used (ISIC). The available
SITC-1 data (source: OECD, UNSO) are converted to ISIC. This conversion is
necessary because the independent variables are only available in 3-digit ISIC
form. Contrary to most trade studies, price indices are used to control for the
influence of price changes. While most trade studies use either 'real' volumes
(tons, numbers) or values, the present analysis uses volumes expressed in some
common price unit (like in most production-related statistics). The price indices
used are the implicit domestic producer price indices from the UNIDO Industrial
Statistics Database. This means that it is implicitly assumed that there is no (price)
segmentation between export and home markets. The data for wages and labour
productivity are also taken from the UNIDO industrial statistics database. Patent
statistics are taken from the US Patent Office.
In order to bring the data together in the E5IC-2 scheme, both trade and patent
statistics had to be converted from their original classification schemes. The
concordance tables used for trade data are self-developed on the basis of tables
used at the OECD and UNIDO, and are documented in Appendix VIII.l. Patents
are classified by the US Patent Office by SICs (not JSICs). Details about this
procedure and on the conversion between SIC and ISIC can also be found in
Appendix VIII.l.
Contrary to DPS, the analysis does not concentrate on one specific year, but
instead uses a panel of pooled cross-country time series data. While this method
drastically increases the number of observations, and thus the power of the
statistical methods applied, it also introduces some specific problems like the
possibility of structural change over time and autocorrelation of residuals for
separate countries. These problems will not be addressed explicitly in this section,
since the aim is only to do a rough test of some results obtained before. The period
for which data is available is 1964-1987.
In a first regression, export market shares are correlated with the wage rate, labour
productivity, patenting shares and a constant. The variables are defined as follows.
167(VIII.2)
with <. P: stock of patents'",
T: a technology indicator,
u>: a wage rate indicator,
g; a labour productivity indicator,
W: wage sum,
and / and / denoting countries and sectors, respectively". .
Note that the wage and productivity variables are defined as the ratio of the
country value and the average world value. In the construction of the technology
variable, the share of patenting is divided by a direction coejjftcienr of exports, which
has a value higher (lower) than one for countries having 'above (below) normal'
trade intensity with the USA, This is meant to control for any influences of trade
direction connected to the patent variable.
The technology variable is essentially the share in patenting, and can therefore be
expected to be correlated to the export market share if only because of size
differentials. Therefore, this regression in itself is not intended to provide a test of
the influence of technology-related variables on export performance. Instead, the
estimated parameters will be used to deduce some conclusions on the influence
of technology on exports.
The actual equation used is a simple linear form, and includes two additional
(multiplicative) dummy variables (d, defined as D,7*j, with D being equal to one
for i, and zero for others) for the USA and Japan. The reasons for this are the same
as in the estimation of the patenting function. The dummy for Canada is no longer
included, because this effect is assumed to be captured by the more appropriate
direction of trade correction used here. Thus, the equation looks as follows.
In this equation, <? is an error term with the usual assumptions, c is a constant, and
«„ and a, are parameters. The results of this regression are presented in Table
VIII.l.
" The use of a stock variable is meant primarily to account for some of the time lags involved
in the relation between innovation (patents) and performance. The stock is calculated using a
perpetual inventory method with a yearly depreciation rate of 15%. For calculating the initial value
of the stock, it was assumed that its growth rate in the period 1%2-1%3 was 5%. Regressions with
the number of patents instead of the stock in general produce the same results, although the value
of the elasticities varies, and the t-values are generally less significant.
"A superscript US indicate market shares of exports to the USA.













































































































































































































































































169The degree of explanation, as measured by the R* statistics and overall significance
of the f-values, is high. Regarding individual variables, the wage variable turns out
to be significant and correctly signed in almost all sectors. Rubber has a correct,
but insignificant, sign. Industrial chemicals, refined oil (not significant) and non-
ferrous metals (significant) are the sectors with a wrong sign. The labour
productivity variable, which measures the other aspect of unit wage costs, has the
correct sign in all but one sector (non-ferrous metal, insignificant). In all other
cases it is positive, and, except for rubber, significant. The rubber sector has a
correct, but insignificant sign. This indicates in a preliminary way, stronger than
in DPS, the importance of the wage rate in competitiveness.
As could be expected, the patent variable is highly significant and has the correct
sign in almost all cases. The exception is refined oil (wrong sign, but significant),
a highly natural resource-based sector. The same holds for the USA dummy
variable. The Japanese dummy variable more often has a positive than a negative
sign, indicating the weakness of the argument that Japanese patenting is 'above
normal' for a// sectors. However, even though it was expected that there is a
positive correlation between patenting shares and export market shares due to size
differentials alone, the estimated parameters (a,) are generally different from each
other. If one assumes that the influence of size is equal among sectors, this implies
that there are also other aspects of patenting that are important. Therefore, it is
useful to compare the estimated elasticities by ranking the sectors in order of
increasing magnitude of the estimated parameters. Table VIII.2 does this for the
three variables in the regression.
The results of this ranking procedure closely correspond to the intuitive ranking
that one would make for the relative importance of innovation and price
competitiveness. In the wage column, it are the typically low- (high-) tech sectors
that rank among the highest (lowest) parameters. Sectors that have a slightly
unexpected position are food (low) and transport (high). In the productivity
column, the order is more diffuse. This is probably a reflection of the fact that the
labour productivity coefficient both captures quality and price competition aspects
of technology (more on this below). *
In the patents column, the order is quite close to intuition again. Exceptions are the
electrical machinery sector (low) and glass (high). On the basis of the 'image' of
the electrical machinery sector, one would expect it to rank as a high-tech sector.
However, this is probably caused by the time and ISIC aggregations. The broad
definition of this sector at the ISIC 3-digit level includes both high-tech products
such as digital recording equipment, and products for which price competition is
important and technological content low (for example electric can openers)".
Moreover, because the importance of the high-tech elements in this sector has only
become significant in the 1980s, this equation most probably suffers from pooling
over time.
" Note that the IS1C-2 logic classifies most computer-related products under office machinery,
which is a part of nonelectrical machinery. Another sector which suffers from severe aggregation


















































































* For the wage variable, sectors are ranked in order of decreasing magnitude (Le., large positive values first and large
negative values last); for the other variables, the order is reverse. Round brackets 0 indicate nonsignificance, straight
brackets [] indicate a wrong sign.The next equation explains the market share of individual countries. This time,
however, the patents indicator used is not biased by size. It is defined as follows.
Essentially, this indicator is a normalized patents per head indicator, with the
average number of patents per head in the sector as the normalization variable.
Moreover, the indicator is corrected for the direction of trade, and the openness
of the economy by multiplying it with the ratio of the shares in production and
exports to the USA (multiplying by a number larger (smaller) than one if a country
is closed (open) towards the USA).
Another variable that is included in the regression at this stage is the share in total
population. This is done for two reasons. First, on the Ins of the equation is now
a variable that is highly dependent on country size, while the variables on the rhs
are all independent of size. Therefore, an equation without the size variable suffers
from misspecification due to left-out variables. Second, following DPS, the
influence of scale economies is tested. The share in total population is assumed to
capture these two effects. The other variables (including the definition of the
dummies) are the same as Ln the previous equation.
The results of this estimation can be found in Table VIII3. Overall, the R* statistics
are somewhat lower than in the previous equation. Still, they are in most cases
acceptable. The wage cost variable performs less well than in the previous
equation. Now, in most cases the sign is wrong (positive), and the lvalues are
low. Thus, the influence of wage rate differentials in this equation is, if anything,
reverse. This result corresponds more or less to the results in DPS. A possible
explanation for this might be the differences in quality of labour, corresponding
to differences in wages, in broad accordance with the efficiency wage hypothesis.
The performance of the labour productivity variable is more or less the same as
in the previous equation. Only in the nonferrous metals sector is the sign wrong
(although the f-value is not significant). In industrial chemicals, rubber and glass,
the correct sign is not significant. In an (undocumented) regression with a more
restrictive form (standardized unit wage costs instead of the two separate terms
g and w), the net result of these two results was that the unit wage variable is in
most cases significant with the correct sign. This shows the dominance of the
labour productivity results m this equation.
The patent variable also performs less well than in the first equation. Still, some
plausible results arise. First, in ten sectors, the sign of the patent variable is correct
and significant, as well as the sign of the USA dummy. Most of these sectors
(chemicals, plastic, fabricated metal, machinery, instruments) are high- or medium-
tech sectors. The textiles and apparel sectors also belong to this group, which is
perhaps surprising, given their low-tech image (compare, however, the results for
this sector in Chapter 4). The absence of transport in this group is notable, but
might be explained by its very crude aggregation. Significantly negative signs are
found in food, refined oil, rubber, glass, and other minerals, all of them sectors in
which there natural resources play a major role, which might explain part of their























































































































































































































































































































173Table VBtU. Ranking of sectors aeeording to the value of the estimated parameters in Table VflO*.
Sequence









































































* For the wage variable, sectors are ranked in order of decreasing magnitude (i.e., large positive values first and large
negative values last); for the other variables, the order is reverse. Round brackets 0 indicate nonsignifkance, straight
brackets [] indicate a wrong sign. Numbers following sector names indicate shifts in rank relative to Table VIII.2.indicating a better Japanese performance than can be predicted )ust by patents.
The population variable is significant in all but one sector (refined oil), which
indicates the influence of size and economies of scale. These two influences can be
separated out by looking at the magnitude of the estimated coefficient and their
rank order. Table VEI.4 ranks the sectors by magnitude of the estimated
parameters. The wage rate estimates are excluded from this, because the results
cannot directly be interpreted. In the productivity column, food and other minerals
rank among the high elasticities, while otherwise one finds the high-tech sectors
in the lower part of the table. In the patents column, the result of the low-tech,
partly natural resource-based sectors ranking low (with wrong signs), and the
typical high-tech sectors ranking high is now very clear. With regard to the
population variable, the switch from coefficients smaller than unity to larger than
unity lies between other chemicals and fabricated metal (positions 6 and 7). Thus,
most sectors have an estimated elasticity with regard to size that is larger than one,
which might point to the existence of scale economies in these sectors.
Summarizing Tables VIII.l - VHI.4, there seems to be evidence in this data set to*
the importance of technology in the static explanation of trade patterns, as found
before by DPS. Mostly, sectors in which technology plays a major role (according
to the results) are also the sectors that one would intuitively label as high- or
medium-tech. The results with regard to the importance of low wage rates also
correspond to those in DPS, indicating that low wage rates do not cdms parties
go together with good export performance.
83. Trade rntd Tech«o/ogt/.' A Dynamic Ewfatiowflry Frawieworfc
The aim of this thesis is to provide a dynamic, evolutionary perspective on the
relation between trade, growth and technology. In light of the interpretation of
these concepts that has been used until now, the analysis by DPS (and the
previous section) can be characterized as essentially taking a static, structural,
point of view. What is being estimated is the relation between the structure of
technological capabilities (mainly as measured by patents), and the structure of
trade relations. The regressions performed relate the trade structure to the
innovation structure, assuming that the relation between the two does not change
over time (this is even the case in the pooled data set in the previous section).
In Chapter 7, the replicator equation was used to describe the relation between
technological performance and trade from a specific dynamic and evolutionary
perspective. The rest of this chapter will be aimed at testing the empirical value
of this explicit way of modelling the evolutionary dynamics of trade and
technology. The assumption behind the replicator equation is that differences in
competitiveness induce cfcmges in the trade structure, as opposed to the more
commonly used notion that differences in competitiveness correspond to deferences
in the trade structure. The replicator equation can be rewritten, so that it only has
the current period market share on the Ins, as follows,
175This form of the equation contains a number of restrictions, which can be tested
in a regression analysis. The form of the equation that will be used for this is the
following,
z =V2''+y> .Jiz'-'+c+e (VIII.9)
The 'ew/ufiownry resfricf/ons' that would give equation (VIII.9) the same form as
equation (VI1L8) are *F=1-Z0^ c^- <= 0, and e, being a usual error term. These
restrictions will be tested by the appropriate tests below. The last restriction (about
the error term) is quite special here. Note that in the complete replicator system
with equations for each country in the sample, the error terms sum to one by
definition (see also Appendix VII.2). Thus, the assumption about a zero mean of
the error term is satisfied by definition. However, this also introduces
interdependent error terms, which should ideally be taken into account in the
estimation procedure. However, since one does not generally have observations
for £ for each country in the sample, it is possible that the error term does not
have mean zero, and the interdependencies are more complex than in the case of
a full system of equations. In fact, the mean of the error terms would be exactly
zero only if the average value of competitiveness of the left-out countries were
equal to E, In case this does not hold, the estimated constant will pick up the
mean of the error tstm". Therefore, although the constant is assumed to be zero
in theory, one should not be surprised if it turns out to be significant in practice.
Moreover, the combination of the lagged dependent variable and the error term
in equation (VIII.9) introduces the concept of a sfodwsfic frend into the model.
Stochastic trends have been the key concept in a recent discussion about
permanent and transitory components in macroeconomics (the wmf roof debate),
which had a large influence on the estimation of equations with a stochastic
trend". The conclusions from this debate are not, however, directly applicable to
the model used here, because of the complicated error structure discussed above,
and the variable 2 being bounded between zero and one. Thus, while the point
about the error structure is well taken, the analysis will proceed by using simple
OLS methods.
The question that has been raised above a few times and that has to be faced here
ultimately, is how to define the different aspects of competitiveness, or how to
" To be precise, the above reasoning about the interpretation of the constant term only holds
for observations belonging to one time period, and not for the whole pooled data set. In the
estimations, year-specific additive dummies were estimated, but these proved to be insignificant
in general. Therefore, it seems that the error resulting from this source can be picked up by a single
constant term.
'* For overviews of this discussion, see Stock and Watson (1988) and Campbell and Perron
(1991). For an original contribution from the point of view of evolutionary theory, see Lippi (1989).
176measure E*. The approach taken is basically the same as that in the previous
section. The same variables will be used, although they will be slightly
transformed to make them more consistent with the replicator equation approach.
Thus, there will be wage rate, labour productivity and patent variables as different
aspects of competitiveness. Using the wage rate and productivity variables, it is
possible to deduce the importance of both aspects of technology introduced above
(cost competition and quality competition) by looking at the parameter estimates
of &, with it = (wage rate, labour productivity). To grasp this, consider the case it*
which (the absolute values of) the estimates of the partial #s of the wage rate and
labour productivity are equal to each other. This means that if a country has unit
wage costs exactly equal to the world level, its market share will not change. The
same situation, but with the partial $ for labour productivity now being larger
than the one for the wage rate, means that even if unit wage costs are equal to the
average, the market share will change (the direction depends on the 'source* of
averagely competitive unit wage costs). Obviously, in this case there is more to
technology than just the price competitiveness aspect Thus, the extent to which
(the absolute value of) the partial $ for labour productivity is larger than its wage
rate counterpart is a measure for the importance of the 'non-price-competition-
related' aspects of technological change.
8.4 Estimation 0/ the Replicator Efttafion
In the construction of lite independent variables in the estimations of the replicator
equation, one should be aware that the term E/ £ has an average value of one for
countries with competitiveness exactly equal to average. In the theoretical logic of
the equation, this is assured by the definition of £. However, because the exact
construction of E in this way is somewhat misleading in the case of missing
values, a different approach is taken here. Like in the estimations above, the
independent variables are standardized by the sample mean, so that an average
value of one results. In addition, one should realize that according to equation
(VIII.9), this value must be multiplied by the previous period market share. Thus,
the following definition for the wage rate variable arises. •»•-•••.:
VV.<VW^<VV'CEV£V <vm.io>
The labour productivity indicator is defined in a similar way.
The scale variable included in the regression is now scaled to the value one, which
it obtains for a country that is exactly as large as the simple mean of all countries.
Note that the effects that are due to size differences are included in the lagged
dependent variable, so that the size variable is mainly related to economies of scale
now.The first patent indicator used is the one in the regression in Table VULI and
VTII.2, but normalized by the market share z"*. This means that the indicator is
now free of influences of size differentials between countries, and has a 'natural'
average of one. In mathematical terms, it looks as follows.
The estimated equation looks as follows.
In first instance, this equation is estimated for the whole sample of pooled
observations (1964-1987). The results are shown in Table VIII.5. The R* statistics in
this table are generally blurred, because market shares change only very slowly,
so that the autoregressive term has a large explanatory power. Therefore, the
partial R* of the variables of interest (technology-related, population and wages)
are generally lower. The r-statistics in the column for the autoregressive term are
constructed under the hypothesis that 4*=1-1^. Thus, they test one of the two
restrictions that result from the evolutionary logic, so that an insignificant value
indicates a 'good' result. The results show that in many cases (exactly half),
rejection of this hypothesis is indeed the result, which shows the limits of the
evolutionary logic. Nevertheless, the value of most of the parameters for z,., still
has the correct sign (i.e., it is on the correct side of one), and one must keep in
mind that the values used in the f-test are estimates for the other parameters, which
are subject to variation, as shown by their standard errors.
The wage rate variable gives good results. A correct significant sign is found 15
out of 18 times, which is nine times significant. A significant, but wrong sign is
found twice (glass, nonferrous metals). More or less the same result is found for
the labour productivity estimates. In 10 out of 18 cases, the parameters have a
significant and correct sign, and one time (other minerals) a significant, but wrong
sign is found. This indicates that the evolutionary specification of the competition
process makes sense, and that these two variables are indeed strongly related to
the evolutionary performance of countries.
The results are less dear for the patent-related variable. Only six times is it
significant, and four out of these six times, it has a negative sign. Particularly in
the chemically related sectors the negative signs are remarkable. The two patent
dummy variables also show insignificant or significantly wrong signs in many
cases.
The population variable is often (12 times) significant and has a positive sign,
particularly in high-tech sectors. The presence of economies of scale seems to be
indicated by this result (see also Fagerberg 1991). With regard to the constant, it
is worth noting that the 'predicted' violation of the second evolutionary restriction
(the constant is equal to zero) is indeed taking place in many cases, although the
estimated value is generally small, and in many cases only weakly significant.
















































































































































































































































































































































6,99Table VIIL6. Results for the replicator equation, wage rate, labour productivity

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Before discussing these results in a more detailed way, a regression with another
patent variable is carried out. This variable is basically the same as that used in the
static estimates, and is defined as follows.
. »iVIII.15)
The results of this estimation are in Table VIII.6. Overall, the results closely
resemble those in the previous table. The qualitative results (significance and signs)
in the columns for the autoregressive term, the wage rate, labour productivity and
size are almost exactly the same. The results for the patent variable are slightly
more significant overall (eight significant estimates). However, the sign is negative
in half of these cases. Summarizing the significant results for the patent variables
gives significantly positive coefficients in textiles and transport (twice), apparel,
plastic (once), and significantly negative coefficients in industrial and other
chemicals, rubber (twice) and nonferrous metals and instruments (once).
Qven the performance of the patent-related variables, it makes sense to run the
same regressions without a patent variable at all. The results of this procedure are
presented in Table VII1.7. This table also includes the sectors for which no patent
data are available. In the first column of the table (the parameters for 2,.,), it now
appears that the first evolutionary restriction is violated in fewer cases (total 11,
and seven times for the sectors already in Table VIII.5 and VIII.6). Excluding
patents from the analysis seems to improve the equation in this respect The wage
182rate variable still performs well, although there are now Ive (out of 28) sectors
with a significant, but wrong sign: wood, refined oil, plastic, glass and nonferrous
metals. In the labour productivity column, only one new significant, but wrong
parameter is found (in paper). Overall, the results are still quite strong: 21 out of
28 correct and significant signs for the wage rate variable, and 15 out of 28 for tht
labour productivity variable. n - ;-w . , ^. ;
Thus, the evolutionary dynamics with regard to wage rate and labour productivity
competition seem to work with the data applied. Most parameters estimated are
significant, have the correct sign and a reasonable magnitude, but the two
evolutionary restrictions are not always satisfied. The specific results with regard
to the patent variables will be discussed in more detail below.
&5. Soiw Further Tests o« the Rob«srness o/ tfce ItepHcfltor Estimates
In this section, some tests are carried out to find out whether the estimates in the
previous section suffer from some common problems in the regression model. All
the tests will be carried out for the equation estimated in Table VIII.7,
First, the possibility of autocorrelation of the error terms in the equation estimated
is investigated. Since the model is not a pure time series model, the assumption
of autocorrelated errors only makes sense for groups of observations in the sample
that can be sequenced in time in a meaningful way. In other words, one only has
to look at autocorrelation between error terms of the time series of one country at
a time, repeating this procedure for all countries in the sample. Because there are
lagged dependent variables in the equation, the normal Durbin-Watson statistic
cannot be used, and because it is not possible to say whether or not Durbin's h
statistic can be computed (see Johnston, 1982:318), the following testing procedure
is applied. For each country in the sample, the residuals are computed, and used
as the dependent variable in a regression with the lagged residual and all the other
variables in Table VIIL7 as explaining variables. A r-test on the parameter for the
lagged residual is then an dsympfoficaJ/y ajMiraifcnr" procedure to using Durbin's
7t statistic (Johnston, 1982: 318).
Table VIII.8 displays the results of this testing procedure. It appears that the
problem of autocorrelated residuals is present in the regressions, but not to an
overwhelming degree in most sectors. Nevertheless, Table VIII.8 raises the question
as to what extent the results in Table VIII.7 are affected by this. To answer this
question, one should keep in mind that OLS estimation under autocorrelation leads
to inefficient estimates, possibly overestimation off-values on individual parameter
estimates, although the estimates themselves are still wnMoserf. However, to answer
the question of the consequences of autocorrelation for the results obtained, it is
not a 'statistical' way of correcting for its presence that is followed. Instead, some
theoretical reflections on the possible causes will be given. , . ,
" Note, however, that there are 23 observations at the most for each of these regressions.




Food Denmark (+ •**), Italy (+ *), Netherlands (+ •*), Sweden (+ •), Mexico (+ *), South
Korea (- —)
Beverages USA (- "*), Canada (- **), Belgium (+ —), Germany (+ ***), Ireland (+ •), Turkey (- *»),
Argentina (- •")
Tobacco Belgium (+^), Germany (+•*), Austria (-••), Malaysia (+•")
Textiles USA (+ *), Greece (- •*), Finland (- *), Malaysia {- •*•)
Apparel Netherlands (+ "*), New Zealand (+ •*), Austria (+ *•), Yugoslavia (+ ••), Uruguay (+
••), Singapore {+ •*•)
Leather USA {+ *•), Spain (- •), Norway (+ **), Brazil {- •), Malaysia (- »), Singapore {+ ")
Footwear New Zetland (- •*), Norway (- •), Thailand (- —), South Korea (- ")
Wood USA (+ *% Canada (+ ••), Germany (+ •*•), Greece {+ *•), Norway (+ —), Mexico (+
Wood hire Italy (+ *), United Kingdom (• *), Norway (+ •), Turkey (- "*), Yugoslavia (+ •*),
Malaysia <• *•)
Paper USA (+ •"), Denmark (+ •), Hong Kong (- "•), Colombia (+ •*), Thailand (+ »)
Print/publ Canada (- '•), Belgium (+ •**), Denmark (+ **•), Italy (+ •), Turkey (- *), Yugoslavia (-
•»), Uruguay (- •*•), Egypt (- «•), Thailand (- •**), South Korea (- •"), Hong Kong (-
«)
Ind chem USA (+ *»*), Canada (+ •"*), Belgium (+ •), Greece (- "•), Australia (- *), New Zealand
(. ••), Yugoslavia (+ "), Mexico (+ •*), Singapore (+ •)
Oth chem Japan (+ •), Italy (• "), New Z^land (+ ••), Yugoslavia (+ •), Colombia (- *•), Malaysia
Refined oil Belgium (+ •), France (- •), Ireland (- *), Sweden (+ "), Brazil (- "), Egypt (- •*•),
Thailand (+ •**), Malaysia (+ •»), Singapore (+ •*•), South Korea (+ *)
Misc C&O Greece (+ •••), Austria (+ •••), Colombia (- "•) *
Rubber Japan (+ ••), Belgium (+ "•), Greece (+ *•), Finland (- *), Sweden (+ ••), Mexico (+ •*),
Colombia (+ •"), Singapore (+ ")
Plastic USA (+ '), Canada (+ •), Australia (- •••), Norway (- •")
Pottery, etc. USA (- ••), Belgium (+ •*), Ireland (+ "), Turkey (- •••), Colombia (- •), Uruguay (- *),
Egypt (• •»)
Glass USA (+ •), Germany (+ •*), United Kingdom (- *'»), New Zealand (- '*•), Bratil (- *)
Oth min Canada (+ *), Denmark (+ •), Germany (+ •*•), Australia (+ *••), Austria (+ "), Mexico
(+ •*•), Egypt (- ••»)
Iron, steel Denmark (+ •'•), Netherlands (+ •), Spain (- "), Yugoslavia (- "), Mexico (+ *»),
Singapore (- *), South Korea (- •)
Non-fermet USA (- •) 1 W i
Fabr met USA (+ *•), Germany ( + •*•), Italy (+ ••), Turkey (- **), Israel (- •**)
Non-el mac USA (+ •"), Greece (- **), Netherlands (+ «•), New Zealand (- *), Turkey (- ***),
Yugoslavia (+ •*•), South Korea (- *)
Bl mach USA (+ •»), Belgium (- •), Wand (+ "), Portugal (- «•), Austria (+ —), Turkey (- «),
Yugoslavia (+ *•), Israel (- •), Malaysia (- "), Thailand (- **•), South Korea (- "•)
Transport USA (+ ••»), Canada (+ «•»), Be^ium (- *•), Portugal (- *), Israel (- *), Brazil (-")
Instruments Finland (+ *•), Yugoslavia (- **•), Colombia (- •), Argentina (- **), Singapore (+ **),
South Korea (- •")
OtJt man USA (+ •), Canada (+ •), Greece (+ "*), Netherlands (- *), United Kingdom (- •*),
Norway <+ •), Turkey (- *•>, Brazil (- "X Argentina (+ •••), Egypt (-»• ••)





































































































































































In many cases, the presence of autocorrelation does not results from a
deterministic relation between the error terms themselves, but instead from some
degree of misspecification, which leads to serially correlated resi^Mfl/s. Most
probably, this is also the case in this regression. To picture this, consider part B of
Table VIII.8. It appears that some countries are more seriously affected by the
autocorrelation problem than others, in the sense that they have more sectors
where it appears. The USA, Canada, Belgium, Turkey, and Yugoslavia are the
countries where the problem is most serious. Therefore, the hypothesis that there
are some variables left out of the regression, but explaining part of the
performance of separate countries (especially the ones mentioned), seems to be
plausible. Indeed, there are many variables influencing competitiveness that have
necessarily been left out of the regressions here. These are investment, profit
margins, trade barriers, distances and many others. Therefore, the results probably
suffer from some degree of misspecification (left-out variables), which manifests
185itself partly through the presence of autocorrelated residuals. Unfortunately, the
only way to solve this problem, i.e., to get data on the variables left out, is not
within the reach of research.
The next test performed involves the detection of heteroscedastic error terms. It is
a simple Glejser test (Johnston, 1982: 301-2), in which the absolute values of the
estimated residuals are used as dependent variables in regressions with each of the
explaining variables in Table VIII.7 and a constant as independent variables. A f-
test for the estimated slope of the regression line is a test for heteroscedasticity,
and was performed for the regressions in Table VIII.7. The results are not
documented separately, but can be summarized briefly. All the estimated
parameters in the Glejser test were significant, pointing indeed to a serious degree
of heteroscedasticity in the results in Table VIII.7. In most (22 out of 28) cases, the
estimated parameter for z,., yielded the highest f-values in the Glejser tests.
The presence of heteroscedasticity mainly has the same consequences as autocor-
relation: It makes the parameter estimates inefficient (i.e., more reliable estimates
are possible), but leaves them unbiased. Estimation under heteroscedasticity is
possible, and various methods are known. Here, the simplest of these methods, a
simple weighted regression, will be used. The square root of the variable that
seems to be the strongest source of the observed heteroscedasticity (z,.,) will be
used as the weight. Weighted variants of the equations estimated in Tables VIII.5,
V1II.6 and VIII.7 were performed, but only the equivalent of Table VIII.7 is
documented here as Table VIII.9. The results in the two other tables did not vary
much'*. The main conclusions from comparing the results in Table VIII.9 and
Table VIII.7 are as follows. First, the value of the f-statistics is somewhat higher
overall. Clearly, this results from the more efficient estimation method used.
Second, there are no drastic shifts in the signs or values of the estimated
parameters.
In order to evaluate the parameter estimates in another way than has been done
previously, Table VIII.10 ranks the sectors with regard to the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients. In the column for the wage rate, some of the high-tech
sectors rank among the ones with a high evolutionary elasticity with regard to this
variable. Electrical machinery is the best example. However, one also finds
traditional low-tech products like apparel, footwear and pottery among the high-
ranking sectors. In the labour productivity column, the high-tech sectors rank
generally lower, with transport as an exception, which illustrates the importance
of the cost aspects of technology. The next column ranks the difference between
the wage rate and labour productivity elasticities. As explained above, this gives
an indication of the noncost aspects of technology. In this column, the high-tech
sectors rank higher than in the previous two, with instruments, transport, and
machinery among the highest ones. The low classification of electrical machinery
is surprising, as well as the presence of beverages at the bottom of this and the
former column.
" In the interpretation of the constant in the weighted regressions, one should bear in mind that
because we have weighted by s,,,, it can no longer be interpreted as a constant See Johnston (1982,
Chapter 8).
186Table VI1I.9. Results for the replicator equation, wage rate, labour productivity i

















































































































































































































































































































































































In the size column, it is interesting to note that the distinction between negative
and positive coefficients lies between printing and publishing and fabricated metal
(positions 10 and 11). Thus, in more than half of the sectors, the scale economies
variable has a positive (and mostly significant) sign. The high-tech sectors have
high, positive coefficients, although there are a few more traditional sectors at the
very bottom of the list.
The last test performed is one for structural change in the parameters of the model
over time"'. Table VIIL11 documents Chow F-statistics for a 'trapped' hypothesis
of structural change. The first statistic tests for changes between the period 1964-
1972 and 1973-1987, while the second statistic divides the latter period into 1973-
1979 and 1980-1987. The hypothesis used is that all parameters in the equation in
Table VIII.7 (constant and two elasticities) change over time. The results in the
table indicate that structural change is a relevant phenomenon for most of the
sectors and periods. However, the results must be interpreted with caution,
because in some cases, splitting up the sample into different periods leads to
wrongly signed parameters, which constitutes a better fit, but yields parameters
that are hard to interpret.
" Note that due to the restriction that market shares must count to one in each period (see
Appendix VII.2), it does not mate sense to estimate the model with parameter differences between
countries. One can, however, introduce dummy variables to capture country specific effects. This
has been done, although the results are not published. In general, the dummies were not significant
in a systematic way.
188Table VIII.10. Ranking of sectors according to the value of the estimated parameters in Table Vin.10*,
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* For the wage variable, sectors are ranked in order of decreasing magnitude (i.e., large positive values first and large negative values tost); for the other
variables, the order is reverse Round brackets 0 indicate nonsignificance, straight brackets [ j indicate a wrong sign. The third column ranks according
to the difference between the labour productivity and wage rate parameters. In this calculation, parameter estimates with a wrong sign were set to zero.

























































































190The exact results of the parameter estimates are not documented here because of
space considerations. A summary of the estimates is as follows. In textiles and
leather-related branches, the parameters generally decline over time, particularly
the one for productivity. This indicates that competition is becoming less intensive
in these sectors. An exception to this is the change in the wage parameters of the
two last periods (1973-1979 and 1980-1987) in the leather-related branches, which
increase. In chemicals, the productivity parameter generally decreases, while the
wage rate parameter increases. This points to increasing attention for cost aspects
in the competition process in these industries. In basic metals and fabricated metals
also, the productivity parameter is decreasing over time, which indicates that
technology aspects are becoming less important here. In machinery, on the other
hand, both the wage and productivity parameters are increasing.
8,6. £xpia»itng the Resu/fs /or the Patent Vartflbtes
As has already been indicated above, the 'dynamic equation' results with respect
to patents are quite different from those obtained in the first (static) structural
regressions. In the static regressions, the parameters estimated were significantly
positive for those sectors in which one would expect technology to play a major
role. In the dynamic regressions, significantly positive coefficients were obtained
in some sectors, and negative estimates were found in others. What are the
possible explanations for these, at first sight, contradictory results?
It mUSt De noted mat U me eSUUldUun of a dynamic piutw» lr.au«loo tk*t poeittva
changes of some variable take place in cases where another variable has a low
value, this would imply that at some point an equilibrium point could be reached
in which a high value of the first variable is correlated with a low value of the
second one. Obviously, such an equilibrium is not found in the static regressions.
Instead, negative dynamic and positive static coefficients were found (particularly
in chemicals). The only explanation for this is that the system started in a situation
that was far from its (new) equilibrium state, and moved towards it only very
slowly.
This seems to be an adequate description of the situation in the world in an era
which witnessed the catching up of the NICs. Even if this points to an explanation
for the 'strange' combination of positive static and negative dynamic correlations,
it does not in itself provide an explanation for the negative dynamic correlations.
However, there are some tendencies that are not captured in the previous analyses,
which would lead to the results found if they were strong enough.
The first of these tendencies relates to a point mentioned in section 8.1 above. Due
to the increasing complexity of technological developments, an increasing number
of firms relies on diffusion rather than in-house development of knowledge. The
number of high-tech firms developing knowledge largely by themselves is
generally higher in countries that have a strong trade position, as shown by the
static regressions. Due to the cumulativeness of technology, the core group of high-
tech firms (even at a world level) changes only gradually. The duwges in trade
positions, which are also slow (this emerges from the results, as well as from other
evidence, for example in Amendola et a/. 1991), are related to the total group offirms. If the technological performance of these firms is much more related to
diffusion-like characteristics, the indicators related to the core high-tech group of
firms are not very adequate, and one might find unclear results by using them.
However, this still does not explicitly explain the negariee coefficients found-
Therefore, one would have to rely on other explanations.
Second, and building on the first point, the specific meaning of patents as a way
of appropriating technologies might actually have a negative effect on the diffusion
of technologies to other firms. In some sectors, Eke chemicals, patents are an
important and effective way of protecting technology from flowing to other firms.
Thus, in countries where firms have a high propensity to patent, diffusion to other
domestic firms might be slower, eventually leading to bad performance. Even if
this argument is intrinsically logical, one might be reluctant to believe it, because
of limits to the diffusion-braking characteristics of patents. However, specifically
addressing the international dimension makes the argument stronger.
This leads to the third argument. The usefulness of patent statistics for innovation
can be questioned from the point of view of the working of the international
system of intellectual property protection. There are at least two reasons why this
system has been rather unsuccessful during the past decades. Primo, the rise of the
NICs, especially the Asian economies, was often built on the 'undermining' of
Intellectual property. A major factor contributing to the success of the NICs has
been the imitation of Western inventions. In some cases, this imitation took place
by so-called 'inventing-around' a patent, which is in accordance with international
agreements on intellectual property. But in other cases, the imitation violated these
international agreements. Either way, imitating countries have not patented much,
but they have grown very fast, so that one is likely to find a negative correlation
between the two.
Seeundo, the rise of multinational cooperations made it possible to easily relocate
production in manufacturing sectors. Therefore, multinationals can easily spread
the different activities (i.e., research and production) over different locations. In
practice, this often led to research being undertaken in the 'home' country, and
production being relocated to the so-called low-wage countries. This means that
technology developed in the traditional (Western) countries was applied in other
countries, i.e., the countries that are viewed as competitors in the above
regressions.
Recently, a slightly different form of this phenomenon has taken place. In this case,
the presence of trade barriers between economies (for example, between USA and
Japan), has forced companies (mostly Japanese) to invest abroad. The idea was to
build factories in the countries whose markets were protected by all sorts of trade
barriers, so that the producte made in these factories could be sold in a home
market rather than being exported. It goes without saying that the technologies
lhat were used in these investment flows were mainly developed domestically.
Thus, these two phenomena lead to slow growth of countries that have high patent
activity.
These points provide possible explanations for the results obtained in the
192regressions. However, there is no direct way of testing either of these possibilities
in the present analysis other than by relating them to some general facts, as done
above. Therefore, future research is necessary to investigate the merits of each of
the points in depth.
8.7. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has examined the relation between trade and technology from an
empirical point of view. In a discussion on indicators, it was concluded that
although patents are often used as innovation indicators, they have some specific
drawbacks that make them inadequate for this purpose in some ways. Therefore,
the regressions estimated used patents and labour productivity as indicators of
technological capabilities.
The data set used included 28 manufacturing sectors (3-digit ISIC), 34 countries
(OECD and NICs) and the period 1964-1987. In a panel of pooled cross-country
time series data, equations for each sector were estimated. First, the (static)
relations found in Dosi ef of. (1990) were re-estimated. Although the sectoral
aggregation is much higher than in DPS, and the data are panel instead of cross-
country, it was concluded that the qualitative results are much the same. For high-
tech sectors, there is a positive relation between patenting and export market
shares- Other significant variables are the relative level of labour productivity, and
country size (both controlling for size differences and economies of scale). The
wage rate turned out to be not very significant in most sectors.
The main aim of the analysis was to test the empirical relevance of the
specification of the relation between trade and technology developed in Chapter
7. Therefore, the replicator equation was used as a specific dynamic specification
for the relation between trade and competitiveness in an OLS estimation. The
results from these estimates were that the evolutionary specification finds some
dear, but not entirely conclusive, support from the data. Moreover, the
performance of the variables is quite different from the static regressions. First, the
wage rate turned out to be significant in most cases. Second, the patent variables
were only significant in a few sectors, and often had a negative sign. The results
for the two other variables (labour productivity and country size) was more or less
the same. In this case, the significance of country size points to economies of scale,
because the influence of size differences had already been captured in another way
by the evolutionary specification. Especially in high-tech sectors, the scale factor
contributed significantly.
The (partly) negative signs for the patenting variables are in sharp contrast with
the positive coefficients estimated in the initial, static, equations. Possible
explanations for mis might be related to the specific characteristics of patents as
invention-appropriating-indicators. Moreover, the presence of multinational
companies has led to a situation in which technologies are applied in countries
where they were not invented, so that there might be a negative relation between
patenting and exports. Further research is necessary to investigate these
possibilities.
193Appendix VIJI.3 Concordance feerween SJTC-l, JSIC-2 and fftc SIC-c/asst/tcafton
The SITC-1 trade data were translated into ISIC-2 using the following concordance
table, developed on the basis of similar tables used by OECD and UNIDO.
Table VIH.A1. Concordance between SITC-1 and ISIC-2'
ISIC-2 SITC-1
311-312 0#### (ex 001##, 025##, 041##, 043##, 044M, 045##, 0482#, 051##, 0721#, 074##,




321 2216#, 261## (ex 2611#), 262## (ex 2621#, 2623#), 263## (ex 2631#), 2651#,
26623, 26633, 2664#, 26702, 65### (ex 6557#, 65545), 84142, 84145, 89998
322 2118#,6557#,84### (ex 84142, 84145)
323 61# (ex 6123#), 831##
324 6123#,851## (ex 85101)
331 243##, 2440#, 63###
332 821#» (ex 82102)
341 251##, 59962, 64«N» (ex 64194, 6423#, 64292)
342 64194, 6423#, 892##
351 2312#, 266## (ex 26623, 26633, 2664#), 51### (ex 51327, 51328), 53###, (ex
5332#, 53332, 53333, 53334, 53335), 561## (ex 56121), 581##, 599## (ex 5995#,
59962, 59977, 59991, 59994, 59995)
352 43142, 51327, 5332#, 53332, 53334, 53335, 541## (ex 5419#), 55###, 571## (ex
5714#), 5995#, 59977, 59994, 59995, 8624# (ex 86244, 86245)
353 33102, 332##, 521## (ex 5213#), 89933
354 3218#, 51328, 5213#, 66181,
355 2313#, 2314#, 62###, 65545
356 85101, 893##, 89422, 89921, 89954
361 666##, 72321, 8122#
362 664##, 665##, 81241,
369 27321, 27521, 661##, (ex 66181), 662##, 663##, 69791, 89592
371 27661,56121, 67###, 69311, 6932#
372 28312, 28322, 28401, 28408, 68###, 6931# (ex 69311)
381 69### (ex 6931#, 6932#, 69526,69711,69791,69852), 71U#, 7112#, 7117#, 71941,
71943,71966,71994,71999,812## (ex 8122#, 81241), 8951#, 89997,95104,282##,
284«# (ex 28401, 28408)
382 5714#, 69526,69711,71### (ex 7111#, 7112#, 7114#, 7115#, 7117#, 71941,71943,
71966, 71994, 71999), 7296#, 8943#, 8945#, 89999, 951## (ex 95104)
383 72### (ex 7295#, 7296#, 7297#, 72321), 8911#, 8912#
3*4 7114#, 7115#, 73###, 8941#
385 5419#, 7295#, 7297#, 82102,861##, 864##, 89927, 8996#
390 28502, 53333, 59991, 64292, 667## (ex 6671#), 69852, 891#» (ex 8911#, 8912#),
897##, 8942# (ex 89422), 8944#, 899« (ex 89921, 89927, 89933, 8996#, 89954,
89997, 89998, 89999), 961##
' • points to a nonsignificant digit
US patents are classified by the patent office in SIC classes on the basis of
technological characteristics. However, one patent may be assigned to more than
one SIC class. Therefore, one has to decide how to count the number of patents per
SIC. The procedure used here is to count a patent that has been assigned to more
than one (say n) SIC classes for l/« in each class (so-called fractional counting).
The scheme to convert SIC classes to ISIC-2 is the following.Table VIII.A2. Concordance between ISIC-2 and US Patent SIC
Sequence


















































































' Not all sequence numbers are used, because some classes are aggregates.CHAPTER 9. A Broader Empmca/ Vtetu on
Trade, Technology and Growfn
This final chapter of Part Three is aimed at providing a more general test of the
theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 7. However, since the model proposed
there was very stylized, the procedure of testing it necessarily involves some
'creativity' by transforming the general consequences of the model into testable
hypotheses. In order to do so, two different strategies will be used. First, some
equations will be derived on the basis of the model, and these will be estimated
using the data set and some of the results from the previous chapter. This provides
a genera/ approach to the subject, which pays no attention to results for specific
countries. This is were the stylized facts from Chapter 4 will be brought back into
the analysis: Among other things, the idea of structural differences will be applied
to the case of uneven growth.
The second approach is more case study-oriented, and it concentrates on the Asian
countries in the sample, which were shown to be 'prime' examples of catching up
in Chapter 4. The current analysis tries to give an in-depth overview of the
observed performance of these countries in light of the preceding analysis.
However, the reader should keep in mind that it is not the aim of this part to give
a comp/efe overview of development in Asian NICs. Instead, the analysis will focus
on isolated parts which are directly relevant to the preceding chapters.
9.2. A General Tesf o/ ffce Refarion Between Compeft'fjwness, Structure and
GrotvtA Rate Differentials
In applying the model from Chapter 7 to actual data, a number of problems arise.
The first problem is concerned with the concepts used in the model. The main
force determining the growth rate of a country was the iw/ance of payments, which
was assumed to be in equilibrium at all times. During the presentation of the
model it has already been admitted that this assumption does not comply with the
real-world facts. What one observes are balance of payments deficits and
surpluses, and as a result, accumulation of debt in some countries. Nevertheless,
Thirlwall (1979) and Fagerberg (1988a) have shown that the balance of payments
restriction to growth rates does make sense in an empirical setting. Therefore,
although balance of payments equilibrium is seldom achieved, growth rates seem
to converge to the value that is consistent with external equilibrium, at least for the
countries investigated by Thirlwall and Fagerberg.
196However, both Thirlwall and Fagerberg used aggregate data to test their models.
As was shown in Chapter 7, the country-wise differences in elasticities observed
by them can (at least theoretically) be explained by the production and
consumption structure of the domestic economy. This is the main reason why the
analysis in Chapters 7 and 8 was extended to include the sectoral level. However,
this poses another problem: The data used in the previous chapter are available
for the manufacturing sector only, and, as a result, many sectors of the economy,
such as agriculture, mining, building, transport, and other forms of services, were
ignored. And even though large parts of the services sector are nontradeable,
concentrating on manufacturing alone leads to ignoring large parts of the trade
balance. Therefore, even if the balance of payments restriction to economic growth
is relevant, it cannot be used in the narrow manufacturing perspective adopted
here.
Thus, it is imperative to develop another way of exploring the empirical
consequences of the model proposed in Chapter 7. To do this, assume for the
moment that there is only one market for each of the products of the industrial
sectors identified in the previous chapter. In other words, the relevant market for
each producer is the total world market, irrespective of its location. This means
that the detailed specification of the relation between competitiveness and growth
through the import and export sides of the trade balance will be 'skipped'. Then,
using a simple definition, each country's rate of growth of production in a specific
sector over a specific period will be the sum of the growth rate of its market share
and the growth rate of volume of the market.
In this equation, the symbols are as defined in previous chapters, and M is the size
of the market. As before, it is assumed that the movement of the market share is
determined by competitiveness, so that a country whose competitiveness is exactly
equal to the average will grow as fast as the market volume. This country 4
denoted by *.
The next step is to write an expression for the aggregate growth rate of countries.
Obviously, the aggregate growth rate can be found by adding together the sector-
wise growth rates, taking sector shares as weights. In mathematical form, this is
written as follows.
Obviously, for the 'average competitive' country (*), the aggregate growth rate
reduces to the following.
Combining the last two equations, the growth rate differential between an
individual country and the average country growth rate can be written as follows.
197This equation shows that the growth rate differential is the sum of two partial
effects, the first can be attributed to competitiveness, and the second to the
structure of production. Using the evolutionary equation used in the two
preceding chapters, the last equation can be rewritten as follows.
The first term on the rhs of equation (IX.6) is due to competitiveness, while the
second one is due to the production structure.
However, the irrealistic assumption of one world market leads to the necessity of
carefully interpreting this equation. First, the competitiveness part does not take
into account all sorts of factors that might prohibit a successful transformation of
high competitiveness into high growth. The most obvious of these factors is the
existence of trade barriers in the form of protectionist measures, and the space
dimension, which leads to trade flows from and to one specific country that are
unequally distributed over the world. Second, the structural part of the equation
models the structural problem from the supply side, while it seems to be more
logical to model it from the demand side, as in Chapter 7. In other words, in the
theoretically preferred approach from Chapter 7, the existence of a structural
advantage or disadvantage was determined by the country's and the world's con-
sumption structures, while here it are the production structures that matter.
Obviously, at the total world level, the consumption and production structures
must be equal, but as the simulation results in Chapter 7 showed, for separate
countries that are trading with other countries, the two are likely to differ, due to
specialization. Therefore, part of the equation is misspecified with regard to the
impact of competitiveness on growth through the import (i.e., demand) side of the
economy.
Nevertheless, equation (IX.6) can be tested using the data and results for <j)
estimated in the previous chapter. Before doing so, a regression relating growth
rate differentials of manufacturing production and total GDP (denoted by Y) is
carried out. This equation gives an idea as to what extent the results for
manufacturing have significance for the economy as a whole. The equation used
is as follows'.
The outcome of this regression is the following.
Oo = 0.437 (22.02"*)
Yo - 0.001 (0.88)
' The data set used in the regressions in this section is partly the same as that used in the
previous chapter. Manufacturing variables not used there (such as the growth rate of output) are
token from the same source (UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database). Data for GDP in this chapter
are taken from Summers and Heston (1991). Countries used and the period involved are also the
same (1963-1987). Starred values refer to (weighted) sample averages.n = 652
adj. R* » 0.43
A Chow-test for structural change between the periods before and after 1973 is not
significant. These results show that there is a strong correlation between the
growth rate differential with respect to total output and the growth rate
differential of manufacturing output. Of course, this correlation is not surprising,
since manufacturing output is a part of total output. Nevertheless, the value of the
estimated coefficient, which is clearly smaller than one, shows that there is a
general tendency in the data towards specialization between the manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing countries. The reason for this is that the estimated value of a,
shows that large positive values of growth rate differentials in manufacturing tend
to go hand in hand with below-average growth (i.e., negative growth rate
differentials) in nonmanufacturing sectors of GDP, Large negative values of the
growth rate differential in manufacturing tend to go together with above-average
growth in nonmanufacturing sectors. As a result, the growth rate differential
induced by the manufacturing sector is partly offset by the other sectors. In other
words, the manufacturing sector has induced a tendency towards diwrge»«» while
this has been partly offset by a converging tendency in nonmanufacturing sectors.
Now that the relation between manufacturing and total growth rate differentials
is clear, attention can be shifted towards explaining the growth rate differentials.




0 stands for competitiveness, and is defined according to equations (IX.5) - (IX.6).
The <!>s are taken from the empirical analysis in the previous chapter*. S is the
effect of the production structure, and is also defined as in the equations above.
O measures the openness of the economy. This variable is used to correct the
relations above for different degrees of openness. Several specifications will be
used to do this, which will be discussed below in more detail. H is a measure of
the degree of specialization of the economy. It is defined as the variance of the
sectoral shares in manufacturing output around the sample means, so that high
* $s used are moving averages of those obtained in fte estimations for Table VlH.ll, so that
competitiveness consists of the wage rate, labour productivity and a stale factor. For the exact
values of the $s used, the reader should refer to the floppy disk. The program that should be
started is ELAS.EXE, and variable names are as follows: $«afc,j = CNj; $ubo«i>«xi»«*y,) = CPfc &..*«!».,
= CWj (/" refers to a sequence number in Appendix IV.2).
199values correspond to a high degree of specialization. This variable is meant to pick
up the effects of increasing returns to scale due to specialization, which were
explained in the discussion of the simulation results of the model in Chapter 7, In
principle, these scale effects are assumed to be included in the measures of
competitiveness used, but in order to see if any of these effects are not captured
through 0, the H variable is included in the regressions. Although the definitions
of H and S are alike, the correlation between the two is low (-0.03). This illustrates
that H and S measure two different things: H is related to the static structure of
the economy, which is assumed to provide opportunities for dynamic scale effects,
while S measures the dynamic structural advantages related to market demand,
fc stands for the investment intensity, and is included to take into account some
aspects of competitiveness that are not included in the definition of 0.
These variables will be used in a number of different equations. Since the basic
equation derived above (IX.6) assumes that all economies are completely open,
some additional specifications will be tested that relax this assumption. The basic
idea behind these other forms is that the relation between competitiveness and
growth rate differentials is stronger for economies that are more open. Thus, one
can assume that in a regression of the type (IX.6), the estimated coefficient for
competitiveness varies with openness. One way of taking this into account is by
estimating an equation with competitiveness multiplied by openness (O-0) as one
of the independent variables. Another possibility is to specify a nonlinear (in the
parameters) relation between openness, competitiveness and growth. Both
approaches will be followed below.
First, some linear (in the parameters) equations will be estimated. The estimates
will be done both for equations explaining the growth rate differential in
manufacturing, and GDP. The results for the linear equations are in Tables IX.l
and IX.2, The tables show that the overall explanatory power of the regressions is
rather weak. However, the coefficients are (highly) significant in most cases, which
indicates that although the variance explained is low, there is a significant
relationship of the kind assumed. Chow-tests for structural change between
periods before and after 1973 are not significant.
Turning to the individual equations, the following can be said. In Table IX. 1,
equation (1) is the purest form of the hypothesis derived above (IX.6). The
parameter estimate of 0 is smaller than one, indicating that there is indeed a factor
which prohibits the differences in competitiveness to be transformed into
differences in growth rates completely. This is probably a mixed effect of the
competitiveness measures being less than perfect and of the omission of the
openness effect. The estimated parameter of the structural term S is larger than
one, which is hard to explain from the point of view of the above equations.
Equation (ii) tries to correct for the openness by assuming that the slope of the
basic equation (as in i) varies with openness. The minimum value of O observed
(around 4%) corresponds to an estimated coefficient of around 0.015, while the
maximum O value (around 245%) yields a slope of around one. Thus, these results
indicate that the slope of the competitiveness variable varies between zero and
one, with the extremes of this interval reached for the most closed and open
200economies in the sample.
Equations (iM) and (Iv) are basically the same, but introduce the specialization
term. It is shown that higher specialization leads to higher growth. The coefficient
of ©-O becomes smaller and insignificant, while the (adjusted) R' in (iv) gets
smaller by including the extra variable. This effect might be partially due to muW-
collinearity (the correlation between 0-0 and H is close to 0.4), In any case, this
shows that part of the effect of the openness variable in (ii) is due to specialization
increasing with openness. The constant in (Hi) - (iv) becomes smaller, while the
other coefficients remain more or less the same.
Table IX.1. Estimation results for linear equations explaining growth rate

























































































Variants (v) and (vi) show that there is also a significant relation between
investment intensity and growth rate differentials, and that the influence of S and
© is not affected by this. Finally, equations (vii) and (viii) include all the variables,
and show the general significance.
Table IX.2 repeats the same relations, but explaining GDP growth rate differentials
instead. As could be expected from the estimated relation between GDP and
manufacturing growth, the coefficients in these equations are smaller than the ones
in (i)-(iv), and so are the R*s. However, the coefficients are also significant, which
indicates that the relations are strong enough to survive additional sources of
disturbance caused by the relation between GDP and manufacturing output
201Table IX.2, Estimation results for linear equations explaining growth rate

























































































The influence of openness on the coefficient of 8 can also be estimated by means
of nonlinear specifications. Various alternatives were tested, which are ail nested
in the following equation.
D =(u+aO*)0+BS+y (IX.13)
Estimating this equation in its least restrictive form (i.e., leaving all the parameters
free) does not yield very good results, both in terms of convergence and in terms
of f-values of the estimated parameters. Therefore, various special cases of the
general equation were estimated, which, in general, produce quite good results.
Table IX.3 lists the results (Chow-tests for structural change are not significant).
In equations (i) and (iv), one would expect 1 a p+O* > 0 (close to zero for dosed
economies, and close to one for open economies), which implies that u<0 and §>0.
Note that this equation assumes that the relation between competitiveness and
growth is zero for an economy with a value of O>0. In other words, the point at
which competitiveness becomes meaningless lies before the point of a completely
closed economy. The performance of the equation for GDP growth is better than
for the equation for manufacturing, at least in terms of significance of the
coefficients. Although the relation may not be very strong, it is useful to calculate
the boundaries of the range for the implied coefficient of ©. These are as follows:
for DQ : 0.45 £ p+O* a 0.10; for D>.: 050 * p+O* a -0.10,
202Table IX.3. Nonlinear specifications of the relation between growth,














































































Thus, the estimated coefficients for manufacturing yield values of the regression
slope in the correct range, which holds to a lesser extent for total GDP. Although
part of the estimated range is smaller than zero, keeping standard errors of the
estimated coefficients in mind, these values are quite good.
The results of variants (ii) and (v) indicate that for GDP growth rate differentials,
the linear (in the parameters) forms (vi) and (iix) in Table IX.2 are more restrictive
than necessary. These equations yield significant parameters, which are different
from those obtained in linear regressions. However, calculating the maximum
value for the slope of the 0 term yields values around six for the GDP equation,
and 0.8 for the manufacturing variant. The value for GDP is quite high from a
theoretical point of view. Equations (iii) and (vi) bring the maximum values for the
slopes of 0 closer to each other. For these equations, in which all parameters are
significant, the values are 3.7 (GDP) and 2.5 (manufacturing). Still, this is quite
high, so that one should interpret equations (ii), (iii), (vi) and (vii) as being not
very relevant to the rightmost tail of the distribution of O.
The exact relationship between competitiveness, openness and growth as described
by the first nonlinear equation is explained in Figures IX.la and IX.lb. The other
nonlinear equations, as well as variants (ii), (iv), (vi) and (viii) in the linear
estimates, yield similar '/anrfscapes', but they are somewhat less steep (and
nonlinear) in the O dimension. In the figures, the 3-dimensional function described
is projected on a 2-dimensional space, using the relevant ranges for the
competitiveness and openness variable, and the estimated parameters for the
manufacturing output growth variant of the equation. The structural part of the
equation, as well as the constant, have been set to zero.
203Figure IJCla. The 3-dimensional relation between openness, competitiveness and
growth, viewpoint 1
Figure IX. 1b The 3-dimensional relation between openness, competitiveness and
growth, viewpoint 2
204The two different figures project the same function in the 2-dimensional space,
each taking a different viewpoint. Growth rate differentials are measured on the
2-axis (vertical), the X-axis (stretching from the bottom-left to the top-right corner)
measures competitiveness, and the Y-axis (stretching from top-left to bottom-right)
measures openness. For growth and competitiveness, the middle of the respective
axes represent the point zero. For the Y-axis, the middle point corresponds with
a value of the openness variable of around 125%. Moving to the right on the X-axis
means a higher value of competitiveness, while moving to the left on the Y-axis
corresponds to higher openness. Dark-coloured surfaces represent the top of the
projected plane, and light shades correspond to the bottom of the plane.
In order to interpret the form of the plane, it is useful to start by imagining a
situation in which openness does not matter, and the relation between
competitiveness and growth is linear. This is the case in equations (i) in Tables 1X.1
and IX.2. Here, one could graph this relation in a 2-dimensional space. However,
if a 3-dimensional space was used, there would be no variation along the third
dimension, and the figure would simply look like an uphill road that can be
crossed without gaining or losing height. Rufrng the road with a bicycle, however,
would lead to gain/loss of height. At some point (halfway, at the point zero on the
competitiveness axis), one would reach a point where the height corresponds to
a zero growth rate differential.
Bearing this situation in mind, it is easy to see what would happen if the influence
of openness is taken into account in as in the different variants of equation (IX.9).
Now, each s/fce of the road (along its 'direction of the traffic') has a 'personal'
steepness, which means that if one drives closer to one side of the road, the
steepness varies. In fact, if one drives on the outer rightmost edge (corresponding
to a closed economy), the road is completely flat. This slice of the road
corresponds to the X-axis. The more one moves to the left, the steeper the surface
becomes. This interpretation is evident from Figure IX.la. ,,..-..,
Another way of saying the same thing is the following. At the maximum of
openness (the farthest possible point on the Y-axis from the origin), the plane cuts
the horizontal plane for which growth (Z) is zero with a fairly large slope (close
to 0.7). From that slice on, the slices closer to the origin are cur/erf towards the X-
axis. For negative values of competitiveness (X-axis), the plane curls to the X-axis
from fce/ow (negative values on the Z-axis), and for positive competitiveness it curls
to the X-axis from above. This interpretation is more evident from the viewpoint
taken in Figure IX.lb.
The simple, but important, economic interpretation of these figures is that
competitiveness only matters when the economy is open enough. Economies
actively taking part in world trade are more sensitive to differences in
competitiveness than less open economies. To put it another way, it is not
beneficial to have an open economy unless the domestic economy is competitive.
2059.2. CafcWHg Up? A Detarfed Loofc at the ASWH NICS
After this general interpretation of the relation between trade, competitiveness and
growth, this section will take a closer look at some of the countries in the sample,
in order to see to what extent their growth pattern can be explained by the
approach taken. The aim of this is to go beyond the general nature of the
regressions in the previous section, and explore the data used there, as well as
some additional data, for the consequences of the general framework derived from
the model in Chapter 7.
The empirical overview in Chapter 4 has indicated that the NICs are the countries
which have achieved the most spectacular growth performance in the period under
consideration. But even within this group, there are considerable differences.
Although the data are not actually documented here, it is a well-known fact that
the Asian NICs* are most remarkable. As will become apparent below, these
countries have achieved very high growth rates over the previous period, which
is the reason why they are sometimes called the Dynamic Asian Economies (DAEs,).
Thus, these countries seem to be good candidates for the case study approach
adopted in this section. The USA (representing the economic and technological
leader at the outset of the period) and Japan (the early example of catching up,
and by now an economic and technological leader, especially in the Asian region)
will also be considered as benchmarks.
Table IX. 4 summarizes the growth performance of these countries. The table shows
that at the outset of the period, the USA, as the technological and economic leader,
was realizing a small positive growth rate differential. In manufacturing, most of
the Asian economies were still falling behind, with Japan as a clear and Korea and
Malaysia as less clear exceptions. For GDP, the growth rate differentials for the
Asian economies were more on the positive side. Thus, Japan emerged as a
regional leader in terms of growth rates and per capita income (not documented)
as early as the 1960s. After 1965, the USA economy slowed down, and mostly
achieved negative growth rate differentials. The Asian catching-up process set off
in this period, and only came to a standstill in Japan in the most recent period. The
other Asian economies, especially Korea, continued to grow very rapidly, both
with regard to GDP and manufacturing, with occasional exceptions.
* In this thesis: Hong Kong, (South) Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, The Philippines.
206Table DC4. Growth performance of Asian NICs and technological leaders,
1987
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How can this growth pattern be explained? Bearing the results of the regressions
in the previous section in mind, the present section explores the trends for the
USA and Asian economies in more detail. The first factor that wiU be examined
is competitiveness (0). In Figure IX.2a, the competitiveness profiles of the USA and
Japan are presented. The figure gives the percentage point contribution of wage
rate competitiveness to the total on the horizontal axis, and its productivity and
scale counterpart on the vertical axis. The solid line going from the upper left
corner to the bottom right corner makes the distinction between negative (left) and
positive (right) total competitiveness. The dotted lines divide the 2-dimensional
space in parts that correspond to different sources of competitiveness. Japan starts
as a technologically backward country, which is still competitive due to its low
wage rate. The USA starts as a highly competitive country with regard to
technology, but lags behind in the wage rate dimension. Some of the reasons why
the USA's tola/ competitive lag did not materialize in a larger negative growth rate
differential than that in Table IX.4 will become apparent below. The catching-up
process of Japan is made visible through its constant upward movement in the
diagram. However, at the same time, Japan moves slowly to the left, indicating its
loss in the wage rate dimension of competitiveness. The USA shows a movement
in the opposite direction. The catching-up process in the rest of the sample makes
KS7it lose part of its advantage on the vertical axis. Regarding the wage rate, however,
the USA moves in the positive direction, making it more competitive overall,
especially in the late 1970s and 1980s,
The movements in the horizontal direction of Figure IX.2a illustrates the influence
of exchange rates on the wage rate competitiveness of the two leading economies
in the world. The USA's swing in the horizontal direction corresponds exactly with
the large amplitude of the exchange rate path of the US$ over the 1970s and 1980s.
The same holds for the Japanese pattern over the 1980s.
Figures IX.2b and IX.2c show that exchange rate movements are not quite so
dominant for the other Asian economies. Since the movements of these economies
mainly take place in quadrant IV, the figure only gives the rightmost half of the
total competitiveness diagram in Figure IX.2a. The Asian NICs' increasing
competitiveness is in most cases due to wages, both in a startc sense (the presence
of most series in the top of quadrant IV) and in a dynamic sense (the movement to
the right). At the same time, however, some of the series (especially Malaysia and
Korea) also show a small upward movement (over the latest period), indicating the
technological catching-up process.
JPN-*-USA
Figure !X-2a. The competitiveness profiles of Japan and die USA, 196Os-198Os
208THA-*-MLY-»~PHL




SNG -•*- KOR -*- HKG
Figure IX.2c. The competitiveness profiles of Singapore, Hong Kong and Korea,
1960s-1980s
209To sum up, Figures IX.2a - IX,2c illustrate one important source of the large
positive growth rate differentials of the Asian economies, in the form of their high
competitiveness. Compared to the other countries in the sample (not documented),
which mostly move around the origin, or the solid line, competitiveness in these
countries is very high. However, there are a number of countries for which the
match between competitiveness in Figures IX.2 and growth rate differentials in
Table IX.4 is not particularly good for some periods (with Korea in the early years
being the most prominent example). This means that there must be additional
factors explaining these countries' growth performance.
Table IX.5 gives two possible sources. First, the table shows fee openness
coefficients for the countries under consideration. The bottom line (sample mean)
of the first half of the table shows the increasing internationalization of the world
economy over the 1970s in the form of increased world trade. Over the 1980s, the
trend in O is downward again, which does not necessarily indicate a decrease in
internationalization. The presence of multinational companies might bias the
particular statistic used here. Nevertheless, the numbers show the relatively large
importance of domestic growth factors for the large economies of the USA and
Japan. These two countries have a value of O clearly below the sample mean,
which indicates the relatively small importance of competitiveness in this context.
Both countries, however, have an increasing trend in O, in line with the world
trend. The other Asian NICs can be divided into two groups. One group (Hong
Kong, Singapore) is highly dependent on international trade, and achieves values
of O far above the sample mean (in the case of Singapore even extremely high).
The other group (The Philippines, Thailand, Korea) clearly has a value of O below
the sample mean. Malaysia lies somewhat in between, with values of O around the
mean, Korea starts at a very low level of 0, but moves to a more open economy
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This shows that the logic of completely export-
based growth is only valid for a limited number of the Asian 'tigers'. It also
explains some of the mismatches between growth in Table IX.4 and
competitiveness in Figures IX.2a - IX.2c.
One of the domestic sources of growth that has not been taken into account yet,
is capital accumulation, which is presented in the bottom half of Table IX.5.
Regarding the two leaders, USA and Japan, the well-known pattern is reproduced
here. The USA has an investment ratio which is constant over most of the 1960-
1980 period, but is well below the mean. Japan's investment intensity is much
more volatile, reaching a peak in the mid-1970s, but is well above the sample mean
for the whole period. The other Asian economies can be subdivided into two
groups. The first group (Korea, Singapore, Malaysia) are /oftmomg Japan, with
investment intensities around average in the early 1960s, and above average
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, The other group (The Philippines, Hong Kong)
achieves around average investment intensities for the whole period. However,
considering that the level of development in these countries is lower than in the
OECD countries, one might interpret this as relatively high. Thailand is an
exception to the high investment intensity in Asia, with levels well below those of
the USA.
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Malaysia -w- Samplemean
Figure DC3b. The evolution of the spedaliiation index, high-specialization countries
212Hnally, the degree of specialization is investigated. The regressions in the previous
section showed that this is a very strong factor explaining growth. As explained
above, there are two sides to spedalization, which can be broadly defined as
demand side induced and supply side induced. Before separating these two,
Figures IX.3a and IX3b present the degree of spedalization for the countries in the
sample. The figures divide the countries into two groups, one with a high degree,
and the other with a low degree of spedalization. This division corresponds closely
to the one made in the case of openness, which illustrates the relation between
openness and spedalization. The first group, in which the leaders Japan and the
USA are found besides Korea and the Philippines, all have starting values of the
variable H below the sample mean. The second group has starting values above
the sample mean. In Figure IX,3a, note the trends for Japan and Korea. In the case
of Japan, the increased openness over the 1970s and 1980s has also lead to
increased spedalization. For Korea, however, increased openness has gone together
with decreased spedalization (except for the period since 1985). This indicates the
very broad range of the Korean competitive manufacturing activities.
In Figure IX3b, note that all series show a decreasing trend over time. These
countries, which all started at very high levels of spedalization, are becoming less
specialized over time. The sample mean is also decreasing, which shows that this
is indeed a trend that is not limited to Asia. In light of the increasing trend in
openness that was observed earlier, this is surprising, since one would expect
increasing openness to go hand in hand with increasing spedalization.
One possible explanation for this might be the dynamics of sectoral shares at the
world level. In line with some of the theory on diffusion of innovations, long
waves and technological paradigms, the share of new technologies in total (world)
production has been rising since the late 1970s (see the discussion in Chapter 3).
Reshaping the division of labour at the world level on the basis of this new
sectoral division of labour is a process which erodes the old division of labour, and
thus leads to a decreasing trend in spedalization initially. This is consistent with
the rise in spedalization in some of the countries in Figures IX.3a and IX.3b since
the beginning of the 1980s.
Table IX.6 investigates this hypothesis in more detail for the DAEs. The table
illustrates the dynamics of specialization patterns in a nonquantitative way. The
underlying statistics for this table are ra>eai«d compsrafiw adt««%es (RCA),
calculated on the basis of production statistics. The table gives the top-3 sectors for
different criteria for different periods, which have been chosen on the basis of the
movement in H in Figures IX.3a and IX.3b.
In the early 1960s, all Asian economies (including Japan) were specialized in low-
tech sectors. Tobacco, wood and textiles were among the sectors with the highest
RCAs. The USA, on the other hand, were spedalized in instruments, transport
equipment (mostly cars and aircraft), and refined oil.
The USA economy's spedalization pattern remained largely constant, with the
high-tech sectors at the forefront. However, in line with the Japanese competition
in the automobile industry, transport equipment vanished from the RCA top-3 in
2131987, Japan, on the other hand, showed major changes in its specialization pattern.
The sectors which had been in the RCA top-3 in 1963 realized major losses in RCA
(see the line top-3 changes -). The top-3 changes + sectors (instruments, electrical
machinery and iron and steel) increased their RCA to such an extent that they
became the top-3 sectors in 1987. Thus, the picture of Japan as a country switching
from low-tech to high-tech production that was clear from Figure IX.2a, is
confirmed by the dynamics of its specialization pattern.
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The other Asian economies are less dynamic in this respect. Still, a number of
them (Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore) manage to become specialized in at least
one high-tech sector (electrical machinery or instruments). In Korea, electrical
machinery is becoming increasingly important, as is clear from the top-3 changes
+ row, but in 1987, this sector did not rank among the top-3 RCA yet. Thus, all the
economies which have shown an increasing trend in specialization over the last
years, are becoming more specialized in at least one high-tech sector. This
illustrated the value of the argument on the reshaping of the international division
of labour.
Another point that is worth mentioning from Table IX.6 is the importance of
natural resource-based industries such as refined oil, rubber and wood for some
of the Asian economies. Being tied to one particular location, these sectors would
be expected to have a high degree of specialization. Nevertheless, the fact that
most Asian economies have been able to go beyond the exclusive exploitation of
these natural resources, and specialize in other sectors as well, is indicative of their
dynamic power. Take Korea, which was specialized in the natural resource based
industries rubber and pottery in 1963. At that time, electrical machinery and
transport were very weak. Over the 1960s, Korea experienced a wave of
specialization, which led to a strong position in other manufacturing, and refined
oil as a new, but more important, resource-based industry. After 1970, the Korean
216economy was once again reshaped, this time resulting in a net decline of
specialization. During this period, a number of its weaknesses (leather, electrical
machinery) in 1963 developed into strengths by 1987.
There are two other countries for which wave-like patterns in specialization were
found. The Philippines switched to an oil-based economy during the 1960s and
early 1970s. Subsequently, it became specialized in low-tech sectors such as
beverages and apparel. Note also the constant importance of tobacco over the total
period. Hong Kong showed specialization waves too, but only over the most
recent period was this accompanied by a real structural change in the sense that
instruments became more and more important. Over the total period, this country
is the best example of the importance of textiles(-related) industry in the Asian
countries.
Thus, this table shows the supply side effects and causes of specialization. Table
IX.7 shows the demand side effects related to specialization. The table gives the
average value of the variable S over different subperiods. Overall, the value of S
(compared to growth rate differentials and/or competitiveness) is small. However,
as the regressions showed, the importance is still significant. The table shows that
the two leaders (Japan, USA) mostly stay on the positive (including 0) side (Japan
especially since it has become a technological leader). The other countries are
mostly on the negative side, except for Hong Kong for the post-1960s period, and
the other countries for the period around the first oil crisis. This indicates that the
catching up of the Asian NICs is not due to the demand effects of structural
differences. If anything, this effect was beneficial to the economic and technological
leaders.
Table IX.7. Growth due to the demand side effect of structural differences, Asian







































































217Summarizing the results, it is clear that mere is not a generaf strategy for successful
catching up, even when attention is limited to a small group of countries such as
the Asian NICs. Table IX.8 summarizes the findings of this section in a qualitative
overview of some the factors stimulating growth in the Asian economies. Overall,
low wages seem to (have) be(en) a very strong factor stimulating growth in Asia.
In addition to this, investment plays a (major) role in all countries, except
Thailand. More recently, growth in high-tech industries has been a factor
contributing in a positive way. Overall, the Asian economies do not seem to be
specialized in sectors with very high (world) income elasticity. Other factors, such
as specialization and openness vary between the different Asian economies. Some
of the countries have benefited from these factors, while others have had a weaker
position in this respect.







































































































































The tests performed in section 9.1 show the general relevance of the approach to
growth in the model presented in Chapter 7. The results show the importance of
the evolutionary argument that differences in economic structure and differences
in competitiveness are related to growth rate differentials. Thus, the mode! and the
tests based on it have shown to have some value in explaining the first stylized
fact in Chapter 4. It has also been shown that the second and third stylized fact are
significant factors in explaining the first one. However, since the explanatory
power of the regression is low, it also appears that one needs to consider more
factors determining competitiveness than the limited set used here and in the
previous chapter. To do so, further research must be carried out
The case study approach adopted in section 9.2 also shows this. The growth
pattern of the Asian NICs can be explained by looking at the variables in the
regressions, but there are also parts which cannot be explained directly by this
method. Moreover, the case study approach shows that wrtrry is a very important
concept in explaining growth. As the evolutionary logic stresses, there is not a
generally valid strategy for catching up. Each of the countries considered has its
own specific factors fostering growth.
This leads to a specific way of looking at growth that is quite different from the
mainstream models outlined in Chapter 2, which treat growth as a balanced
phenomenon, having a gradual nature. The open economy evolutionary logic, on
the contrary, looks at growth as induced by changes in trade and the selection
environment, which can be quite sudden and unexpected. Thus, the growth paths
of the economies are subject to sudden shocks and trend reversals.
However, the concluding section of this last empirical chapter is not the place to
discuss this issue in depth. This will be done in the last chapter, which will
summarize the main arguments and conclusions.
219PART FOUR
Summary andt •CHAPTER 20. A Cortc/m/m? Summary
The main aim of this thesis was to examine the nature of the relation between
economic growth and technological change in an international context. The
analysis centred around three major themes. The first theme is the identification
of the issues to be explained (sry/ized /ads) and the choice of the methodological
framework in which to analyze them. Part One was mainly devoted to these
topics. The second theme is the influence of knowledge spillovers on international
growth patterns. This was developed in theoretical and empirical detail in Part
Two. The third theme is the relation between trade, competitiveness and the
international division of growth. Part Three was devoted to setting up a model
which gives a stylized overview of this relation, and exploring its consequences by
means of simulation techniques and empirical analysis.
The concluding summary in this chapter will also focus on these three issues. Each
of them will be discussed in a separate section. In addition, the last section will try
to make some links between the current thesis and some other fields in the
economics of technological change and (international) growth, thus outlining some
possibilities for further research.
10.2. The Merits o/ « Dynamic Ewittfionjiry Approach
The approach chosen in Chapter 3 and later developed in Chapters 5 and 7 can be
characterized as rfyramic and nx>/uf/onary. The main points that lend the presented
models their specific character, are the idea of diversity (in behavioural patterns)
as the driving force of the economic system, the idea of out-of-equilibrium
behaviour of the agents and the system, and the notion of learning (in a
Lamarckian sense) as the most important way of feedback between performance
and behaviour. Looking back at the models presented and the tests undertaken,
what can be identified as the specific advantages of this dynamic evolutionary
perspective?
To answer this question is more difficult than it seems. The reason for this is that
unlike some other areas of science (especially the nafwra/ sciences), the application
of experimental or empirical methods cannot give a definite answer to the question
which of the two alternative theoretical perspectives is better. However, a number
of preliminary conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the above.
In the case of knowledge spillovers, considered in Part Two, the dynamic approach
chosen obviously has big advantages. Spillovers constitute ofd/rions to the
213knowledge stock of a country (firm), and as such they require a dynamic
perspective almost by definition, as in early approaches to the subject (Nelson
1968, Gomulka 1971). Apart from the methodological argument for a dynamic
model of knowledge spillovers, the specific way of modelling used in Part Two
(placing differences in learning capacity at the centre) proved to be very useful
from a theoretical and empirical point of view. This will be discussed in more
detail below.
The advantages of the dynamic evolutionary framework are even more prominent
in the model presented in Chapter 7. As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the
mainstream growth theories in the literature start by specifying the relations
between the variables in the model by means of static equations. The more recent
new neoclassical growth models with endogenous technological change model the
growth rate of knowledge by relating it to R&D investments. However, in both
cases, the outcome of the model is that an equilibrium growth rate is achieved in
the long run, the so-called situation of balanced growth. This view of the world
stresses that the economic system will at some point in time settle in a situation
with a fixed growth rate differential between different economies. Changes in this
equilibrium growth rate (differential) can be induced by changes in the parameters
or exogenous variables, but not by the endogenous behaviour of the agents in the
model.
In some cases, the equilibrium growth rate is not fixed, but has a more
complicated regular pattern, as for example a growth cycle (Aghion and Howitt
1990). However, mis does not change the basic characteristic of the model. Even
in the case of a growth cycle, the regular pattern that the model generates cannot
be changed without changes in parameters and / or exogenous variables.
The model developed in Chapter 7 is strongly opposed to this view of the world
as a system in which regu/ariry is the most important characteristic of growth. The
dynamic evolutionary character of the model generates growth patterns which are
far from regular, and in which the growth path of output, and fluctuations in
employment, prices and productivity growth are quite unpredictable in the
medium or longer run. The basic assumption that underlies this difference is the
evolutionary idea that diversify is the driving force of the economic system, rather
than a homogeneous behavioural pattern that is assumed in most mainstream
growth theories.
The regularity of the growth path has also been raised in the debate on long waves
(see for example Maddison 1982), a field in which the evolutionary approach to
economics is fairly prominent (Schumpeter 1939, Clark ef a/. 1982). Some
approaches (especially the early ones) to the subject of long waves have started
from the assumption that the /eng um« is in fact a fang cyc/e. This usage of the
term cyc/g points to the inherent regularity in the growth path which connects up-
and downturns in the same way over and over again. Thus, although most of the
contributions to the long-wave debate can be characterized as 'outside mainstream
economic analysis', these particular interpretations conform quite well to a
mainstream idea about the character of growth.
224Several authors have objected to this perspective on long waves {for example Clark
rt ai. 1982 and Maddison 1982). They argue that there is no inherent mechanism
which connects up- and downturns in a regular way, but that the explanation for
observed wave-like patterns is more diffuse. Maddison argues that one should
rather speak of different phases in long-term growth. In light of the model
proposed here, the dynamic evolutionary way of modelling stresses this particular
interpretation of growth. But even if the basic ideas underlying many of the
assumptions of the model are due to Schumpeter (see Chapter 3), who is also
considered the founder of the JKntwafion-driven long-wave theory, the model has
not shown any signs of a long-wave pattern. It would be interesting to see under
what assumptions a model like the one in Chapter 7 could generate a growth
pattern which resembles Maddison's phases in long-term growth. Such a model
could contribute to the specific (methodological) long wave debate about the
distinction between fowg cycte and awws.
One might be inclined to consider the conclusion of the irregularity of growth
paths as not being a particularly interesting one, since the economic history of the
(most recent) past contains lots of examples of this phenomenon. However, it is
paradoxical to see that, for example, the ma)or break in the growth path that
occurred in the 1970s has led to a 'panicky reaction' among economists. The
mainstream theories developed until men were all aimed at explaining balanced
growth, and the fact that reality did not conform to this idea was shocking to moit
people in the field. An example of this is the debate on the so-called productivity
slowdown, which centers around the question why the (supposed) potential of
technological progress has not yet materialized in higher productivity growth (for
an overview of this debate, see for example Link 1987). The evolutionary idea of
a complex relation between technological change and growth in which different
countries react differently to different circumstances might be more fruitful in this
debate than the mainstream 'linear' view of the production function (see for
example Freeman 1986).
On the other hand, the extremely unequal growth between the developed and
undeveloped world, did not seem to shock the mainstream economics profession
until recently. Theories dealing with the falling behind of the third world
otherwise than by pointing to exogenous factors have received little attention. The
new neoclassical growth models might provide a promising new line of research
in this field, although the first preliminary ways of 'translating' the new models
into empirical relevant models for the poorest countries are perhaps a little
disappointing (Romer 1989).
One of the reasons why the evolutionary view on growth put forward above did
not receive much attention, is the lack of formal methods in the evolutionary
tradition until recently (see Chapter 3). The current analysis has tried to add to the
growing stream of work that is filling this gap. Although the models developed
above are not really on ^r yet with the level of sophistication in methods and
detail of much of the mainstream theory in the same field, the developments in the
area of nonlinear mathematics seem to be promising in this respect (see for
example Lorenz 1989). The nature of nonlinear dynamic models seems to make
them highly suitable for application in the field of evolutionary theory (Silverberg
2251988), but also poses all sorts of problems with regard to testability and the nature
of the conclusions drawn from them.
20.2. KKOW/£% SptHtwers; Cafe/ting Up or Falling Be/itnd?
Much in line with the way in which the notion of balanced growth has been taken
for granted, the idea of automatic knowledge spillovers from rich to poor countries
has gained ground in the catching-up debate. The idea that the advance of
technological knowledge benefits everyone in the world eventually, seems to be
implicit in this notion of automatic international diffusion of innovation. Starting
from a situation which is described by inequality in innovation capacity,
international knowledge spillovers are believed to r<aiiflfe the beneficial effects of
technological progress all over the world.
The analysis in Part Two has shown the inaccuracy of the view of knowledge
spillovers as an unconditional blessing for the world as a whole. In line with
arguments found in many fields of the economic literature, the model developed
here argues that spillovers do not take place automatically, but require a certain
ossfrniiafi'ng capacity from the side of the receiving party. Moreover, it was
assumed that the larger the technological distance between leader and follower,
the less effective technology spillovers will be, an idea which is supposed to
capture the effect of cumulativeness of technological change. The model was aimed
at explaining two stylized facts of world long-run growth patterns formulated in
Chapter 4. The first of these is that for a limited set of (OECD) countries, the initial
levels of labour productivity are inversely related to the rate of technological
progress. This stylized fact is the basis for the optimistic views on knowledge
spillovers referred to above. The second stylized fact to be explained is that the
inverse relation between initial labour productivity and the rate of technological
progress, or the rate of growth of income, is not valid for the part of the world
lagging furthest behind the technological or welfare frontier.
Using a functional, nonlinear specification of knowledge spillovers that is based
upon some of the insights in parts of the economic literature on technological
change, it was shown that for countries lagging too far behind the technological
frontier, the effects of knowledge spillovers are much too small in order to be able
to provide them with a catching-up perspective. For growing gaps, the actual
knowledge spillovers tend to zero. The model predicts that countries which are
relatively close to the technological frontier and have a relatively high intrinsic
capability to assimilate knowledge spillovers are likely to catch up. Countries
lagging far behind and / or having a low intrinsic capability to assimilate
spillovers will fall (even further) behind. The empirical analysis in Chapter 6
proved the functional specification of the model to be most valuable as compared
to other specifications in the literature and special cases of the equation proposed.
The different possibilities for growth patterns predicted by the model link up quite
closely to the ideas of growth that were described in the above section. Instead of
a regular growth pattern, the model predicts mat (sudden) shocks and trend
reversals in the growth path might arise if the intrinsic capability to assimilate
knowledge spillovers changes over time. In a mathematical way, the model shows,
226even given its very simple nature, some of the possibilities of nonlinear dynamics
referred to above, and generates a W/wrcafion pattern.
Since most of the factors influencing the intrinsic capability to assimilate
knowledge spillovers - such as education and infrastructure, two variables which
are used in the empirical test of the model - are more or less public goods, there
is a possibility for governments to influence growth performance by means of an
active policy in this field. As the analysis of the estimation results in Chapter 6
shows, this holds particularly true for the poorest mostly African, countries, which
are in a position in which the intrinsic knowledge assimilating capability is low to
the extent that they cannot catch up, irrespective of the value of the initial gap.
However, the brief discussion of policy alternatives in Chapter 6 has mentioned
the problem that most of the governments of the countries involved do not havt
the money to pursue such a policy, or lack the political will to spend the money
in this way.
10J. InfcrnartOMflJ Trade, Growth and Compcttfirencss
Part Three of this thesis was aimed at explaining the first three stylized facts of
international growth in Chapter 4. The first of these says that growth rates differ
between countries, although the differences are smaller between groups of
relatively homogeneous countries, The second and third stylized facts suggest a
structural explanation for the question why growth rates differ. The second
stylized fact stresses the differences between sectoral rates of technological change
and the third stylized fact points to differences in the production (and
consumption) structure between countries.
In an attempt to explain these phenomena, the three chapters in Part Three of the
thesis have highlighted the role of technology (and wages) in the process of
international competition for growth. The model that was presented in Chapter 7
has challenged the traditional view that free trade benefits every party involved.
Although the static Ricardian logic of comparative advantages is undisputed, and
actually comes out of the model in terms of emerging specialization patterns, the
model has shown that some countries benefit more from trade man others. It was
in this chapter that the evolutionary logic proposed was expanded fully into a
model, stressing the importance of variety in the specification of the selection
environment using the replicator equation, and using the idea of Lamarckian
feedbacks between performance and (learning) behaviour in the specification of
equations for the wage rate, productivity growth, the exchange rate and income
elasticities of consumer demand.
A normative argument about whether or not a country is better off with free trade
has not been given, because this proves to be impossible in the setting of the
simple model used. The model showed that free trade induces specialization
patterns, which are highly path-dependent due to feedback effects in the form of
learning. It is hard to judge whether or not a country would have been better off
if it had been on a different specialization path due to (initially) closing its
economy.
227What the model did show is that growth rate differentials arise between
heterogeneous economies that trade with each other. These differences in growth
paths are partly due to demand side effects like income elasticities, and partly due
to supply side effects like differential rates of technological change between sectors
and countries. Thus, once again the conclusion is that technological change is not
something that equally benefits everyone in the world.
The model stresses the interaction between trade and growth, and argues that the
possibilities to grow faster than other countries are materialized by an increasing
market share in world markets. This is why the model describes the comprfifiee
sfrugg/e /or groart/i. The factor that determines trade performance, and hence
growth, is competitiveness. In the theoretical model and in the empirical analysis,
competitiveness has been divided into technological competitiveness and wage rate
competitiveness.
In a framework where increasing market shares are the vehicle for growth,
expansion of the economy beyond the capacity limits is a real threat for some
(highly competitive) countries. Therefore, the models contains a negative feedback
effect from performance to competitiveness. This feedback mainly works through
the labour market, and takes the form of a modified Phillips curve. There is also
a technological effect in the form of decreasing marginal returns to learning.
Because of the multi-sector context of the model, there is a structural part to
growth. Growth rate differentials can arise because of varying income elasticities.
Also, specialization patterns are induced by technological advantages (comparative
or absolute), the domestic consumption structure, and competitive pressure.
The resulting growth pattern in an open economy that is modelled in this way is
best described as dynamic. With the exception of some special cases, in which
countries and / or sectors are alike or very symmetric, each country will generally
generate a growth rate different from that in the rest of the world. This result links
up closely to the empirical finding in Chapter 4 that homogeneous groups of
countries have shown more similar growth patterns than heterogeneous groups of
coun tries. Moreover, due to the complex (Lamarckian) links between the different
variables in the system, the growth rate differential itself is subject to sudden and
unexpected shocks.
The empirical analysis of the model highlights the importance of the assumption
of variety in the current framework. Regressions undertaken in Chapter 8, testing
the specific way of modelling the impact of variety on trade performance, in
general support the evolutionary way of modelling, although the evidence is not
altogether conclusive.
With regard to the use of patents as indicators of innovation, the regressions in
Chapter 8 showed that in the context of explaining the static, structural relation
between trade and technology (in manufacturing) that is often found in other work
(Dosi rt «J. 1990), significant and positive relations can be obtained. This result was
also reached in previous work on the subject. However, using the same data in the
dynamic context proposed in the model in Chapter 7, where the motion of market
shares is explained by the level of competitiveness, patent variables behave in a
228much more unexpected way. Many of the estimated coefficients have a negative
sign, as opposed to positive signs in the structural, static approach. As a
preliminary explanation for this phenomenon, the specific role of patents as
indicators of the (international) appropriation of technology was alluded to. Due
to imitation and the presence of multinationals, patents might not be a very good
indicator of innovative power in an international dynamic context. For example,
patents are generally assigned to the country where the research lab of the
applicant is located, but the application of the knowledge embodied in the patent
might well take place in another country. In the current framework, this tendency
might lead to a negative correlation between patents and growth of export market
shares. This puts forward the interesting issue of the role of multinational
corporations and low-wage countries in the process of international appropriation
of knowledge. However, the exact nature of this relation is beyond the scope of
this thesis, and requires more research.
Whereas the regressions in Chapter 8 show the merits of the approach with regard
to trade alone, empirical analysis in Chapter 9 has shown the usefulness of the
general approach of linking trade to growth in the dynamic evolutionary way
proposed. Using the estimated values of the evolutionary elasticities from Chapter
8, the value of competitiveness (defined as the expected percentage point additions
to the growth rate differential of a country in manufacturing) are calculated.
Regressions using these data show that there is a highly significant relation
between competitiveness and structural differences between countries on the one
hand, and aggregate (manufacturing as well as total GDP) growth rate differentiate
on the other. Other variables which could not be taken into account in the
framework of Chapter 8, such as fixed capital accumulation and the degree of
specialization of the economy, are shown to have a significant influence as well.
Despite the significance of these variables, the explanatory power of the
regressions is generally low. This deficiency was attributed partly to the lack of
good indicators for various aspects of competitiveness.
One specific issue in the estimates was the role of openness in the relation between
trade and growth. In order to test for this, a number of nonlinear regressions were
set up. Together with the linear regressions, these showed the limits of the
approach followed in Part Three with regard to countries that have relatively
closed economies, especially the large ones like the USA and Japan. The more open
a country, the higher the influence of competitiveness on growth, Thus, the model
in Chapter 7 needs to be enhanced with regard to the domestic side of the
economy in order to give a more complete description of growth for countries mat
are not so open.
An additional case study approach in Chapter 9 showed the importance of variety
for explaining growth paths of the Asian NICs. The good performance of these
countries, which had already been observed in Chapter 4, can be explained by
several factors among which low wages, specialization and (recently) technological
dynamism are at the centre. However, the analysis also showed that even in this
limited sample of Asian 'tigers', there is not one single recipe for growth. Each of
the countries has its own specific way in which high growth rates were achieved.
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Techno/ogy; Possibilities /or Farther Research
The issue of international growth and technological change has been approached
in this thesis from a macroeconomic perspective. Although the models proposed
here are not very similar to the ones the current macroeconomic literature focuses
on (see for example Blanchard and Fischer 1989), the basic equations underlying
them can be found in other (older) parts of the macroeconomic literature. While
the above discussion shows that a number of interesting points emerge from this
approach, it would also have been possible to treat the main themes from a
different perspective.
Two of these alternative frameworks which are quite close to the main methodolo-
gical, evolutionary ideas underlying this thesis, and therefore come to mind direct-
ly, are the fields of nofiona/ systems of mmwafion (Freeman 1986, Lundvall 1992,
Nelson 1992 and the four contributions in Part V of Dosi ef a/. 1988), and the
(mostly nonformal) part of the field of indusfria/ economics that focuses on firm
level dynamics of international production (Cantwell 1990), including such issues
as the behaviour of multinational corporations (Cantwell 1989) and interfirm
cooperation (in R&D) (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1992). A much more elaborate
discussion of the possibilities of both fields is in Soete (1991).
The importance of the effects of multinational corporations has already been out-
lined when discussing the paradoxical results of the regressions in Chapter 8. But
it Is not only the presence of multinationals that makes industrial organization
relevant. Basically, the dynamics that have been described in Parts Two and Three
take place at the firm level. Competition takes place between firms rather than
nations. And although it is justifiable to treat all firms in a country as a group, as
was done in the above, performing the analysis at the firm level most certainly will
add to the understanding of the dynamics of international trade and growth.
Recently, a lot of work on interfirm technology agreements has been done (for
example Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1992). Most of this work can be seen as
concentrating on the question as to what determines technological strengths and
weaknesses of firms, and how this affects their willingness to share inputs and
costs in the innovation process with other firms. As such, 'traditional' issues such
as diversification, vertical integration, protection of technologies, market structure,
etc. are relevant to this field of research. Thinking about the application of this line
of research leads to the question as to what is the relation between all these
industrial organization topics and the topic of the current thesis. To what extent
does the specific Japanese corporate structure influence the trade and growth
performance of this country? What is the role of market structure upon innovative-
ness in an international context? What role does technology transfer between
national units of multinational firms play? To what extent can small and open
economies rely on the presence of multinational firms for their technological
strength? Will international technological cooperation between firms facilitate
knowledge spillovers, and under what circumstances will cooperation take place?
All these questions are highly relevant to the central topic of this thesis, and might
be answered by looking in more detail at the field of industrial organization.
230Of course, a great deal of work in the field of industrial organization falls under
the heading of mainstream theory, and is thus subject to the critique that much of
the current thesis has centred around. The narrow optimization perspective taken
by much of the work in this field does not easily conform to the evolutionary view
proposed here. Nevertheless, there are a number of interesting lines of research in
the branch of industrial organization, among which those mentioned by Cantwell
and Hagedoom and Schakenraad, which seem to be more close to the evolutionary
view, are perhaps the most prominent It would be a useful exercise to see to what
extent an integration between this work and the current macroeconomie approach
could take place, much along the same lines along which new growth theory has
combined Solow's model and the more traditional work from the field of industrial
organization,
A second useful road for integration might be the recent work on H«fton«l systems
<^ tflnottttioff. The central idea in this field of research is that countries differ with
regard to the general nature of institutions {government policy, educational
systems, legal framework, managers attitude towards risk, etc.) influencing techno-
logical change. It is argued that each country has a specific system, which may or
may not place it in an advantageous position at some point in time. One ol the
ideas in this field which is very dose to the current topic, is the link between
differences in national systems and performance (for example Freeman 1986), As
such, this line of research provides an important way of analyzing one of the cen-
tral themes of mis thesis: national differences in technological capability. In much
of the above analysis, these differences, despite their crucial importance for the line
of the argument, have remained largely unexplained. They were either assumed
to depend on policy variables (Part Two), or modelled in a very stylized way (Part
Three). Therefore, the theory about national systems of innovations provides a
useful way of further specifying one crucial issue in the current approach.
However, if one wants to integrate these two lines of research, one has to deal
with the differences in methodological approaches. The current perspective has
been one of formal methods, using models and statistical analysis. However, the
most fruitful way to analyze national systems of innovation is by means of a
descriptive, case study-like approach. The reason for this is obvious; Factors like
institutional frameworks, (qualitative) government policy and legal issues are not
easy to quantify in a model, and even harder to measure and put into a statistical
analysis. Therefore, if one tried to apply a narrow formal framework to the issue
of national systems, this would probably result in a loss of the most important
benefits of the approach.
On the other hand, it is also dear that the current way in which national systems
are analyzed could benefit from the increased use of formal methods. Due to the
descriptive nature of much of the work, the evidence is fragmented, and open to
doubts with regard to the generality of the results. Therefore, the conclusion that
a compromise between both methodological frameworks would be most fruitful
seems obvious. In any case, the collection of new, internationally comparable data
on institutions and policy variables seems to be a promising way of integrating
these two lines of research.
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242Samem?«tt*«g - Dufc/i
Dit proefschrift behartdelt de relatie tussen ekonomische groei, technologie en
Internationale handel, De manier waarop de analyse van deze relaties plaatsvindt
is te kenschetsen als een modelrnatige evolutionaire methode. De evolutionaire
benadering van ekonomische processen onderscheidt zich van de meer gangbare
neo-klassieke benaderingswijze door een aantal verschiltende uitgangspunten. De
belangrijkste van deze zifn:
1, Het proces van ekonomische groei en ontwikkeling kan niet gekenmerkt warden
als evenwichtig en gelijkmatig. Er zijn desruptieve krachten, zoals teehnologische
vemieuwing, aanwezig in het ekonomische systeem die ervoor zorgen dat steeds
opnieuw een tendentie naar nieuwe groeipaden ontstaat. Dit resuHeert in moeilijk
te voorspellen fases waarin groei en stagnatie elkaar afwisselen,
Z De drijvende kracht achter ekonomische ontwikkeling ligt in de verscheidenheid
tussen ekonomische agenten (bedrijven). In plaats van het gangbare begrip van de
"representatieve agent", gaat de evolutionaire ekonomie er van uit dat endogene
verschillen tussen agenten aanleiding zijn voor een Darwiniaans selektie-proce«,
Nauw hiermee samenhangend, wordt het idee van volledige rationaliteit ingeruild
voor dat van "bounded rationality". Deze vorm van rationaliteit laat ruimte voor
sub-optimaal gedrag, en kenmerkt ondememersgedrag eerder als "winst-zoekend"
dan "wiBSt-maximerend".
De toepassing van deze ideeen op het onderwerp van dit proefschrift leidt tot de
volgende argumentatie. In het eerste gedeelte wordt een interpretatie van de
bestaande literatuur gegeven. In hoofdstuk 1 wordt vanuit een historisch
perspektief globaal uiteengezet hoe technologische vooruitgang de welvaart in de
wereld bemvloed heeft. Hoofdstuk 2 vat vervolgens samen hoe de ekonomische
theorievorming aankijkt tegen de relatie technologic en groei. Hierbij komen
achtereenvolgens het neo-Wassieke, het post-keynesiaanse en het neo-keynesiaanse
groeimodel aan bod. Bovendien wordt een samenvatting gegeven van de
zogenaamde nieuw neo-klassieke groeimodellen, die sinds 1986 sterk in opkomst
zijn. Ook wordt aandacht besteed aan de theorie-vorming met betrekking tot
technologie en groei vanuit een internationaal perspektief.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt aangetoond hoe men vanuit de analyse van het fenomeen
technologische innovatie de voordelen van de hierboven geschetste evolutionaire
benadering plausibel kan maken, Dit hoofdstuk biedt zowel een mikro- als een
makro-ekonomische blik op het innovatie-proces. In hoofdstuk 4, dat tevens deel
1 afsluit, wordt een empirische invalshoek gekozen. In dit hoofdstuk worden
enkele gestileerde feiten met betrekking tot het onderwerp van het proefschrift
geformuleerd. Deze luiden als volgt:
1. Er bestaan verschillen in ekonomische groeivoeten tussen landen, en tussen
groepen van landen, zowel op het nivo van gegaggregeerd inkomen (BBP), als
sektorale produktie.
2. De snelheid van technologische vooruitgang verschllt tussen ekonomische
sektoren.
2433. De produktie-struktuur verschilt tussen landen en over de Hjd. Echter, binnen
bepaalde groepen van landen zijn deze verschillen relatief klein.
4. De snelheid van technologische vooruitgang, gemeten op het makro-
ekonomische nivo, is het sterkst gerelateerd aan het initiele nivo van de
arbeidsproduktiviteit. Andere variabelen, zoals Onderzoek en Ontwikkelings-
inspanningen en investeringen spelen een minder duidelijke rol.
5. De inkomens-kloof tussen de ontwikkelingslanden en de rijke landen wordt
eerder groter dan kleiner, De kloof tussen midden-inkomen-landen en de rijke
landen wordt echter kleiner.
Het verklaren van deze gestileerde feiten is de taak die de rest van het proefschrift
zich stelt. Deel 2 probeert de feiten 4 en 5 te verklaren. Daarvoor wordt in
hoofdstuk 5 een model geformuleerd dat de invloed van technologische
"spillovers" beschrijft. In een kontext van twee landen wordt beschreven hoe
technologische kennis van een geavanceerd land naar een minder ontwikkeld land
vloeit. Hierbij wordt, in tegenstelling tot de zogenaamde catching-up modellen die
men in de literatuur aantreft, benadrukt dat de kapaciteit om technologische
"spillovers" te assimileren een belangrijke rol speelt. Verondersteld wordt dat deze
kapaciteit afhangt van de technologische afstand tussen de twee landen, en een
"intrinsiek" gedeelte, waarbij scholing van de arbeidskrachten en het nivo van de
infrastruktuur een grote rol spelen.
De uitkomst van dit model, dat bestaat uit een aantal niet-linaire
differentiaal-vergelijkingen, is als volgt samen te vatten. Voor kleine waarden van
de intrinsieke capaciteit om technolgie "spillovers" te assimileren, zal de
technologische kloof tussen het geavanceerde en minder ontwikkelde land steeds
blijven groeien ("falling behind"). Voor waardes van de genoemde kapaciteit groter
dan een bepaalde waarde (het zogenaamde bifurkatie-punt), onstaat de
mogelijkheid dat de technologische kloof konvergeert naar een vaste, relatief kleine
waarde ("catching up"). Deze mogelijkheid doet zich slechts voor indien de initiele
technologische kloof niet te groot is. Is dit laatste wel het geval, dan is "falling
behind" de uitkomst.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt getest of het model uit hoofdstuk 5 de empirische data beter
kan beschrijven dan de genoemde "catching-up" modellen. Deze modellen, die in
het algemeen lineair zijn, bieden slechts de mogelijkheid van "catching up", en
kunnen beschouwd worden als een speciaal geval van het model in hoofdstuk 5.
De ekonometrische analyse, die zowel gebruik maakt van geneste als niet-geneste
toetsingsmethoden, toont aan dat voor de steekproef van groeipaden in de periode
1960-1985 voor meer dan honderd landen, het model in hoofdstuk 5 signifikant
beter presteert dan lineaire varianten.
Deel 3 probeert de overgebleven gestileerde feiten te verklaren. Terwijl in deel 2
Internationale handel nog slechts een ondergeschikte rol speelde, wordt in
hoofdstuk 7 een model gepresenteerd dat de relatie tussen handel en groei vanuit
een selektie-oogpunt voorstelt. Dit houdt onder meer in dat verondersteld wordt
dat er belangrijke verschillen tussen landen bestaan op (onder andere) het gebied
van inkomenselastidteiten van konsumptie, leereffekten, en de arbeidsmarkt. In
een mathematische beschrijving die ontleend is aan de biologie, wordt getracht het
244verband tussen konkurrentie-vermogen, dat bepaald wordt door een samenspel
van technologische faktoren en arbeidskosten, en handelsprestattes weer te geven.
De zogenaamde handelsbalans-restriktie aan ekonomische groei bepaalt vervolgens
de groeivoet van een ekonomie. Het model, waarin lonen, technologie (in de vorm
van kumulatieve leereffekten), handel, konsumptie-patronen en inkomensgroei
endogeen bepaald zijn, kan niet analytisch opgelost worden, als gevolg van het
komplexe niet-iineaire karakter.
Om deze reden wordt het model geanalyseerd door middel van komputer-
simulaties. Deze experimenten tonen aan dat het model in het algemeen
groeipaden vertoont die een hoge mate van diversiteit tussen landen en over de
tijd laten zien. Met andere woorden, de experimenten leveren uitkomsten op die
verschillend zijn van de evenwichtige en gelijkmatige groeipaden die men aantreft
in de meer gangbare theorieen. Tegelijkertijd wordt aangetoond dat in een aantal
spetifieke gevallen, waarin de assumptie van heterogeniteit tussen landen vervalt,
wel een evenwichtig en gelijkmatig groeipad ontstaat.
De laatste twee hoofdstukken van deel 3 zijn gewijd aan een empirische toete van
de ideeen in hoofdsruk 7. Aangezien het model in dat hoofdstuk enkele gestileerde
veronderstelingen bevat (waaronder de afwezigheid van kapitaal en monetaire
stromen, en de handelsbalans-restriktie aan ekonomische groei), moet volstaan
worden met een partiele en/of indirekte test. In hoofdstuk 8 wordt getracht om
door middel van een ekonometrische toets de mathematische beschrijving van het
selektie-proces te toetsen. De kontext die hiervoor is gekozen is de wereldmarkt
voor exporten. De vergelijkingen die geschat worden verklaren het marktaandeel
op de markten voor 28 industriele sektoren. De uitkomst van de schattingen geeft
aan dat zowel loonkosten als technologie (in de vorm van arbeidsproduktiviteit)
een rol spelen in het selektie-proces. Technologie voor zover die tot uitdrukking
komtin patenten heeft een overwegend negatieve invloed op de markprestatie. Als
een tentatieve verklaring voor dit laatste resultaat is gewezen op de rol van multi-
nationale ondernemingen, die ervoor zorgen dat de lokatie van inventie en
produktie (en origine van export) verschillen,
De resultaten van de schattingen in hoofdstuk 8 zijn in hoofdstuk 9 gebruikt om
de geaggregeerde konkurrentie-kracht voor de totale industriele sektor te
berekenen. Vervolgens is deze variabele gebruikt om de groeivoet van de
produktie te verklaren. In een regressie blijkt de konkurrentie-kracht een
signifikante invloed op de groeivoet te hebben, zowel voor de industriele
produktie, als voor de totale produktie (BBP).
Het tweede gedeelte van hoofdstuk 9 probeert de groei-prestatie van een aantal
Aziatische landen te verklaren. Deze landen bleken in hoofdstuk 4 te behoren tot
het gedeelte van de wereld dat het snelste gegroeid is in de na-oorlogse periode.
Uit deze analyse, die een meer 'case-study' georienteerd karakter heeft, blijkt dat
zelfs voor deze geografisch geconcentreerde groep landen niet een enkele bundel
van verklarende faktoren aan te wijzen is. Faktoren die van belang bleken te zijn
zijn onder andere loonkosten, specialisetiepatronen, en openheid van de ekonomie.
Hieruit blijkt dus dat heterogeniteit een belangrijke faktor is bij het verklaren van
groei.
245In het laatste hoofdstuk, 10, worden de belangrijkste uitkomsten samengevat, en
worden enkele mogelijkheden voor verder onderzoek aangegeven. Deze Uggen met
name op het gebied van de theorie omtrent zgn. nationale innovatie-systemen, en
industriele ekonomie, waarin ondermeer het gedrag van multi-nationale
ondernemingen en samenwerking tussen ondernemingen op het gebied van
onderzoek geanalyseerd worden.
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